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 The twentieth century is often regarded as inaugurating a renewal of trinitarian theology.  
Although the works of theologians such as of Barth, Moltmann, Pannenberg (on the Protestant 
side), Balthasar and Rahner (on the Catholic side), and Bulgakov (on the Orthodox side) all 
embody a centrality of the Trinity, such a claim can nonetheless be questioned through an 
examination of the works of the Catholic theologian Franz Anton Staudenmaier (1800-1856) and 
the Lutheran theologian Isaak August Dorner (1809-1884). Although there are differences in the 
ways in which these two thinkers execute their theological systems, they both share a broad 
agreement on the importance – indeed, the centrality – of the doctrine of the Trinity for Christian 
theological reflection. 
 As I hope to show, for both of these theologians the Trinity gets to the heart of one of the 
most fundamental questions of theology, for it is that by which we can make sense of divine 
personal subjectivity. Staudenmaier and Dorner regard the Trinity not simply as a matter of 
soteriological significance (although, of course, it includes this), but in addition they see it as 
grounding something even much more basic. For both, the Trinity is the ground by which God 
can engage that which is other than Himself without divesting Himself of transcendence. To put 
it in somewhat stark terms, the Trinity is that by which God can be God for that which is not 
God. 
 Staudenmaier’s and Dorner’s renditions of divine subjectivity cannot be understood 




tradition that begins with Kant and grows into Romanticism and Idealism, philosophical 
understandings of personal subjectivity underwent drastic changes. I argue in this dissertation 
that these new understandings of personal subjectivity exercised an important influence on how 
Staudenmaier and Dorner conceived of the personal subjectivity of the divine, particularly on 
how they rendered the divine as a triune personal subject. Therefore, we will examine some of 
the changes in how personal subjectivity came to be understood during this period. 
 
1. Subjectivity in the German Philosophical Tradition 
 Broadly speaking, the modern German philosophical tradition moves further and further 
away from a Cartesian understanding of what constitutes subjectivity – as that which is merely 
located in the individual rational agent – and moves toward a view of subjectivity seen as 
constituted by otherness. The novel view of subjectivity inaugurated by the modern German 
philosophical tradition can be seen by first recalling the Cartesian method of skepticism 
regarding the external world. 
 Skepticism regarding the external world can be described as subjectivist in the sense that 
the subject’s belief in the reality of the external world is inferred from the subject’s inner 
representations. Insofar as those inner representations can be doubted, the reality of the external 
world can be doubted. What cannot be doubted, Descartes shows, is that the subject thinks. It is 
from this foundation of the subject as thinking that one eventually arrives at the reality of the 
external world. Thus, in such a system, one begins with a subject and from there deduces that 
which is other than the subject. 
 This picture begins to change beginning with Kant and continuing with Fichte and Hegel. 
Kant departed significantly from his predecessors through his philosophical ‘Copernican 




receiving data through her senses, but rather an application of a priori forms and concepts by the 
subject to received sensible data. 
 While Kant surely brought to the fore the active role that the subject plays in her own 
experience, and while such a construal of personal subjectivity might seem to have pushed the 
conception of the subject in a more Cartesian – and so subjectivist – direction, the exact opposite 
was the case.1 As we will see below, in his “Refutation of Idealism,” Kant offered an argument 
against Cartesian subjectivism (which he referred to as “problematic idealism”), namely, “the 
theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be…merely doubtful and 
indemonstrable…”2 Although Kant highlighted the active role which the subject takes in the 
constitution of her experience, he nevertheless also argued that there must be a reality beyond 
mere representations for the possibility of experience at all.3 Kant’s argument, in short, is that 
while the Cartesian skeptic infers the reality of the external world from her inner representations 
(which are subject to doubt), the very sequence of such representations for a numerically-
singular subject is possible only if the subject indexes those representations to a persistent reality 
that is linked via laws of causality and interaction. Such a reality is possible only amongst 
 
1 Indeed, Frederick Beiser narrates the early history of German Idealism (in which he includes Kant) as precisely 
anti-subjectivist. As he puts it, the development of German Idealism “is not the culmination but the nemesis of the 
Cartesian tradition.” See Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781–1801 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 2. 
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), B 274 (p. 326) (hereafter abbreviated as CPR). The lines of the first edition are indicated by an “A” 
and the second edition by a “B,” followed by the page number of the Guyer and Wood translation in parenthesis. 
The Refutation of Idealism appears only in the second edition of the CPR. 
3 Whether or not Kant’s Refutation of Idealism is actually a successful argument is much debated among Kantian 
scholars. For helpful assessments of the argument, see the following: Dina Emundts, “The Refutation of Idealism 
and the Distinction between Phenomena and Noumena,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 168–89; Paul Guyer, Kant, 2nd edition 
(London New York: Routledge, 2014); Paul Guyer, “Kant’s Intentions in the Refutation of Idealism,” The 




substances which are external to one another (i.e. in space), and thus possible only as external to 
the subject herself. 
 
1.1 Kant’s Analogies of Experience and Refutation of Idealism 
 Kant’s argument against Descartes’ “problematic idealism” is located in the second 
edition of The Critique of Pure Reason. Many background assumptions for the Refutation of 
Idealism are established in the “Analogies of Experience,” where Kant establishes what relations 
are necessary of things given in space and time, so we will begin our examination there.  
 In the First Analogy, Kant considers what is necessary in order to perceive change. 
Empirical experience, of course, is constituted by representations. Yet, as we experience different 
representations, our experience can be said to form a sequence of representations. If the 
experience of representations as a sequence is due to a difference between representations, then 
the experience of representations as a sequence is precisely an experience of change. However, 
Kant argues, the very notion of change requires a notion of persistence: “Our apprehension of the 
manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing. We can therefore 
never determine from this alone whether this manifold, as object of experience, is simultaneous 
or successive, if something does not ground it which always exists, i.e., something lasting and 
persisting…”4 Put differently, if it is not the same object across change, there are just different 
objects (and so there actually is no change at all). The explanation for the experience of change, 
and thus the experience of representations as a sequence, is that there is some sort of persistence 
across change (which Kant refers to as ‘substance’). As Kant puts it, “Persistence is accordingly 
 




a necessary condition under which alone appearances, as things or objects, are determinable in a 
possible experience.”5 
 The Second Analogy considers the order of representations. As occurring in sequences, 
our representations occur in a particular order. In perceiving the various parts of a house, for 
example, I might first have a representation of the basement followed by a representation of the 
roof. Why does my representation of the basement precede my representation of the roof? In this 
case, there is no rule explaining why this representation preceded that representation (other than 
my directing my attention here and then there). Thus, logically speaking, in such a case the 
succession of my representations could have occurred in any order (first the basement then the 
roof, or first the roof then the basement). There is nothing about my representation of the one 
part of the house which necessitates that I have a representation of another part, and so there is 
nothing which necessitates that the sequence of my representations occurs in a certain order. 
That there is no necessitated order of my representations is due to there being no objective 
change in the house, but only a change in where I direct my attention. 
 But consider a case in which there is a change in the empirical object. In perceiving 
someone kicking a ball, for example, I first have a representation of a ball sitting motionless on 
the ground, followed by a person’s foot making physical contact with the ball, followed by a 
representation of the ball in the air.6 If a representation in and of itself contains only the content 
of that particular moment and so, in and of itself, is independent of any successive 
representations, what makes for the ordering of this series of representations? In other words, 
why does this representation (that of the foot touching the ball) precede that representation (that 
 
5 CPR A 189 / B 232 (pp. 303-04) 




of the ball in the air)? Why does the representation of the ball in the air not precede the 
representation of the foot touching the ball?  
 In the case of the ball, we are perceiving something which was not previously the case 
but subsequently came to be the case: the ball was not previously in the air but subsequently 
came to be in the air. Unlike in the case of the house, here we are perceiving an occurrence. And 
in an occurrence, Kant says, the order of representations is determined. This is because, in order 
to even perceive the occurrence, we must have a representation which is preceded by its lack: 
“That something happens, i.e., that something or a state comes to be that previously was not, 
cannot be empirically perceived except where an appearance precedes that does not contain this 
state in itself; for a reality that would follow on an empty time, thus an arising not preceded by 
any state of things, can be apprehended just as little as empty time itself.”7 
 That the order of my representations was first that of the motionless ball on the ground, 
then of a foot touching the ball, and then that of the ball in the air is explained by a causal 
relation. “Thus, the relation of appearances (as possible perceptions) in accordance with which 
the existence of that which succeeds (what happens) is determined in time necessarily and in 
accordance with a rule by something that precedes it, consequently the relation of cause to effect, 
is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments with regard to the series of 
perceptions, thus of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience.”8 Thus, the possibility of 
our perception of objective change is expressed in the principle of causality. The principle of 
causality explains not only why the representations occurred in a sequence, but why they 
occurred in the sequence that they did. 
 
7 CPR A 191-92 / B 236-37 (p. 306). 




 Finally, the Third Analogy treats simultaneous causal relations. Some substances appear 
to be causally affected by other substances and yet we are unable to have representations of the 
two substances simultaneously (e.g., substances which are separated in space to a degree such 
that one would not be able to simply observe them simultaneously – Kant uses the example of 
directing one’s attention first to the moon then to the earth, and vice versa). We assume that the 
states of such substances occur simultaneously (e.g., that the earth and the moon exist 
simultaneously), but since our representations afford us access to content only in a particular 
temporal and spatial location, we cannot observe simultaneous states of substances as 
simultaneous: “The synthesis of the imagination in apprehension [can] only present each of these 
perceptions as one that it present in the subject when the other is not, and conversely, but not that 
the objects are simultaneous, i.e., that if the one is then the other also is in the same time…”9  
 For example, say I know based on scientific experiments that the gravitational pull of the 
moon affects the ocean tide. However, the moon and the tide are sufficiently separated in space 
such that I cannot perceive both simultaneously. Although I know that the moon’s gravitational 
force affects the tide, when I focus my perception on the tide (rather than on the moon), and 
perceive the tide of the ocean as causally affected, the causal relation between the moon and the 
tide is not something which I am able to have representations of. However, I know that the moon 
is causally affecting the tide. The only way to account for such simultaneous causal relations is 
to infer a law of interaction or community between them, such that although I cannot perceive 
them as located within a singular spatial plane (and thus as able to interact), they nonetheless are: 
 




“Thus it is necessary for all substances in appearance, insofar as they are simultaneous, to stand 
in thoroughgoing community of interaction with each other.”10 
 As a whole, therefore, our experience, which is constituted by a series of representations 
(by which we perceive change), presupposes a persistent reality which is linked via laws of 
causality and interaction. That is, our experience is such that it can only be made coherent by 
assuming a persistent reality of substance which is governed by relations of causality and 
interaction in a lawlike regularity.  
 With this background in place, we can now look at Kant’s Refutation of Idealism proper. 
The first step in the argument is: “I am conscious of my existence as determined in time.”11 More 
precisely, I am conscious of my representations as forming a temporal order. This is a premise 
even the Cartesian skeptic would accept. 
 The second step of the argument is “All time-determination presupposes something 
persistent in perception.”12 In other words, my awareness of my representations as forming a 
temporal order is possible only if I have something permanent against which their temporality is 
measured. This brings us to the third step: “This persisting thing, however, cannot be something 
in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persisting 
thing.”13 Thus, this permanent framework against which the change of representations is 
measured obviously cannot itself be a representation. Or better put, since my representations are 
in me, and since this permanent framework cannot itself be a representation, it cannot be in me. 
 
10 CPR A 213 / B 260 (p. 318).  






 Therefore, the fourth step runs: “Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible 
only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside 
me.”14 Here, the claim is not that this persistent thing is something outside the empirical I (e.g., 
in some object I perceive as other than myself), for in this case it would still be part of a 
representation. This would not defeat skepticism because, as the skeptics insist, representations 
are subject to doubt. (This was the burden of the third step.) Doubt regarding the truth of my 
representations can be overcome only through something which is determined by laws, since 
laws are relations of necessity. 
 Something which is persistent and is determined through laws, which is not itself a 
representation, is possible only amongst substances which are external to one another (i.e. in 
space), and thus possible only as external to the subject herself (the first Analogy). Such laws are 
precisely those established in the second and third Analogies (the laws of causality and 
interaction). If there must be a non-representational reality constituted by space and subject to 
laws for there to be a succession of representations, then skeptical doubt – to even get off the 
ground – must presuppose a non-representational reality constituted by space and subject to laws, 
for skeptical doubt itself presupposes a succession of representations. Thus, the conclusion of the 
argument: “Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means 
of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself.”15 
 
 





1.2 Fichte’s Argument for the External World and Other Rational Agents 
 If Kant sought to establish the subject’s capacity for orderly representations upon that 
which is other than the subject herself, Fichte dug even deeper by seeking to ground the subject’s 
very consciousness in her activity upon that which is other than herself (the ‘non-I’). Take, for 
example, the basic activity of reading a book. As one reads a book, she does not think to herself, 
“I am reading a book.” When she reads a book, her conscious activity is focused on the content 
of the book itself and not on the activity itself which she is performing.16 “In acting,” Fichte says, 
“the rational being does not become conscious of its acting; for it itself is its acting and nothing 
else…”17 
 However, if someone interrupts this activity and asks her what she is doing, she replies, 
“I am reading a book.” Her reply to another is an explicit declaration regarding that activity. But 
if, when engaging in this activity, she was not explicitly conscious that “I am reading a book,” 
how is it that she was able to have an explicit awareness that she was reading a book when asked 
what she was doing? Although while reading, her explicit awareness was an awareness of the 
content of the book (rather than of herself reading the book), when she moved to an explicit 
awareness of something different than the content of the book (viz., the explicit awareness that I 
was reading a book, prompted by the question posed to her), she knows that it was she who was 
reading the book. 
 
16 I owe this example to Allen Wood. See Allen W. Wood, “The ‘I’ as Principle of Practical Philosophy,” in The 
Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, ed. Sally Sedgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 96. 
17 J.G. Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, ed. Frederick Neuhouser, trans. Michael Baur, 1st Edition (Cambridge, 





 To know that it was she who was reading the book means that during her act of reading, 
although she was not the object of her own explicit awareness, nonetheless there was some less 
explicit awareness of herself as reading.  If there could not be such a dual awareness, she could 
never respond to a question of what activity she was doing, for she would never be able to know 
that it was she doing it. Thus, no matter what sort of activity she is engaged in (which occupies 
her explicit awareness), there is always an implicit awareness that it is she who is engaging in 
this activity. 
 Self-awareness, then, requires that the agent engage in practical activity, for it is only 
posterior to activity that the subject has something to be conscious of herself as doing: “The I 
becomes conscious only of what emerges for it in this acting and through this acting…”18 
Practical activity consists in setting an end and acting to conform the world (the ‘not-I’) to that 
end. Because the performance of actions is what makes possible the subject’s self-consciousness, 
and because the performance of actions involves setting an end to which the subject seeks to 
conform the world, the subject’s self-consciousness is possible insofar as she conforms the 
external world/the not-I to her ends. Self-consciousness, therefore, is possible for a subject only 
if she posits a world, or a ‘not-I’, which exists outside of herself upon which she can exercise 
practical activity: “Since the I can posit itself in self-consciousness only practically, but in 
general can posit only what is finite, and hence must also posit a limit to its practical activity, it 
follows that the I must posit a world outside itself.”19 The not-I is thereby the vehicle by which 
self-consciousness is actualized. 
 
18 FNR, Introduction, I.4 (p. 5).  




 Thus far, Fichte has not gone much beyond Kant in positing what is other than the subject 
as constitutive for the subject as such. Fichte made a radical move beyond Kant, however, by 
making a transcendental argument not simply for an external world, but also for the existence of 
other rational beings.20 We have seen that it is in virtue of a not-I that the agent can exercise her 
subjectivity, that she can be an I. Acting involves acting for ends, and such acting is based on 
reasons. But how does a being encounter reasons in the first place? Or better, how are reasons 
for any particular act present to the subject precisely as reasons (as opposed to natural desires 
which are the basis for actions of non-rational animals)? 
 Imagine, for example, a person whose every action had no reasons behind its 
performance. Each act would appear arbitrary. To observe a series of actions performed by this 
sort of person would make no sense in the eyes of others. In short, this person would appear to be 
irrational or non-rational. It is in acting based upon reasons, then, that our acts have rationality. 
Reasons, however, do not necessitate. If another offers me a reason for, say, reading this book 
rather than that book, I am free to refuse. Reasons, therefore, have the unique quality, on one 
hand, of providing rationality for a subject’s acts, while on the other hand not necessitating that 
the subject perform the act.21 As Fichte puts it, “The rational being’s activity is by no means to 
be determined and necessitated by the summons in the way that – under the concept of causality 
– an effect is determined and necessitated by its cause; rather, the rational being is to determine 
itself in consequence of the summons.”22 
 
20 For a helpful treatment of Fichte’s argument, see Allen W. Wood, “Deduction of the Summons and the Existence 
of Other Rational Beings,” in Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right: A Critical Guide, ed. Gabriel Gottlieb 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 72–91. 
21 See Wood, “Deduction…,” 82-4. 




 Insofar as they are rational grounds for acts, reasons presuppose the capacity for 
understanding them as reasons. That is, the subject is rational only insofar as she acts upon 
reasons as reasons. But reasons – because they do not compel but only invite action – appear 
outside the subject, in the sense that they summon the subject to perform acts. Therefore, Fichte 
concludes that if reasons presuppose the capacity of understanding them as reasons (if reasons 
presuppose the subject’s potential for acting rationally), and if reasons address the subject from 
outside, then reasons can come to a subject only from a source [1] that exists outside the subject 
herself and [2] is itself rational: 
The external being that is posited as the cause of the summons must at the very least 
presuppose the possibility that the subject is capable of understanding and 
comprehending; otherwise its summons to the subject would have no purpose at all. The 
purposiveness of the summons is conditional on the understanding and freedom of the 
being to whom it is addressed. Therefore, the cause of the summons must itself 
necessarily possess the concept of reason and freedom; thus it must itself be a being 
capable of having concepts; it must be an intelligence, and – since this is not possible 
without freedom, as has just been shown – it must also be a free, and thus a rational, 
being, and must be posited as such.23 
 
 We have seen that, for Fichte, self-consciousness is possible only through practical 
action. Further, we have seen that practical action is rational only insofar as it is based upon 
reasons. Finally, we have seen that reasons, because they summon a subject rather than compel 
her, exist externally to the subject. Thus, Fichte’s argument is that an agent can be a self-
conscious rational subject only if there are external sources of rationality present to her by which 
she can receive reasons for her acts. Thus, an agent can be a self-conscious rational subject only 
in the presence of other rational subjects, i.e. only in a community. As Fichte therefore puts it, 
“The human being (like all finite beings in general) becomes a human being only among human 
beings; and since the human being can be nothing other than a human being and would not exist 
 




at all if it were not this – it follows that, if there are to be human beings at all, there must be more 
than one.”24 
 While Kant argued that what lies beyond the individual subject is constitutive of her 
unified experience, in Fichte we see that what lies beyond the individual subject has a much 
more robust role in the constitution of the subject as such. Hegel appropriates much from Fichte 
regarding the role of others in the constitution of subjectivity.25 However, Hegel departs from 
Fichte in one significant way, the presence of which we will see in Staudenmaier and Dorner. 
 
1.3 Hegel and Mutual Recognition 
 Hegel approaches subjectivity not transcendentally but phenomenologically.26 In 
everyday self-consciousness, one has a consciousness of oneself, but also a consciousness of 
what is not oneself: “For the in-itself is consciousness; but equally it is that for which an other 
(the in-itself) is; and it is for consciousness that the in-itself of the object, and the being of the 
object for an other, are one and the same; the ‘I’ is the content of the connection and the 
connecting itself. Opposed to an other, the ‘I’ is its own self, and at the same time it overarches 
this other which, for the ‘I’, is equally only the ‘I’ itself.”27 
 
24 FNR §3, First Corollary (p. 37). 
25 See Allen W. Wood, “Fichtean Themes in Hegel’s Dialectic of Recognition,” in The Free Development of Each: 
Studies on Freedom, Right, and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
214–28. 
26 See Stephen Houlgate, “Is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit an Essay in Transcendental Argument?,” in The 
Transcendental Turn, ed. Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 173–94. 
Much of my understanding of Hegel as presented in these paragraphs is based on Houlgate’s work. See Stephen 
Houlgate, Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit”: A Reader’s Guide, 1st edition (London; New York, NY: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013). 
27 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, Revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 




 This introduces a paradox for self-consciousness. Self-consciousness can be what it is 
only in relation to what is other than itself. Self-consciousness sees this as a contradiction and 
tries to resolve this contradiction by turning away from otherness back onto itself. It can do this 
because, although it certainly views its object as real, it nevertheless views it as subordinate to 
itself, as existing for self-consciousness. Thus, self-consciousness affirms itself by turning away 
from its object. Self-consciousness, in order to affirm itself, must continually negate other 
objects. 
 Since self-consciousness can satisfy itself only through this continual negation of 
otherness, it comes to realize that otherness has a degree of independence. Self-consciousness 
must therefore relate to otherness in a new way: otherness can still be negated, but it is 
something independent that can be negated: “Self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by 
superseding this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life…”28 
 Another contradiction then arises. Self-consciousness is satisfied by being what it is, by 
being conscious of itself alone. Yet such awareness must occur through something which is other 
and independent. This contradiction can be resolved if the independent other is capable of self-
negation: this allows for the negation of otherness (leaving self-consciousness aware of itself 
alone), yet without self-consciousness having to engage with otherness (which is what 
precipitates the contradiction). 
 However, the only thing that is capable of self-negation is another self-consciousness. In 
negating itself for the sake of the other, the second self-consciousness thereby enables the first 
self-consciousness to have awareness of itself with minimal engagement with the second. The 
second self-consciousness is merely a mirror for the first, for the first sees only itself in the 
 




second. The second self-consciousness recognizes the first, but the first does not recognize the 
second. Recognition is only one-sided. 
 In seeing itself in the other, however, the first self-consciousness feels alienated from 
itself because its identity is located outside of itself. To remedy this, the first self-consciousness 
recognizes the full independence of the second. By recognizing the full independence and 
equality of the second, the first self-consciousness receives back its identity within itself. 
However, in recognizing the full independence and equality of the second, the identity of the first 
is not located solely within itself. Recognition of another as independent and equal is a 
recognition that both possess a commonality: “A self-consciousness exists for a self-
consciousness. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of 
itself in its otherness become explicit for it.”29 Possession of a commonality in turn entails that 
the rights of one are shared by the other, and thus that the preservation of one’s own rights is 
dependent upon that one’s upholding the rights of the other. 
 The upshot of Hegel’s dialectic of recognition is that persons can achieve freedom in its 
fullest extent only in relations of mutual recognition, i.e. in a community. This much we saw 
with Fichte. Hegel departs from Fichte, however, in that the other does not resist the subject’s I-
hood (as is the case for Fichte), but rather the other expresses the subject’s I-hood.30 For Hegel, 
therefore, the subject’s freedom consists in an alignment between herself and what is other than 
herself. She can recognize herself in what is other than herself because it is not alien to her. For 
Hegel, therefore, the subject’s freedom consists in the willful alignment of herself with what is 
other than herself. 
 
29 PS §177 (p. 110). 




2. Staudenmaier and Dorner: Embracing Novelty and Tradition 
 The understanding of subjectivity outlined above, I argue, had an important influence on 
the construction of the Trinity in the theologies of Staudenmaier and Dorner. Broadly speaking, 
both present the divine persons of the Trinity in terms of a willful alignment of oneself with one 
another. (Although we will see that Staudenmaier and Dorner render this willful alignment in 
different ways.) 
 The idealist heritage of Staudenmaier and Dorner, however, is complicated. Neither 
appropriated such idealist frameworks for subjectivity uncritically and unmodified, for such 
frameworks for subjectivity – when applied to the divine unmodified – would have involved 
costs which neither Staudenmaier nor Dorner were willing to pay. 
 For Fichte, as we have seen, subjectivity requires resistance or opposition to the I by the 
not-I. Thus, in order to be an I, the I must be limited by a not-I. Personal subjectivity, in other 
words, requires constraint by otherness as its condition of possibility. Thus, for Fichte, the only 
possible personal subjects are those that are finite. Fichte, therefore, saves divine infinitude by 
denying personhood to God. For Staudenmaier and Dorner, however, divine personhood is a 
fundamental and so irrevocable feature of Christian religion. 
 For Hegel, the full subjectivity of the Absolute requires both the infinite milieu and the 
finite milieu. To put the matter in representational terms (the register of discourse in which 
Staudenmaier and Dorner operate but which Hegel seeks to transcend), complete divine 
subjectivity, for Hegel, requires that God create and dwell within the finite.31 Staudenmaier and 
 
31 As Cyril O’Regan puts the matter, “To be sufficient divine subjectivity, what is required, besides ahistorical or 
metahistorical divine becoming, is becoming within the milieu of finitude, the divine history of creation, fall, 
incarnation, redemption, and salvation. . . . The role of finitude in the self-development of the divine is impossible to 
overestimate. Crucially, the milieu of finitude makes possible the genuine contrariety that cannot be established on 
the level of the immanent divine.” Cyril O’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel (Albany: State University of New York 




Dorner, by contrast, want to see subjectivity as an immanent characteristic of the divine. Thus, 
for Staudenmaier and Dorner, the created order cannot contribute to God’s subjectivity in any 
way. As they see it, it is only because God is immanently a personal subject that He can freely 
create and encounter the finite as its ultimate end. 
 My claim in this dissertation is therefore that Staudenmaier and Dorner both appropriated 
this novel notion of subjectivity inaugurated by the German Idealist tradition, but critically 
appropriated it. Specifically, both theologians took to heart that otherness is constitutive of 
personal subjectivity, and yet, in the case of the divine, were unwilling to locate this otherness in 
creation. Although taking seriously the notion that otherness is constitutive of personal 
subjectivity, in their construal of God Staudenmaier and Dorner depart from Hegel in making the 
locus of such otherness the immanent divine life itself. 
 The resource that Staudenmaier and Dorner draw upon in order to render otherness as an 
immanent feature of the divine does not have its roots in Hegelianism but in Christianity: it is the 
Trinity. (Hegel, of course, had his own construal of the Trinity but, as we will see, Staudenmaier 
and Dorner depart from him in holding that the Trinity can account for immanent divine 
subjectivity.) Throughout the mainstream Christian theological tradition, doctrinally established 
at the councils of Nicaea and Constantinople in the fourth century, God is identified as ‘one’ 
with respect to the divine essence, and as ‘three’ with respect to the divine persons (who are 
traditionally referred to as ‘the Father,’ ‘the Son,’ and ‘the Holy Spirit’). Or conversely, each of 
the divine persons is identified as ‘God’ in virtue of their sharing one and the same essence, and 
individually identified as either ‘the Father,’ or as ‘the Son,’ or as the ‘Holy Spirit’ (and so 




 Finally, the mainstream Christian theological tradition has asserted that the distinction of 
the divine persons – and so divine otherness – is not a distinction merely in virtue of divine 
revelation. Rather, the distinction of the divine persons is characteristic of the divine even apart 
from divine revelation. Contra Sabellianism, the mainstream Christian tradition has insisted that 
the distinction of persons within the Trinity is an eternal – and therefore immanent – feature of 
the divine. 
 Mainstream Christian theological reflection, therefore, has held that there is indeed an 
‘otherness’ present within the divine insofar as God is viewed with respect to the category of 
persons, even though such otherness is not viewed as present within the divine insofar as God is 
viewed with respect to the category of essence. It is this sense of otherness that Staudenmaier 
and Dorner utilize in order to apply the insights regarding subjectivity made by their German 
idealist predecessors . 
 My interpretation of Staudenmaier and Dorner, therefore, is that they have utilized the 
resources of the Christian tradition while applying the insights of (what was then) modern 
philosophical reflection. On one hand, the notion of ontological otherness immanent to the divine 
(the category of persons), provides the means by which Staudenmaier and Dorner can affirm 
otherness as constitutive for personal subjectivity, and thereby construe God as a personal 
subject; on the other hand, because this otherness is nonetheless an eternal feature of the divine, 





3. Research on Staudenmaier and Dorner 
 In this dissertation, I have focused on the dogmatic works of Staudenmaier and Dorner.32 
My reasoning for this is that these works were written later in their life and so offer their most 
mature thinking on the subject. 
 English-language research on Staudenmaier and Dorner is quite limited, particularly that 
on the former. Further, while previous research has highlighted Staudenmaier’s and Dorner’s 
debts to the German idealist tradition, none has given a comprehensive treatment of the issue in 
terms of divine subjectivity. This dissertation, therefore, offers a treatment of nineteenth-century 
trinitarian theology from a new angle. 
 For a brief treatment in English of Staudenmaier on the Trinity, particularly some ways in 
which he related the Trinity to other theological loci, see Bradford E. Hinze, “Tracing Trinity in 
Tradition: The Achievement of Franz Anton Staudenmaier,” Journal for the History of Modern 
Theology / Zeitschrift für neuere Theologiegeschichte 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 34–57. See also 
Aidan Nichols, “Catholic Theology of the Trinity in the Nineteenth Century,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Trinity, ed. Matthew Levering and Gilles Emery (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 281–93. For a comprehensive treatment of Staudenmaier’s doctrine of God 
(including the Trinity), see Karl Friedrich Reith, Die Gotteslehre bei Franz Anton Staudenmaier 
(Bern: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 1974). 
 For a general overview of Staudenmaier’s theology and background, see the following: 
Peter Hünermann, “Franz Anton Staudenmaier,” in Katholische Theologen im 19 Jahrhundert, 
 
32 Franz Anton Staudenmaier, Die christliche Dogmatik, 4 vols. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1844-52). All 
translations of Staudenmaier are my own. For Dorner, all quotations come from the English translation: Isaak 
August Dorner, A System of Christian Doctrine, trans. Alfred Cave and J.S. Banks, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1880), although I have altered the translation in some places. This translation is based on: Isaak August Dorner, 




ed. Henrich Fries and Georg Schwaiger, vol. 2 (Munich: Kösel Verlag, 1975), 99–128; Peter 
Hünermann, “Franz Anton Staudenmaier,” Theologische Quartalschrift 150 (1970): 52–54. For 
the Hegelian background, see Peter Hünermann, “Die Hegel-Rezeption Franz Anton 
Staudenmaiers,” in Kirche und Theologie im 19 Jahrhundert, ed. Georg Schwaiger (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Rupprecht, 1975).  
 There are some works on specific theological topics in Staudenmaier other than his 
doctrine of God. See the following: Peter Hünermann, Trinitarische Anthropologie Bei Franz 
Anton Staudenmaier (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1962); William E. McConville, Theology and 
Encyclopedia: A Study in the Thought of Franz Anton Staudenmaier (Vanderbilt University, 
1983); Philipp Weindel, Das Verhältnis von Glauben und Wissen in der Theologie Franz Anton 
Staudenmaiers: eine Auseinandersetzung katholischer Theologie mit Hegelschem Idealismus 
(Mosella-Verlag, 1940). 
 On the Catholic Tübingen School to which Staudenmaier belonged, see the following: 
Bernhard Casper, “Der Systemgedanke in der späten Tübinger Schule und in der deutschen 
Neuscholastik,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 72 (1964-1965): 161–79; Bradford E. Hinze, “Roman 
Catholic Theology: Tübingen,” in The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Theology, 
ed. David A. Fergusson (Chichester, U.K.; Malden, Mass: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 187–213; 
Peter Hünermann, “Der Reflex des deutschen Idealismus in der katholischen Tübinger Schule,” 
Philosophisches Jahrbuch 73 (1965-1966): 48–74; Grant Kaplan, Answering the Enlightenment: 
The Catholic Recovery of Historical Revelation (New York: Herder & Herder, 2006); Grant 
Kaplan, “Did Schelling Live on in Catholic Theology? An Examination of His Influence on 
Catholic Tübingen,” International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 80, no. 1–2 (2019): 57–




Theologians, 1st edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982); Philipp Weindel, 
“Fr. H. Jacobis Einwirkung auf die Glaubenwissenschaft der katholischen Tübinger Schule,” in 
Aus Theologie und Philosophie: Festschrift für Fritz Tillmann zu seinem 75. Geburtstag, ed. 
Theodor Steinbüchel and Theodor Müncker (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1950), 573–96; 
Bernhard Welte, “Beobachtungen zum Systemgedanken in der Tübinger Katholischen Schule,” 
Theologische Quartalschrift147 (1967): 40–59. 
 The most comprehensive work in English on Dorner’s theology (including the Trinity) is 
Jonathan Norgate, Isaak A. Dorner: The Triune God and the Gospel of Salvation (London; New 
York: T&T Clark, 2011). See also Christine Axt-Piscalar, Der Grund des Glaubens: Eine 
theologiegeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Glaube und Trinität in der Theologie 
Isaak August Dorners (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990). Dorner’s trinitarian theology is briefly 
touched upon in Samuel M. Powell, “Nineteenth-Century Protestant Doctrines of the Trinity,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity, ed. Matthew Levering and Gilles Emery (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 267–80. There is a chapter on Dorner’s doctrine of God in Dale M. 
Schlitt, German Idealism’s Trinitarian Legacy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2016).  
 On Dorner’s doctrine of divine immutability, see Robert F. Brown, “Schelling and 
Dorner on Divine Immutability,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 53, no. 2 (June 
1985): 237–49; Robert R. Williams, “I. A. Dorner: The Ethical Immutability of God,” Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion 54, no. 4 (1986): 721–38. For a general treatment of Dorner, 
see Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (Grand Rapids, Mich: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002), 563-573. 
 Dorner is not identified as belonging to a particular ‘school’ in the way Staudenmaier is. 




theology’ (Vermittlungstheologie). The most comprehensive treatment of mediating theology is 
Knut Ragnar Holte, Die Vermittlungstheologie. Ihre theologischen Grundbegriffe kritisch 





































FRANZ ANTON STAUDENMAIER AND THE CHRISTIAN GOD AS PERSONAL 
Introduction 
 In the wake of idealistic philosophical systems wherein a relation to the finite is a 
requirement of divine subjectivity (e.g., Hegelianism, as we saw in the introduction), Franz 
Anton Staudenmaier claims to the contrary that the divine forms a complete world unto itself. 
According to Staudenmaier, God does not need the finite in order to realize subjectivity, and this 
is the case precisely in virtue of God being the Trinity: “Because only thereby, that God as triune 
forms for Himself a complete world can He, without Himself becoming the world, posit a 
creation outside of Himself, and stand lofty and elevated over this creation as its Lord, leader, 
ruler, and sanctifier.”33 “For by being not one, but by being three divine persons,” Staudenmaier 
insists, “is the divine life a world for itself, a whole and complete world, which stands by itself 
over the finite world, as it does not require the latter for itself.”34 
 As a world for itself, the divine need not seek out something other than itself, i.e., some 
other world (such as the finite order). Indeed, the divine can be described as a world precisely 
because it is wholly sufficient to sustain its life without any mediation of the nondivine. 
(Although of course, Staudenmaier insists, the Christian faith proclaims that God has in fact 
 
33 Franz Anton Staudenmaier, Die christliche Dogmatik, III (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1844), §5.2 (p. 8). 
Hereafter all citations to this work will be abbreviated as CD followed by volume, section, and page number. 




graciously shared His life – indeed His very person – with the nondivine. But it is precisely 
because God is wholly sufficient to sustain His own life without the nondivine that His act of 
interpersonal interaction with the nondivine can be described as gracious.) 
 What is responsible for the triune life of God being a complete world unto itself is that 
the divine persons of the Trinity, although distinct from one another, nonetheless form a unity. 
As Staudenmaier puts it, “The complete world which God is in Himself is just the divine unity as 
a concrete [unity], i.e. the tripersonality of the one God.”35 It is in virtue of God being Trinity, 
therefore, that God is a ‘living unity,’ and it is in virtue of being a living unity that God does not 
need the created order in order to realize His subjectivity. Staudenmaier puts it this way: 
Now also, when the unity of the divine essence is seen as a living [unity], according to 
which the concept of the Godhead moves itself within itself as the divine love, and God is 
a world within Himself, the Godhead does not need to mix itself with the world out of 
hunger for life and concreteness, so to speak, to posit and to love itself as a world, 
thereby at the same time to make itself dependent on the finite, and to grasp this 
dependence as an essential and necessary element of the divine nature itself, like Hegel 
who, without embarrassment, can grasp no God who can be known without the world.36 
 
 Over the next three chapters, we will explore how Staudenmaier understands God to be 
able to freely relate to the nondivine only if God is Trinity. We will see that, for Staudenmaier, 
an agent’s act of freely relating to what is other than itself is an act that can be performed only by 
a personal subject, and a personal subject requires other personal subjects in order for each to be 
free. In other words, agents achieve personal subjectivity, and thus their freedom, only within a 
matrix of personal intersubjectivity (that is, within a relation to at least one other personal agent). 
And for Staudenmaier, because the Trinity is just such a matrix of personal intersubjectivity, God 
can freely relate to what is other than Himself. 
 
35 CD II §79.2 (p. 472). 




 The next three chapters are arranged as follows. Here, in chapter one, we will examine 
the notion that, for Staudenmaier, freely relating to what is other than itself is an act that can be 
performed only by a personal subject, and we will observe how the aspects of divine personality 
are treated by Staudenmaier. In chapter two, we will explore how the aspects of God’s personal 
subjectivity are manifest in His relating to the nondivine. Finally, in chapter three, we will 
examine how a personal subject requires other personal subjects in order for each to be free, and 
demonstrate that such personal intersubjectivity characterizes Staudenmaier’s understanding of 
the triune life of God. 
 The structure of the current chapter is as follows. First, we will examine how 
Staudenmaier understands personal subjectivity, or ‘personality’ (section 1). Having examined 
the notion of personality, we then examine how Staudenmaier understands the characteristics of 
a personal subject – particularly those of intelligence and will – to be present in the divine. 
Section 2, therefore, examines Staudenmaier’s treatment of the divine intelligence. Here we will 
investigate God’s theoretical (as opposed to practical) knowledge (2.1), specifically God’s self-
knowledge (2.1.1) and God’s knowledge of the nondivine (2.1.2). We will see that, for 
Staudenmaier, it is crucial that God be able to distinguish between knowledge regarding Himself 
and knowledge of the nondivine in order to preserve the free subjectivity of the divine vis-à-vis 
the created order (2.1.3-5). Section 2.2 then treats God’s practical knowledge. Here, we will 
explore how the divine wisdom orders creatures to God as their end. 
 Having covered the divine intellect, section 3 examines how Staudenmaier understands 
the divine will. One of the important topics covered in the treatment of the divine intellect is that 
God apprehends His proper relation to the nondivine. Our task in section 3, then, is to understand 




will see that the divine will can operate only in accordance with the divine essence, which 
demands that God manifest Himself truthfully to the created order (3.2). This entails that God 
always acts as God toward the created order, i.e., that God embody His proper relation to the 
nondivine (the topic of 3.3). 
 In examining how Staudenmaier understands the divine intellect and the divine will, we 
will have come to see how he understands God to be absolute personality. Thus, we will have 
come to see how Staudenmaier understands the conditions that enable free personal interaction 
of the divine with the nondivine. This, then, will set us up for chapter two where we examine 
how Staudenmaier understands the elements of personality to manifest themselves in 
interpersonal encounter with the created order. 
 
1. Personal Subjectivity 
 The ability for an agent to freely relate to what is other than itself requires the possession 
of a will that can determine itself freely. For Staudenmaier, the sort of agent that possesses this 
capacity is a ‘person,’ that is, an individual who possesses the attributes of ‘personality.’ 
Staudenmaier describes the characteristics of a personal subject as following: “The elements of 
personality are (a) organic being-for-self (Fürsichsein), (b) intelligence, and (c) free will.”37 
 Staudenmaier speaks of ‘being-for-self’ as indicating a thing’s irreducible individuality, 
or its irreducibility to another. Thus, being-for-self indicates a thing’s difference from all that is 
other than it, for only if a thing possesses some level of difference from all else can it never be 
reduced to that which is other than itself. ‘Intelligence’ indicates the capacity for knowing. The 
act of knowing, Staudenmaier says, is the process of agreement between mind and being. He 
 




says, “If…all intellectual striving goes toward truth and, as we have seen, the truth consists in the 
accordance of thinking with that which is to be thought, or what is to be known by thinking, then 
it does not hinder us to denote the process of knowing as that process through which the 
accordance is worked…”38 Intelligence, then, is the capacity for intellectual agreement between 
mind and being. In other words, intelligence is the capacity for the mind to accurately render 
reality. Finally, ‘will’ is “the ability…to determine oneself and others…”39 One can think of will 
as a capacity for causing agreement between mind and reality, but in the opposite sense of 
intelligence: it is the capacity to determine reality in accordance with the content of the subject’s 
intelligence. 
 Note that these three components are required for the performance of actions. Take, for 
example, the act of drinking out of a cup. There must be an irreducible agent who performs the 
act of drinking from the cup (being-for-self). There must be a capacity for the agent to accurately 
render reality – e.g., to cognize that there are objects before it, to recognize the object before it as 
a cup (intelligence). There must be a capacity to determine reality in accordance with the content 
of the subject’s intelligence and intentions – e.g., to physically manipulate the cup by picking it 
up so as to drink from it (will). 
 For our purposes, we can describe a subject’s free ‘acts’ or ‘actions’ as (1) its ability to 
achieve accordance between its intellect and being and – based on such intellectual accordance – 
(2) its ability to determine being in accordance with its intellect. A personal subject, then, 
denotes an individual who has the capacity for achieving agreement between its intellect and 
being and then determining being based on this agreement. 
 
38 CD III §100.7 (p. 563). 




 Of course, in the performance of a free act, it is not only what is other than the subject 
that is known and determined by the subject. The subject also must be able to accurately render 
reality about itself (exercise of intellect upon itself): to cognize itself as a subject, as that which is 
capable of acting. The subject must be able to determine itself in accordance with the content of 
the subject’s intelligence and intentions (exercise of will upon itself): to manipulate itself in order 
to pick up the cup (e.g., to direct its bodily movements, etc.). Personal subjectivity involves not 
just the capacity to direct its intelligence and will to what is other than itself, but also the 
capacity to direct its intelligence and will upon itself. 
 Interestingly, because personal subjectivity involves the capacity to direct its intelligence 
and will upon itself, personal subjectivity, it seems, involves a duality vis-à-vis the self. The 
subject cognizes itself as a subject and determines itself in accordance with the content of its 
intelligence and intentions. Thus, there are two aspects of the self: (1) the aspect of the self 
which cognizes and directs itself, and (2) the aspect of the self which is cognized and directed. 
So, as Staudenmaier puts it, “The spirit thinking itself not only grasps itself, but also, by thinking 
and grasping itself, posits itself. He, as he is subject, at the same time posits himself as object, as 
thing, which he strives to know.”40  
 To render itself an object of knowledge for itself, however, the subject must also have an 
acquaintance with what is other than itself. We saw that subjectivity involves a duality between 
the aspect of the self which cognizes and directs itself (a transcendental self), and the aspect of 
the self which is cognized and directed (an empirical self). If an empirical self is necessary for 
subjectivity, there must be a place where the empirical self is such that it can express and 
actualize subjectivity. Or perhaps more precisely, the empirical self must be rendered to the 
 




transcendental self as potentially determinate, and this is possible only as within relations to 
things other than itself. Thus, an empirical self can be such only within a nexus of objects.41 
Thus, at a minimum, the conditions for a subject’s free act of relating to something other than 
itself includes knowledge of self and what is other than self, as well as the capacity to determine 
self and what is other than self. And the capacity for knowledge of self and what is other than 
self, as well as the capacity to determine self and what is other than self, are just the capacities of 
an agent who possesses ‘personality.’ 
 According to Staudenmaier, “because God appears in general universally as intelligence 
and as holy good will, He not only takes to himself the attributes of a personal essence, but also – 
as the highest intelligence and highest most holy will – is the absolute personality.”42 “The God 
who exists out of Himself and who creates all being which subsists outside of Him,” 
Staudenmaier claims, “is the personal God.”43 Staudenmaier regards God as personal because the 
characteristics examined above are all predicable of Him: “We call the divine essence a personal 
essence because being-for-self, intelligence, and free will befit Him, and indeed befit Him in an 
absolute sense.”44 
 On the issue of whether or not God possesses the features of personality, Staudenmaier 
often contrasts his own position with the towering thinkers of the early nineteenth century. The 
personality of God, he argues, is often swallowed up in the systems of those thinkers. In 
 
41 We saw in the introductory chapter than, for Kant, such a nexus must appear spatially to the subject since space 
renders objects as external to one another. For Fichte, an objectual nexus is so vital for subjectivity that he regards 
personal subjectivity as possible only through the possession of a body. 
42 CD II §25.9 (pp. 138-39). 
43 Ibid., §57 heading (p. 284). 




criticizing Friedrich Schleiermacher, for example, Staudenmaier says, “Taking Spinoza as a 
starting point, he can grasp the Godhead only as the causal substance. By combining his 
Spinozism with the tenets of Schellingian nature philosophy, he comes merely only to a 
Spinozistic-Schellingian identity, in which all real difference – and above all the personal – is 
annulled” (aufgehoben ist).45 Likewise in Hegelian philosophy, Staudenmaier maintains, “The 
subjectivity that [Hegel] maintained is far removed from being personality. Within this 
[Hegelian] framework, even if it could ever become a matter of the truly subjective and personal, 
this would only be the subjectivity and personality of man, who immediately enters into the place 
of divinity.”46 For Staudenmaier, it is only insofar that the divine is personal – in possession of 
being-for-self, intelligence, and will – that it can freely engage with the finite. Below, we will 
examine how Staudenmaier posits these characteristics of personality in the divine. 
 
2. The Divine Intelligence 
 In this section, we will explore the divine intelligence. The divine intelligence can be 
divided into its two basic functions or aspects: theoretical and practical. The former is concerned 
with God’s knowledge of the truth (e.g., of Himself and of created essences) and the latter is 
concerned with knowledge of how things are to reach God as their end. 
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2.1 God’s Theoretical Knowledge 
2.1.1 Divine Self-Knowledge 
 In order to act freely, an agent must possess intellect. More specifically, the agent must 
be able to make itself an object of its intellect so as to direct itself to perform specific acts. This 
seems to be the way that Staudenmaier understands the concept of action. In this section, we will 
explore Staudenmaier’s comments regarding the divine as an intellectual agent which, as we will 
see, affects how God acts. 
 Staudenmaier follows the mainstream Christian theological tradition in asserting both that 
God possesses an intellect and that intellect is an essential attribute of the divine: “Thinking in 
God is not something which merely adheres to Him, accidental so to speak, but His substance is 
an essentially (wesentlich) thinking and knowing substance.”47 As an essential attribute of the 
divine, intellect is something which belongs to God by nature; it is not an addition which occurs 
at some stage subsequent to divine existence or achieved by means of some divine act. Thus, 
Staudenmaier says, “God thinks and knows according to His nature, which is spirit. His being is 
therefore a thinking and knowing, and indeed, since His being is itself an eternal being, His 
thinking and knowing is an eternal thinking and eternal knowing.”48 
 That intellect is an essential feature of the divine is important for Staudenmaier in 
maintaining that the divine is a personal subject apart from the created order. Because intellect is 
possessed by God essentially, and because creation is not an essential component of the divine, 
God does not need the created order in order to possess intellect. Staudenmaier notes explicitly 
that the created order does not act as a cause of intellect in the divine: “If God knows Himself 
 





eternally, He has, as an eternal being, an eternal self-consciousness; then any mediation of the 
divine self-knowledge conditioned by finitude is excluded in [our] representation of God …”49 
And again: “Just as little is the idea of God, i.e. the idea which God has of Himself, mediated 
through finite ideas, so that the first [the idea which God has of Himself] has to be obtained only 
through the latter.”50 
 The possession of intellect, of course, entails the capacity for knowledge, and so we must 
explore what sort of knowledge, according to Staudenmaier, is possessed by the divine. 
Staudenmaier divides his treatment of the divine intelligence into three categories: [1] divine 
self-knowledge (CD II §63); [2] divine knowledge of extradivine being (§64); [3] divine wisdom 
(§65).  
 Of the divine self-knowledge, Staudenmaier says, “We understand by the divine 
intelligence, as it is directed in an active way to the divine essence itself as its object, the most 
complete self-knowledge, the deepest and clearest self-grasping of the Godhead; the divine 
nature is known in its entire scope from and through itself, both in the abyss and in the eternity of 
its essence.”51 The divine intellect knows the divine essence in its entirety, both in terms of depth 
and in terms of range. Thus, there is no degree of opacity in God’s knowledge of Himself. 
 This self-knowledge, Staudenmaier argues, is not a ‘relative’ knowledge but an ‘absolute’ 
knowledge. “God knows Himself in an absolute way all the more because it is not one which 
knows and again another which is known. But there is here an absolute identity of the knowing 
and the known, indeed an absolute identity of the absolute self-knowing and of that which is 
 
49 CD II §63.1 (p. 306). 
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known absolutely through itself.”52 Unlike creatures, where there is a mediated gap between the 
knowing subject and the object to be known, there is no mediated gap in the divine between 
knower and known. (This gap between knower and known in human self-knowledge is due to the 
fact that such knowledge “is mediated by world-knowledge and God-knowledge.”)53 
 In God, however, “is neither mediation through another nor a development out of itself 
which becomes subject to time: but in God, self-knowing is a self-knowing which is an eternal 
and eternally complete in unmediated absolute self-beholding, which excludes any further 
revelation or any further self-revelation.”54 The lack of a mediated gap between knower and 
known is why Staudenmaier claims that God’s knowledge – unlike creaturely knowledge – is 
unmediated. This lack of mediation Staudenmaier attributes to divine simplicity, wherein divine 
being and divine knowing are identical: “The self-knowledge of God can therefore also be taken 
for the being (Sein) of God, since it is in the divine thinking, or the divine being (Sein), which as 
spiritual, is foremost self-thinking [being].”55 
 Unfortunately, Staudenmaier does not elaborate on the lack of mediation between the 
divine as object of knowledge and the divine as knowing subject in terms of whether such 
‘identity’ between the two includes personal distinction between the divine persons and, 
correlatively, whether the lack of mediation between the knower and the known occurs only at 
the level of substance but not at the level of person (such that the divine persons’ knowledge of 
one another is mediated in some way). 
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 More important than whether Staudenmaier treats the issue directly, however, is what is 
at stake in his raising the issue in the first place. What he sees at stake in asserting a lack of 
mediation between the divine as object of knowledge and the divine as knowing subject is 
whether God – like creatures – needs something substantially different from Himself in order to 
possess knowledge about Himself. It is clear that his answer is negative. 
 
2.1.2 Divine Knowledge of the Non-Divine 
 Of course, God’s knowledge is not limited to knowledge of Himself. In line with the 
orthodox theological tradition, Staudenmaier maintains that God’s intellect is not merely 
perceptive of created being, but that it is causally efficacious vis-à-vis created being: “Everything 
which has existence is itself only the thought of the Godhead, i.e., the work of divine thinking, 
with which is one with the divine willing.”56 
 Because the divine intellect is a causal factor in bringing the created order into being, 
God has an intimate knowledge – indeed, the highest possible knowledge – of the created order. 
Just as God’s self-knowledge is unmediated, so also is God’s knowledge vis-à-vis the created 
order an unmediated knowledge. “If above we have called the divine omnipresence the absolute 
causality of God which extends itself and continually effects itself in the world, then…the divine 
omniscience must be called the intellectual omnipresence of God in the universe. Indeed, it is 
this absolutely and unmediatedly, i.e. without any mediation, which is necessary only for finite 
knowing.”57 God’s knowledge of creation is unmediated precisely because it is His own 
knowledge which has brought creation into being. 
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 Now that we have examined the sorts of knowledge possessed by the divine intelligence, 
we will explore how they are related to God as the knowing subject (or perhaps more accurately, 
how God, as knowing subject, relates these sorts of knowledge to Himself). Although here we 
have designated these two sorts of knowledge as ‘self-knowledge’ and ‘knowledge of the non-
divine,’ we have actually only presupposed that these referents of knowledge are correct. As we 
will see below, that there actually is a distinction between the divine and the non-divine (and 
therefore a distinction between divine self-knowledge and divine knowledge of the non-divine) 
depends upon how God relates Himself to this knowledge. 
 
2.1.3 The Divine Self-Conception 
 For Staudenmaier, it is crucial that God be able to distinguish between knowledge 
regarding Himself and knowledge of the nondivine. This is crucial because, as Staudenmaier 
reasons, if God is unable to distinguish between Himself and the finite order – if God does not 
know Himself as God and the finite as created – then divine subjectivity cannot be regarded as 
free from, and so independent of, the created order. 
 
2.1.4 The Divine Thought of Self and of Otherness as not Identical in the Divine Mind 
 We have seen that God possesses knowledge of both Himself and creation. Further, we 
have seen that God possesses knowledge both of Himself and of creation un-mediatedly. That 
both knowledge of Himself as well as of the extradivine are related to the divine intellect 
unmediatedly yields an important question: If God knows both Himself and creation 
unmediatedly, is God able to distinguish between Himself and that which is other than Himself?  
 This issue is important to Staudenmaier since whether or not one ventures into pantheism 




itself an object of knowledge and which can create that which is other than itself. If God were 
unable to distinguish between the contents of these two sorts of thought, then God would be 
unable to distinguish between Himself and the nondivine. 
 Staudenmaier, however, asserts that God is able to distinguish between Himself and that 
which is other than Himself. He speaks of the ‘divine idea’ – that is, God’s own thought (not our 
thought of God) – as referring to two types of subject matter: God and creatures. As he puts it, 
“The content of the divine idea is, according to the category of aseity, God Himself, according to 
the category of causality, however, the creature. Therefore, there is posited an absolutely 
essential distinction between the ideas themselves which, as the distinction is original, also can 
never be negated nor would it become negated.”58 Indeed, in this same section he simply notes, 
“The idea of God is absolutely distinct from the idea of the world…”59 
 Because there is distinction between God’s thought of Himself and His thought of the 
extradivine, the content of God’s thoughts is not only about Himself: “The idea as thought of the 
world is therefore a divine thought, i.e. God thinks this thought. But He thinks it not as the 
thinking or as the idea of His own essence, but as the thinking and idea of another, as the essence 
of the world.”60 Here we can see that the ‘as’ structure in the previous remark implies that, for 
Staudenmaier, God explicitly recognizes the difference between His idea of Himself and His idea 
of the created. 
 
58 CD II §64.8 (p. 324), n. 1. Cf. Franz Anton Staudenmaier, Die Philosophie des Christenthums oder Metaphysik 
der heiligen Schrift als Lehre von den göttlichen Ideen und ihrer Entwicklung in Natur, Geist und Geschichte, Erster 
Band: Lehre von der Idee (Gießen: Ferber, 1840), p. 824. The insistence that God’s thought of the non-divine must 
itself be eternal is an important point when considering how God can possibly have an idea of something which is 
not-God. If the thought of otherness cannot enter into the divine thought temporally, and thus must be eternal, then 
otherness must be eternally present in the divine in some way. 
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 Given the distinction between the divine thought of self and the divine thought of the 
non-divine, if creation is included in the contents of the divine mind, and yet does not form the 
entirety of contents of the divine mind, then the divine cannot be identified with creation. To put 
the matter differently, God is not to be identified with the content of His own thought: “It is an 
infinite perversity to draw the conclusion now all at once that…God is Himself also everything 
which He thinks, every and all content of the divine thinking is God Himself.”61  
 Staudenmaier wants to hold to a traditional idea of God’s simplicity, for this text is 
immediately preceded by him saying, “Since, according to our Christian conviction, God is a 
thinking being (Wesen), we do not distinguish between a merely existing and a thinking God, but 
God – who for us is existing – is for us also thinking, and conversely. Insofar as God is a 
thinking being (Wesen), the thinking done by Him is not to be separated: the thought which He 
thinks is His thought just because He thinks it.”62 (CD III p. 49) Staudenmaier does not want to 
reject divine simplicity by saying that God’s being and God’s thought are separate. 
 Yet, Staudenmaier’s worry is that since the contents of the divine mind include that of 
creation, if the contents of the divine mind are identified with the divine being, then creation is 
identified with God. Thus, Staudenmaier says, 
If God directs Himself in His thinking upon Himself in absolute beholding of Himself, so 
certainly is there an identity between the thinker and the thought; God is the content of 
His thought. If this is not the case, that is, if God does not turn in upon Himself but rather 
turns away from Himself, upon the world as His not-I, then that identity of being between 
the thinker and the thought ceases. It does not follow that when God thinks, that He is 
Himself everything which He thinks…63 
 
 






Staudenmaier elaborates on the relation between the divine idea of creation and the being of 
creation in CD III, and it would take us too far off track to investigate how he relates that relation 
to divine simplicity. The main point to take away is that there must be a sharp distinction for God 
between His thought of Himself and His thought of what is not Himself. Indeed, for 
Staudenmaier, God not merely distinguishes His thought of Himself from His thought of the 
non-divine but, more positively, thinks of Himself as an ‘I,’ as a subject, and that which is other 
than Himself as the ‘not-I.’ 
 Staudenmaier says, “The personality of God itself…is constituted by the divine I-ness 
(Ichheit) and the intellectual and ethical abilities which rest in it.”64 “If personality consists in I-
hood,” Staudenmaier says, “then personality is put on God by Holy Scripture as often as it 
presents Him as expressing the word ‘I.’ This occurs either such that it is combined with other 
words, as 2 Mos. [Exod.] 3:14, or such that ‘I’ is posited explicitly: ‘I, I am, I am Jehovah.’ . . . 
For the expression ‘I am Jehovah’ also says, ‘Jehovah is an I,’ i.e. Jehovah is a personal God.”65 
 Further, Staudenmaier insists that God explicitly distinguishes Himself from creation. 
“So greatly does God also recognize the creature as that which is thought, willed, and created by 
Him…The idea of God is absolutely other than the idea of the creature; while beholding Himself 
in His idea, God knows Himself as an absolute other than that which He has before Himself in 
the idea of the world.”66 Staudenmaier’s language states not only that God perceives the 
distinction between Himself and the world but, more strongly, God knows Himself as distinct 
 
64 CD II §57 heading (p. 285). 
65 Ibid., §57.4 (p. 290). 




from the world. We see this language of God knowing and willing Himself as independent from 
all else in other places as well: 
God is not only an absolute essence (Wesen) which exists from and for Himself, which 
excludes from itself everything else as alien to it, but as this being-for-self (Fürsichsein) 
God also knows and wills Himself, and thus He remains eternally distinct from creaturely 
being which, therefore, remains forever the extradivine. As that which exists for Himself 
(Fürsichseiende), or as a personal being-for-self (Fürsichsein), God is also the one of 
whom it can be said neither that the world is an essential and necessary element for Him, 
nor is He Himself an essential and necessary element of the world, and finally just as 
little can it be said that He would not be God without the world, which definitions, as is 
known, are the philosophy of modern pantheism.67 
 
God, Staudenmaier insists, understands that-which-is-not God as that-which-is-not-God: “While 
God knows and beholds Himself in eternal self-knowledge, He likewise knows and beholds that 
which He is not, the extra-divine being, as the divine not-I.”68 As he puts it later, “For if God is 
Himself the idea of the world, then He certainly does not need to behold the world from all 
eternity as the other which is to be posited through becoming, to behold the world, consequently, 
as his not-I, but He merely beholds Himself, until finally the thought comes to him as a kind of 
accident of realizing himself as the world, of presenting himself and manifesting himself as the 
world.”69 
 For Staudenmaier, then, it is crucial that divine knowledge of self and of the nondivine 
not be confused in the divine mind. Why is this? If knowledge of self and knowledge of the 
nondivine are identical in the divine mind, then, “According to this phrase, the world is no other 
than the executed idea of the Godhead: God, who has only Himself in the idea of the world, has 
actualized Himself in the world. The contents of the idea have become the contents of the 
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world.”70 This effectively makes the world identical with the divine: “He who wills and beholds 
Himself in the idea of the world has posited Himself as the world, so that we are just as much 
able to say that God is the world as we are required to express that the world is God, God in 
appearing, God in reality.”71 
 One way to look at the matter is that an intellectual agent must be able to individuate 
itself from other objects so as to direct itself to perform actions. Individuating oneself requires a 
sort of separation of the self: in a subject who undergoes the act of directing herself, there is an 
aspect of the self that directs and another aspect of one and the same subject that is directed. To 
direct oneself, then, requires a positing of oneself – namely, the aspect of oneself that is to be 
directed. Staudenmaier’s worry is that, if God’s thought of Himself and His thought of the world 
are identical in the divine mind, then the world is simply the divine itself, only in its posited 
aspect. 
  
2.1.5 God Knows Himself as ‘God’ and Knows Creation as ‘Creation’ 
 In order for an agent to engage with another, that agent not only must know that he is 
distinct from that other, but he must also know about himself. More precisely, the agent must 
possess the proper knowledge about himself. In order to communicate Himself truthfully to the 
non-divine, God must know the truth about Himself and the truth about His relation to a possible 
created order. In other words, God must know Himself as God – as the creator, as the orderer, as 
the final end of creatures – and the nondivine as created. 
 





 According to Staudenmaier, God does not passively find Himself as God, but actively 
affirms Himself as such. As we will explore in greater depth in the next chapter, God possesses 
aseity – self-existence – which fundamentally distinguishes Him from all other being. Divine 
aseity, for Staudenmaier, is constitutive of God’s status as ‘absolute’ vis-à-vis creation. 
 Thus, God actively affirms His status as ‘absolute’ vis-à-vis the created order: “Insofar 
as, in God, the aseity of His own being (Wesen) becomes object of His knowing and willing, He 
affirms that [aseity] as absolute, i.e., He acknowledges and wills it as that which it is, as the 
innermost depth of His own being (Wesen).”72 Staudenmaier speaks of the divine self-affirmation 
as under the category of ‘personality,’ which denotes the possession of intellect and will.73 
Because divine self-affirmation involves intellect and will, in affirming Himself as absolute, God 
can be said to be consciously and willingly affirming Himself as absolute. As Staudenmaier puts 
it, “through this self-affirmation, however, God is what He is, with consciousness and will, 
through which consciousness and through which will God posits Himself as that which He is 
according to His being (Wesen).”74 
 In consciously affirming Himself as God, God also consciously affirms creation as 
creation. In affirming creation as creation, as what He eternally knows as not-I, God excludes the 
possibility that creation can be constitutive of His essence. “The self-affirmation of God is, 
 
72 CD II §47.1 (p. 240). 
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however, not simply an affirmation inwardly, but also a negation outwardly through which God 
excludes everything which He Himself is not, therefore all other as something which does not 
belong to Him essentially (wesentlich), and therefore foreign to His being (Sein) and life.”75 
Creation, therefore, can never be accorded a status whereby it transcends its status as creation, 
for this would be for God to negate His status as God. “The divine self-affirmation,” 
Staudenmaier says, “is the fidelity of God with respect to His own being (Wesen).”76 The divine 
affirmation “is therefore the self-affirmation of the Godhead as the absolute substance which 
exists from, in, and through itself, which as such has its principle in no other, and which does not 
require another for its existing-in-itself, therefore also, since it does not exist from another, so 
also excludes all other from itself as improper to it.”77 
 In knowing Himself as God and in knowing the nondivine as created, God knows 
Himself as the creator, as the orderer, as the final end of creatures. God thus knows His proper 
relation to creatures. This is the foundation for the divine intellect with regard to its arranging of 
the finite in order that it will embody its proper relation to the divine. We will now turn to this 
particular aspect of the divine intellect. 
 
2.2 God’s Practical Knowledge 
2.2.1 Divine Wisdom 
 Above, we explored the divine intellect in its theoretical aspect. But there is a practical 
side to the divine knowing as well, in that it is also concerned with ordering extradivine being to 
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its end, namely, to God Himself. This aspect of the divine intellect Staudenmaier refers to as the 
‘divine wisdom’: “The divine wisdom relates everywhere to the goal and the destiny of 
extradivine being; and thus we can take the divine wisdom as the teleological directing, or the 
side of the divine intelligence with a view to the goal and end of finite things.”78 Thus, the divine 
intellect implements a vision of how creaturely essences ought to be, as well as implementing 
how creaturely essence can fulfill this vision. “For the eyes of the Godhead,” Staudenmaier says, 
“the world is, from eternity, not only that which it is according to its essential layout and 
according to its idea as divine concept, but for the eyes of the Godhead the world is also eternally 
what it will be according to the determination already contained in the idea.”79 
 Here, the theoretical and the practical aspects of the divine intellect relate. The theoretical 
aspect, the divine idea, encompasses creaturely essences as they ought to be, and the practical 
aspect encompasses how creaturely aspects can reach this goal. As Staudenmaier puts it, God 
“regards the idea of the creature with consideration of its fulfillment, namely as it ought to 
actualize itself in its inner truth in time, the idea, therefore, as what ought to be, or rather the 
essence as what ought to be according to its truth, which truth is just the idea.”80 Although we 
can distinguish these two aspects of the divine intellect, they are nonetheless united in God’s 
intellectual relation to creation: “The divine intelligence is, in its Ur-thinking of the world, also 
already an ordering of the world with consideration to the general world goal.”81 
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 To this point, we have considered how Staudenmaier understands the intellectual relation 
of the divine to the nondivine. But for Staudenmaier, a merely intellectual relation between the 
divine and the nondivine is insufficient to account for the existence of the nondivine: “The 
eternal knowledge of extradivine being, which has merely possible existence, is not itself the sole 
cause of finite being, but to this cause belongs above all the divine will, which decides in a free 
way that merely possible being becomes  a real being.”82 It is the will of God, in cooperation 
with His intellect, which bring the nondivine into existence. Our next task, therefore, is to 
examine the divine will. 
 
3. The Divine Will 
3.1 Introduction 
 As we saw above, the divine will is that ability of God to determine Himself and others. 
But before we investigate the specifics of what God might will, we must step back and consider a 
much larger issue. We have seen that, for Staudenmaier, God not only can distinguish between 
Himself and the created order, but that God knows the proper relation between Himself and 
creatures. And we have seen that, as a result of God’s knowledge of the proper relation between 
Himself and creatures, God knows how to order them to Himself. 
 Although an agent may know his proper relation to others, this is not sufficient to 
guarantee that the agent will act properly towards others. Thus, the question we must pursue is 
this: what is it that demands that God will in accordance with His proper relation to creatures? 
Why ought God respect this ‘proper’ relation between Himself and the created order? That the 
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agent will act properly towards others requires that the agent possess the requisite moral quality. 
This quality Staudenmaier refers to as the ‘divine truthfulness’ (die göttliche Wahrhaftigkeit). 
 
3.2 Divine Manifestation as Truthful 
 In CD II §73, Staudenmaier treats the topic of divine truthfulness. “By truthfulness,” 
Staudenmaier says, “ we understand not only that a being corresponds with its concept, but we 
understand by it chiefly this, that the spirit corresponds most exactly to the concept or the 
representation of itself which it has developed and has stirred up in others through self-revelation 
of its inwardness.”83 Truthfulness, then, is the agreement between a moral being and the way it is 
manifest to that which is other than itself. 
 The truthfulness of God, therefore, is “the absolute accordance of His spiritual being and 
working with His idea which, as the idea known by man, is the result of the self-revelation of 
God to man. God, as the truthful God, is thus that which He reveals Himself as; and: God, as the 
truthful God, works and accomplishes that which He has promised to work and accomplish.”84 
Here, the ‘idea’ is God’s self-manifestation to rational creatures in the act of revelation. Thus, the 
truthfulness of God is the agreement between the divine essence and its self-manifestation to 
creatures. 
 It may seem odd that there is even a question of the agreement between the divine 
essence and its self-manifestation to creatures. It will be helpful, then, to imagine briefly what 
would have to be the case if agreement between essence and its self-manifestation was not even a 
question. 
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 ‘Agreement’ or ‘correspondence’ entails that there are two aspects (in this case the 
essence and its manifestation) involved in a relation. The notion of manifestation is something 
beyond mere being, and thus it entails a relation to that being. Yet manifestation cannot occur 
without that which is being manifest. If, then, the notion of an agreement or correspondence 
between divine essence and divine manifestation were eliminated, then the relation between the 
two would disappear. Since, however, manifestation cannot occur without that which is being 
manifest, a dissolution of the relation entails a dissolution of manifestation. To eliminate the 
notion of a correspondence between essence and manifestation is thereby to eliminate the 
possibility that there be a manifestation of the divine to any essence which is not the divine 
essence. 
 If there is no relation of correspondence between essence and manifestation a second 
possibility suggests itself. We saw that the elimination of a correspondence between divine 
essence and divine manifestation eliminates the notion of manifestation altogether, thus 
eliminating divine revelation to nondivine essences. A second possibility, then, is that God does 
not communicate an idea of His essence to the creature, but simply communicates the divine 
essence itself to the creature. In other words, instead of manifesting or showing the creature who 
He is, God actually makes the creature who He is – and so what would possess a created essence 
instead would possesses the divine essence. (The paradigm instances of the divine 
communicating its very essence to another are, of course, the generation of God the Son from 
God the Father and the spiration of God the Spirit from the Father and the Son). Under this 
possibility, the creature would no longer be a creature at all. 
 To eliminate the notion of an agreement between the divine essence and its self-




eliminated altogether, or that the difference between God and creature would be eliminated 
altogether. This why, therefore, Staudenmaier speaks of God communicating His ‘idea’ to 
creatures: it preserves the difference between the divine and creaturely (which, as we have seen, 
Staudenmaier is very concerned with) while still allowing for the divine to reveal itself to the 
creaturely. 
 Staudenmaier links the truthfulness of God to truth, holiness, and justice as divine 
attributes: “The truthfulness is therefore an attribute blended from truth and holiness, but also 
justice, because justice is just the revelation of the inner holiness [of God] which is expressed 
outwardly.”85 “The truthfulness of God,” Staudenmaier says, “is both the appearing 
(Sichtbarwerden) of the inner truth of the divine nature as well as the self-proving 
(Sichbewähren) of the inner truth of the divine nature. While the contrary of the first would make 
the inner truth of the divine nature a lie, the contrary of the other would make the divine essence 
appear as unholy.”86 What does he mean here? 
 Staudenmaier seems to be saying that a lack of agreement between the divine essence and 
its self-manifestation to creatures is a violation of both divine truth and divine holiness. A self-
manifestation which was the contrary of truth – the contrary of the inner truth of the divine 
nature – would result in a lie: God would not be communicating the truth about Himself to 
others. Second, the divine nature is always holy; it is the highest good there is. A self-
manifestation of the divine which is contrary to the divine nature is a self-manifestation which is 
contrary to such holiness. Thus, a lack of correspondence between the divine essence and its self-
manifestation is thus a manifestation of unholiness. 
 





3.3 The Relation of the Divine Will to the Divine Essence 
 Here, we ought to pause and dwell for a moment on the last point made above. As we 
have seen, God beholds Himself – He possesses self-knowledge. Thus, because God has self-
knowledge, God has a concept of Himself. And further, in having a concept of Himself, God 
knows the truth about Himself. The divine intellect, therefore, is that through which God 
apprehends the truth about Himself. 
 What is important here is that the truth which God apprehends about Himself imposes 
certain constraints upon the divine will. Staudenmaier’s construal of God’s personal subjectivity, 
therefore, includes a normative component over the exercise of the will (viz., the divine essence). 
Indeed, this normative character is brought out in Staudenmaier’s description of the divine 
essence as that of a ‘law’: “The self-concept of the divine nature according to its entire truth, or 
the complete truth of the divine nature, is the law (Gesetzt) of the divine life. The self-concept of 
God, however, is the idea of God – namely, the idea which God has of Himself, i.e., the idea 
which God has of His essence.”87 Indeed, Staudenmaier argues that if God did not will in 
accordance with His own essence, it would be tantamount to a defect in the divine: “If it is, 
however, the divine essence which wills, or if the divine essence is a willing essence, then we 
would posit an imperfection in this essence if we assumed that God does not will as it lies in His 
essence to will; we would put a contradiction and conflict in the divine life when we would 
present to ourselves God willing against His nature, against His essence.”88 
 Therefore, the divine will does not conflict with the divine essence but, on the contrary, is 
bound always to obey the normative constraints of the divine essence. If we were to construe the 
 





divine will as acting out of accord with the divine essence, then “we would cancel (aufheben) the 
concept of eternity in the being (Wesen) of God, we would give ourselves over to the view that at 
one moment God wills according to His nature and the next moment God wills against His 
nature.”89 As Staudenmaier puts it in another place, “The divine will, as a substantial will, is in 
all its movements eternally only the affirmation of the divine essence, the affirmation of the idea 
of divinity. Denial [of the divine idea, of the divine essence] would be cancellation (Aufhebung) 
of the divine essence.”90 Indeed, no divine attribute whatsoever can be in conflict within the 
divine: “Since, however, the Godhead (divinitas) itself underlies all divine attributes, so also can 
there be no attribute in God which contradicts the Godhead.”91 
 Although pursuing the matter in detail would take us too far afield, it should be registered 
how Staudenmaier seems to be following Hegel with respect to divine freedom. Within a 
Hegelian framework, that God is obliged to will in accordance with His essence is not 
understood so much as a limitation of freedom as it is a limitation upon arbitrariness. Within 
such a Hegelian framework, true freedom is found not in unconstrained exercise of the will but 
in seeing oneself at home in otherness. True freedom, therefore, is achieved precisely in 
constraining one’s will such that what is other no longer appears alien. True divine freedom, 
then, is achieved in God constraining the exercise of His will such that the divine essence is not 
alien to it.92 
 
89 CD II §66.6 (p. 354). 
90 Ibid., §66.7 (p. 355-56). 
91 Ibid., §66.6 (p. 354). 
92 Thus, Staudenmaier subtitles his first treatment of the divine will in CD II (§66) as “The Unity (Einheit) of 
Freedom and Necessity.” As we will have opportunity to see, the unity of freedom and necessity in God is a central 




 Yet Staudenmaier is not completely Hegelian in terms of how he construes the divine 
will. Although Staudenmaier stipulates that God must will in accordance with His essence, this 
does not mean that, because God has willed creation, creation is therefore required by the divine 
essence. Insofar as God wills something, that something must accord with the divine essence; 
however, there is nothing other than Himself which God must necessarily will. Thus, it seems 
that Staudenmaier would affirm that God could have willed otherwise than He has, so long as 
whatever would have otherwise been willed was still in accordance with the divine essence. 
 The essence of the divine is to exist, to be what it is. For God to deny the divine essence 
would be keep it, and so Himself, from existing. In the same way that it is a contradiction for the 
divine essence not to exist, so also it is a contradiction for God to will contrary to this essence. 
As the divine will manifests God to the created order, according to Staudenmaier, then, it is the 
very nature of the divine essence to manifest itself as it truly is. 
 This final point is important for the nature of God’s interpersonal interaction with the 
created order (and we will have opportunity to explore this in the next chapter). If God always 
wills in accordance with the divine essence, then God always manifests Himself to the created 
order as God, and nothing else: “Although God relates Himself to the world freely, although He 
is free in His thinking, willing, and creating of the world, He can always only relate to the world 
as God, and therefore can neither think, will, nor bring forth the world in a non-divine way 
(ungöttlich). That God acts with freedom lies in His absolutely free essence; that He is unable to 
act in an ungodly way towards the world lies in His own idea and in His own essence.”93 Given, 
then, that God can act only as God toward the created order, the created order itself thereby 
reflects the divine: “God, therefore, when He thinks, wills, and creates the world, will think, will, 
 




and create it as God. And therefore the world will be a living reflection of the Godhead. 
Precisely herein, and in nothing else, consists the likeness [of the world to God].”94 
  
Conclusion 
 We have examined Staudenmaier’s understanding of the divine intellect and will in order 
to understand better how Staudenmaier sees God to be a personal subject. We have observed 
that, for Staudenmaier, God’s personal subjectivity is such that the divine intellectually grasps 
itself as well as what is other than itself, grasps how it relates to what is other than itself, and its 
volition is normed by the content of its understanding. Having established that God possesses the 
requisite characteristics for free action, our next task is to examine how the personal subjectivity 























 In the previous chapter, we examined those characteristics which must obtain, according 
to Staudenmaier, in order for an agent to be a personal subject, and thereby to be the subject of 
free acts. There we saw that those characteristics of personality are being-for-self, intelligence, 
and free will. We also saw how Staudenmaier understands those characteristics to apply to the 
divine: God is an irreducible individual (being-for-self), who possesses the mental capacity to 
accurately render reality (intelligence), as well as the capacity to determine reality in accordance 
with the content of the subject’s intelligence (will). In virtue of these characteristics, God is a 
personal subject and therefore has the ability to act freely in relation to the nondivine. 
 The previous chapter was concerned with how Staudenmaier understands the constitution 
of a personal subject per se, but did not treat how personal subjectivity is manifest in 
interpersonal encounter. In this chapter, therefore, we will examine how Staudenmaier 
understands the free, interpersonal interaction of the divine personality with the nondivine. That 
is, we will examine how the components of the divine personality are featured in God’s free 
interaction with the nondivine. 
 In section 1, we will examine how the divine being-for-self – the irreducible subjectivity 




regarding the necessity of difference for interpersonal encounter and the singularity of the divine 
essence (sections 1.1 and 1.2), we will see how Staudenmaier grounds the divine being-for-self 
in God’s aseity (1.3). Then, in 1.4, we will examine how Staudenmaier utilizes divine aseity to 
support the necessary existence of the divine (which further establishes the divine being-for-
self). Divine aseity, we will see, is responsible for the infinitude of God, which is responsible for 
God’s transcendence over the finite (1.5). Thus, divine transcendence is constitutive of the 
interpersonal encounter between the divine and the nondivine, as it is the manifestation of the 
divine being-for-self (1.6). 
 In section 2, we will examine the divine intelligence vis-à-vis the nondivine. Section 2.2 
examines the divine intelligence as the theoretical and creative component of nondivine 
essences. Section 2.3 explores the divine intellect as practical knowledge or ‘divine wisdom,’ i.e. 
the role of the divine intellect in enabling nondivine essences to reach God as their ultimate end. 
 In section 3 we will examine how the divine will factors into the interpersonal encounter 
between God and creatures. In 3.2 we will see that the divine necessarily wills the good, and thus 
that the divine requires the manifestation of this goodness in the created order. In 3.3, we will see 
how the divine will is thereby manifest in the holiness of creatures. 
 Our study on Staudenmaier has its focus on interpersonal encounter. Interpersonal 
interaction, though, requires some sort of presence between the subjects of encounter. Thus, in 
section 4, we will examine how the aspects of the divine personality – being-for-self, 
intelligence, and will – are manifest in God’s presence to the nondivine. Section 4.1 details the 
mode of being which by which God is present to the nondivine, namely omnipresence. Section 





 We conclude the chapter by showing how, for Staudenmaier, the finite is not necessary 
for the existence of divine personality (section 5). This will set us up for chapter three, where it 
will be argued that Staudenmaier sees the Trinity as the ground of possibility for God’s 
interpersonal encounter with the nondivine. Thus, the components of the divine personality 
which are featured in God’s interaction with the nondivine – the subject of this chapter – are 
simply the external expression of the interpersonal components of the divine Trinity. 
 
1. Divine Being-for-Self 
1.1 Interpersonal Encounter, Difference, and Being-for-Self 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, being-for-self indicates a thing’s irreducible 
individuality, or its irreducibility to another. The very notion of an interpersonal encounter 
entails that there be an irreducible difference between personal subjects, for pure sameness 
would occlude an interaction with something other than oneself. Thus, the very notion of an 
interpersonal encounter entails that each subject within the encounter be different from the other, 
and so possess its own being-for-self. In other words, there must be a numerical difference 
between personal subjects, for encounter is not possible with only a single subject. (Note that the 
previous assertion is not to be taken to mean that encounter is impossible where there is a single 
essence, for a numerically singular ‘essence’ could include multiple subjects, as in the case of the 
Trinity.) 
 Insofar as we are speaking of encounter between personal subjects in a generic sense, the 
being-for-self of each subject is sufficient to establish numerical difference between subjects, 
and thus is sufficient for the occurrence of an encounter. However, the difference between the 
divine and nondivine spans more than numerical difference, and this difference we must take 




not God. Thus, while there is a numerical difference between the divine and the nondivine, there 
is an ontological difference as well. An interpersonal encounter between the two will therefore 
be characterized by this ontological difference as much as by the numerical difference. It is 
important, then, that we explore this absolute-relative relation that subsists between the divine 
and the nondivine so as to understand the specifics of their interpersonal encounter. 
 
1.2 The Singularity of the Divine 
 ‘God’ is a designation for ‘the divine essence.’ Here, ‘essence’ is a generic designation 
and thus ‘divine essence’ designates whatever kind of thing ‘God’ is. Staudenmaier takes up the 
standard Christian view that God’s essence demands that God can be only one (or more 
precisely, the divine essence demands that it be numerically singular), and thus that there can be 
only one God: “When we say that God is only one according to His essence, there is really 
expressed in this the fact that, in an ontological sense, to the concept of Godhead, θειοτης (Rom. 
1:20), there corresponds only oneness, but not manyness of essence. God is therefore already one 
according to His essence; manyness of essence is against the concept of  Godhead.”95 Although it 
is possible that there be manifold created essences, there can be only one divine essence. 
 Because there can be only one divine essence, an engagement with otherness by the 
divine can only be an engagement with what is not the divine essence. That is, because there can 
be only one divine essence, an engagement with the divine essence by something which is not 
identical with, or a bearer of, the numerical sameness of this essence cannot itself be a divine 
essence. There cannot be an encounter between two things identified with the divine essence if 
those two things are not, according to their essence, numerically singular. (Here, the 
 




specification of being numerically singular according to their essence is important because, in 
the case of the Trinity, we need to be able to say that there is an encounter between multiple 
things identified with the divine essence which are not numerically singular, but this lack of 
numerical singularity is in virtue of their personhood and not in virtue of their essence. The 
divine persons are numerically distinct as persons but numerically singular according to their 
essence.) 
 When the divine essence is compared to other sorts of essences (i.e., essences of a 
nondivine sort), it is designated by Staudenmaier as ‘absolute.’ ‘Absolute’ designates the status 
of God, or the divine essence, relative to what is not God and so what is not the divine essence. 
What sort of relationship obtains between the Absolute (the divine essence) and the non-
absolute? 
 Staudenmaier grounds God’s absoluteness vis-à-vis the non-absolute in God’s aseity. He 
says, “According to the category of aseity, God is absolute life from and through Himself.”96 
God does not receive His existence from something other than Himself – He does not receive His 
existence from a non-divine essence – but derives it from Himself. Aseity, as God’s deriving His 
being or existence from Himself, ensures that God is dependent upon no other for His existence. 
Below, we will explore what Staudenmaier sees as the implications of divine aseity and what 
bearing they have on the interpersonal encounter between God and the created. 
 
1.3 Divine Aseity as Ground of Divine Being-for-Self 
 According to Staudenmaier, because God has His existence from Himself and not from 
another, He is the cause of the existence of everything which is other than Himself. 
 




Staudenmaier says, “For if there is an essence which exists absolutely from – and through – 
itself, then it is necessary that this essence is at the same time the cause of all other reality.”97 
And again: “The absolute being (Sein) of God from Himself is the reason why a being (Sein) of 
things is possible through God.”98 
 Staudenmaier’s argument seems to be something like the following: Multiple essences 
exist; as we saw, however, there can be only one divine essence. The divine essence has its 
existence from or through itself. Therefore, those essences which exist and yet are nondivine 
cannot receive their existence from themselves. This entails, then, that nondivine essences must 
receive their existence from another, viz. that essence which has its existence from or through 
itself (God). 
 The reasoning behind this conviction is that being is not something which spontaneously 
occurs.99 On this point, Staudenmaier contrasts the Christian view that God possesses being 
eternally with what he refers to as those ‘negative’ systems – in particular that of Hegel’s Logic – 
which “begin either with nothing, or with a being (Sein) which as pure being is empty, without 
content and determination.”100 Staudenmaier holds that being simply cannot arise out of nothing. 
Thus, he says, “A being (Sein) which is the same as nothing and is nothing, in which nothing can 
be beheld and nothing can be thought, is absolutely unable either to be a true positing of itself or 
to posit another out of itself. Therefore a being (Sein) which in its primal origin is in itself and 
 
97 CD II §42.2 (p. 228). 
98 Ibid., §54.2 (p. 267). 
99 This is not to be confused with the standard Christian dogma of creation ex nihilo, for here Staudenmaier is not 
referring to created being, but to being per se (and thus inclusive of the being of the divine). 
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intrinsically the negation of being (Sein) will never raise itself to actual being (Sein).”101 If being 
does not arise spontaneously out of nothing, then nondivine being, if it does not receive its being 
from or through itself, must receive it from another (viz., that which possesses being). 
 For Staudenmaier, it follows from divine aseity, then, that God is completely independent 
from the nondivine. As he puts it, “What exists from and through itself can, with respect to being 
(Sein), in no way be thought as dependent upon another, and in fact everything outside of Him, if 
it exists, must be dependent upon Him.”102 Such independence, Staudenmaier says, “is like that 
of negative freedom, [and] consists in being conditioned and determined in being (Sein) and life 
by nothing external.”103  
 Given that the divine has its existence from and through itself, the nondivine is 
characterized by the fact that it receives its existence from outside of itself. As Staudenmaier puts 
it, “To have life in oneself means having life from and through oneself. By contrast everything 
which is not the Godhead itself, but is finite, neither has life in itself, nor is it given to it to have 
life in itself, but life must be given to it in the first place. Finite life therefore, as opposed to the 
absolute life of the Godhead, is a life which is bestowed, given, or better, a life which is carried 
by and created through the absolute life.”104 
 As indicated above, interpersonal interaction requires difference between personal 
subjects in order for interaction to occur. Further, as we have seen, being-for-self indicates the 
irreducibility of some thing to otherness. Interpersonal interaction between the divine and the 
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created therefore requires an irreducible difference between the two, i.e., some aspect which is 
constitutive of each and yet different for each. It is through divine aseity, then, that there exists 
an indissoluble difference between the divine and the nondivine: the one gives existence to the 
other; the one receives its existence from the other. The acts of giving and receiving presuppose 
distinction. In receiving existence from no other, God is absolute; in receiving existence from 
another, creation is relative. Thus, it is precisely in possessing aseity that the divine retains its 
irreducible difference from the one it encounters. 
 
1.4 The Necessary Existence of the Divine 
 The irreducibility of the divine to the nondivine (and vice versa) is also expressed by 
Staudenmaier with respect to the necessity of the divine essence. Through divine aseity, the 
divine essence exists necessarily: 
If God is absolutely independent from everything external, whether this be a thing, 
person, or concept, then the necessity of the divine essence cannot consist in being at all 
dependent or being subject, but the necessity which is ascribed to it is related to the type 
and mode of the inner divine being and life. And here we say: what exists from itself in 
an absolute way cannot be such that it would also be possible for it not to be, but in the 
concept of absolute being lies also the concept of necessary being; in other words, the 
absolute exists in such a way that it cannot not be.105  
 
It is because the divine exists necessarily that it can grant existence to contingent realities. 
Staudenmaier says, “The ground of giving the determination to the merely possible being either 
to be, or not to be, can only lie in that which itself not only exists already, but exists 
necessarily.”106 
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 The created order, because it does not exist from itself, does not exist necessarily, but 
only contingently. “If, however, the absolute being of God is that which, as necessary [being], 
cannot not be, therefore that for which it is possible to be or not to be, but which must be, then 
conversely it lies in the concept of creaturely being, as the non-absolute, to be only possible [for 
it to be].”107 The nondivine is constituted by the fact that it presupposes the divine: “What, 
however, is not necessary is itself only possible being, consequently it is that which presupposes 
an external being in order to be able to be.”108 Here, then, the divine possesses being-for-self in 
that such being is necessary, in opposition to contingent being. 
 Thus, the irreducibility of the divine and the nondivine to one another is constituted by 
the sort of modality characteristic of each: the divine exists necessarily while the nondivine 
exists only contingently. Necessary existence, which follows from aseity, further grounds the 
divine being-for-self, thereby further grounding the conditions for interpersonal interaction 
between God and creatures. 
 
1.5 The Infinity of God 
 Because God’s existence is from or through Himself rather than from another, and 
because this existence is necessary rather than contingent, the divine is not limited by anything 
outside itself. Given this lack of limitation, the divine can be regarded as infinite: “While God, as 
the absolute positing of Himself, neither has originated out of another nor  can be contained in 
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another, and still less  can be limited by something existing outside of Him, infinity (infinitas) 
befits Him and in this is His greatness.”109  
 The notion of infinity is usually thought of numerically, as a never-ending amount of 
something. For Staudenmaier, however, the concept of infinity is better understood in terms of 
quality: 
The category of limitation is, like most others, a category which concerns finite things, 
whose qualities are definable according to this category and are modifiable by the 
influence of foreign qualities. The concept of infinity is therefore not one which relates 
merely to quantity, so that the definition of this attribute would be nothing other than 
having no end, being endless. Rather the concept also relates to quality, and testifies to 
being determinable and modifiable by no finite thing. Being infinite is therefore not 
merely having no end, but also absolutely not being like the finite, not subsisting 
alongside the finite and being determined by the finite.110 
 
Things which are of the same quality subsist alongside each other, thereby limiting each other 
(“modifiable by the influence of foreign qualities,” as he puts it in the passage above). If the 
divine is infinite, and so not modifiable by the influence of foreign qualities, then the divine must 
qualitatively transcend any other sort of quality. 
 Given the infinitude of the divine, God transcends both space and time, features which 
are constitutive of the finite. “The infinity (Unendlichkeit) of God regarded with a view to space 
gives the concept of the immeasurability (immensitas) of God.”111 “The infinity (Unendlichkeit) 
of the divine life with respect to time gives the concept of the eternity of God. Actual eternity is 
distinct from the so-called eternal time – aevum –, which is that time in which the development 
of the finite spirit occurs for eternity.”112 Given the infinity of God with respect to space and 
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time, and given that space and time constitute the finite, the interpersonal encounter between the 
divine and the nondivine is characterized by divine transcendence. 
 
1.6 Divine Being-for-self as Manifest in the Finite: Transcendence 
 According to Staudenmaier, given the infinitude of God – rooted in divine aseity – the 
divine thereby transcends created categories. Staudenmaier says, “Through divine aseity God is 
the super-essential, but as this [is] outside all categories and raised above every finite 
contrast.”113 As super-essential, however, this does not mean that the divine has no essence. 
Rather, the super-essentiality of the divine essence signifies its qualitative difference from 
creaturely essences: “With this attribute, however, the Godhead is not denied essence, but it is 
only said that its essence is an essence absolutely separate from the finite and is an essence 
which infinitely lies above the finite.”114 
 The manifestation of the divine being-for-self in the finite, therefore, is constituted by 
divine transcendence over the finite. God, Staudenmaier says, is present to the nondivine “such 
that He, although existing in space and time, nonetheless in His own right is spaceless and 
timeless, and is not moved in space and time. He is everywhere, but He is in no place. The divine 
immanence, therefore, is never without transcendence. As God no doubt fills the world through 
His omnipresence, so He is also over and above the world; He stands over it, untouched by it.”115 
 Because God is characterized by His transcendence over space and time – because God 
transcends the finite – God can never be reduced to the finite. Therefore, this indissoluble 
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integrity of the divine essence – the divine being-for-self – ensures there will always be 
difference between the divine and the creaturely, thus ensuring the possibility of encounter 
between the two. In encounter with God, therefore, God’s being-for-self – God’s irreducible 
difference from the one whom He encounters – is necessarily manifest, for without the divine 
being-for-self, there would be no God ‘there’ to encounter. 
 We will return to the issue of the divine transcendence, for this is an important aspect for 
Staudenmaier’s assertion (which we treat below, in section 5) that the divine personality is not 
constituted by God’s interpersonal relation to the nondivine. At the moment, though, we must 
address an important question. Interpersonal encounter, it seems, requires an interaction between 
the members of the encounter. Put differently, interpersonal encounter seems to require a form of 
presence of the two parties to one another (and in section 4, we will examine the way in which 
the divine is present to the nondivine in their interpersonal encounter.) The transcendence of God 
over the finite which we have just explored, however, raises a question: if God is transcendent 
over the finite, how can there possibly be an interpersonal encounter between God and the finite? 
If God transcends the finite, how could God possibly be present to and in the finite? 
 This question can be resolved if we keep in mind that God’s transcendence over the finite 
is, as Staudenmaier puts it above, a qualitative difference from creaturely essences. Creaturely 
essences are by nature finite – limited to space and time. God’s qualitative difference from finite 
essences – and so God’s transcendence over the finite – means that God is not limited to space 
and time. Or better: the divine transcendence means that, unlike finite essences, the divine 
essence is not situated in the dichotomies of (1) space as opposed to (2) spacelessness, and (1) 




 In other words, the divine transcendence over the finite means that God is not limited by 
the finite. The finitude of the created order does not preclude God from interacting with it. God’s 
transcendence over the finite, therefore, allows for an interpersonal interaction between the two, 
but an interaction where the former is not reduced to the limitations of the latter. Having 
addressed this question, we will now treat the next element of the divine personality, the divine 
intelligence. 
 
2. Divine Intelligence 
2.1 Introduction 
 We saw in the previous chapter that Staudenmaier divides the divine intelligence into 
three areas: God’s theoretical intelligence regarding Himself, His theoretical intelligence 
regarding the nondivine, and His practical intelligence regarding the nondivine. Because we are 
focusing on the encounter between the divine and the nondivine in this chapter, we will 
concentrate on the latter two. 
 As we saw above, it is only that essence which exists from and through itself that can 
give existence to what is other than itself. Thus, it is only God who can create. Anything that 
exists, of course, has some sort of determinate being. Thus, as an existing thing, a being 
possesses certain aspects or features that make it whatever kind of thing it is. We saw in the 
previous chapter that the free acts of a personal subject (for both God and creatures) involve both 
the intelligence and the will, in that the intelligence is responsible for comprehending the truth of 
being whereas the will is responsible for determining being in accordance with the intelligence. 
The work of the intelligence as comprehending the truth of being is constitutive of free acts 
precisely because a subject must know what it is they are doing in order to freely assent to 




 Therefore, in order for God to be absolutely free vis-à-vis the nondivine – whether in acts 
of creating, sustaining, or governing the nondivine to its end – the divine intelligence must have 
a full comprehension of the nondivine. For God to act freely towards the nondivine, therefore, 
God must know what sort of essences He is creating, sustaining, and governing towards their 
end. Insofar as Staudenmaier divides these two areas, the divine intelligence as theoretical 
concerns the divine knowledge of nondivine essences as such, and the divine intelligence as 
practical concerns how such essences will reach their various ends. 
 
2.2 Divine Intelligence as Theoretical and Creative 
 Because the divine essence is that which bestows existence upon the nondivine, because 
the divine creates the nondivine freely, and because the intelligence is constitutive for free 
actions, the divine intellect functions creatively: “The creature is what God eternally thinks and 
knows it to be; nature is as it exists in the divine intelligence; spirit is, what it is in and for the 
divine thinking; and finally, humanity is what God has before Himself in His knowledge.”116 
 We saw in the previous chapter that the intelligence works to establish an accordance 
between being and thought. Given that the divine intelligence comprehends the nondivine, and 
given that the divine intelligence functions creatively vis-à-vis the nondivine, the accordance 
between being and thought is absolute for the divine intelligence. As Staudenmaier puts it, “The 
thought through which God thinks the creature, therefore, not only accords, as we like to say, 
most accurately with the essence of the creature, but accords absolutely with it, because the 
divine thought thinks the essence of the things themselves.”117 
 





 God’s thought of the world is what Staudenmaier refers to as the divine ‘idea’ (Idee) of 
the world.118 Because the divine intelligence functions creatively and so is concerned with the 
essences of creatures, in this regard it is not to be taken as a knowledge of creatures insofar as 
they fall short of the divine idea, but as a knowledge of creatures as instantiations of the divine 
idea. As Staudenmaier puts it,  
[T]he representation God has of the world, insofar as it is both the truth and the idea of 
the world, is not to be confused with that representation God has of the world insofar as it 
is afflicted with deficiency and ruin (which is certainly also object of divine knowing). 
Rather, the world which corresponds to the idea, or the world in truth, is the pure, 
immaculate world without deficiency, as it is thought by God from eternity as the way it 
ought to be, and as it was also created in this perfect character in the beginning of time.119 
 
Further, because the divine intellect functions creatively vis-à-vis extradivine being, the truth of 
extradivine being is not something which comes to God as mediated, but rather is perceived by 
God immediately. Or to put the matter more forcefully, Staudenmaier notes that the divine 
thought of the nondivine just is the truth of the nondivine: “The divine thought of the world is the 
truth of the world. This is all the more the case, since the world is not an object of divine 
knowledge which is first found by God, as it presents itself as object of our knowing.”120 
 
2.3 Divine Intellect as Practical/Divine Wisdom 
 We saw in the previous chapter that there is a practical side to the divine knowing, 
concerned with ordering nondivine being to its end, namely, to God Himself. Since here we are 
examining the nature of interpersonal encounter between God and creatures, we can now turn to 
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the issue of how creatures reach God as their end. Or, from the perspective of the divine, we can 
now inquire into the means that God implements in the created order for creatures to be able to 
reach Him as their end.  
 According to Staudenmaier, human beings reach the divine by means of religion: “The 
general goal of things is…God, or being and life in God Himself. Divine wisdom is therefore 
that intelligence in God through whose living thinking and acting the being with God of the 
extradivine is mediated, through which mediation extradivine being enters into the true divine 
life-order, which is the determination and the goal of general and particular life. For the free 
spirit, this goal is expressed as religion.”121 The end of extradivine being is that very same being 
and life which is in God Himself, and God’s own being and life is mediated to the creature 
through religion.  
 According to Staudenmaier, “Religion – as actual and true unity – is the conscious, free, 
and living communion of man with God.”122 The descriptions of the communion of man with 
God as ‘conscious, free, and living’ are not accidental, for they denote just those properties of a 
personal subject – ‘conscious’ denotes the intellect, ‘free’ denotes the will, and ‘living’ denotes 
the unity of intellect and will. Religion, therefore, describes a communion between two personal 
subjects: it is the means by which the created personal subject appropriates the divine idea which 
has been communicated to her from the divine personal subject. 
 Consciousness is necessary for the mental act of knowing, and the act of knowing is 
directed at the truth of being. “Religious knowledge, into which divine revelation introduces us, 
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is a knowledge in the truth”123 In religious knowledge, the truth which is sought is that truth 
which enables union with God. The truth sought in religious knowledge, therefore, is that which 
God imparts to creatures about Himself: “The objective truth is the content of divine revelation, 
in which the world takes part”124 
 However, the conscious element is not the only element necessary for union with God: 
Staudenmaier says, “As necessary, however, as communion with God is a conscious 
communion, its character is not exhausted in the essence of the pure consciousness. Rather, 
another moment shows itself to be just as important, that of freedom.”125 How is free will related 
to truth? Staudenmaier says this: “Truth in its complete realization is truth as it posits itself in life 
and appears as life. And precisely in this same completion of its being through life truth also 
aims at religion, so that religion is itself only real where truth has become life.”126 
 Truth, at its core, is not abstract, but has determinate content: the truth of created being is 
that it is meant for God, that it be in ethical communion with God. Ethical communion, though, 
requires exercise of the will. Thus, the exercise of free acts of the will is how the truth becomes a 
reality or, as Staudenmaier puts it, how the truth is brought to ‘life’: “The ability on the side of 
man to bring truth to life is freedom, or the free will.”127 As he also puts it, “If divine truth 
(revelation) is a divine principle of human life, then freedom – the ethical principle of the human 
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spirit – has combined itself with it in order to shape in union with it that life which is the 
expressed goal of man himself.”128 
 Religion is conscious, free, and living because reaching God as one’s end requires both 
intellectual knowledge of, and an ethical-volitional assent to, the divine. Religion, then, is the 
mode of human appropriation of divine wisdom, the appropriation of the divine truth as it 
pertains to reaching God as one’s end. Thus, it is precisely in the empirical fact that such a thing 
as religion exists in the created order – in the fact that there is a means to reach the divine – that 
divine wisdom is manifest in creation. 
 We recall from the previous chapter that the divine will is constrained by the divine 
essence to communicate the truth about Himself to the nondivine. Truthful self-communication, 
therefore, is constitutive of divine interpersonal encounter with the nondivine. Religion, then, is 
just the other side of that interpersonal encounter: it is the mode of human appropriation of God’s 
truthful self-communication. 
 More broadly, the impartation of divine wisdom – as that element of interpersonal 
encounter which leads another to God Himself – is characteristic of God’s interpersonal 
encounter. Interpersonal encounter, however, is not something which begins de novo. Rather, 
because a personal agent needs others by which she can actualize her subjectivity, an 
interpersonal encounter simply manifests those elements by which the personal subject is 
constituted as a personal subject. 
 The upshot is that God’s interpersonal encounter with the nondivine manifests those 
elements by which God is constituted as a personal subject. And as we will examine in the next 
chapter, it is within the inner life of the Trinity that God is constituted as a personal subject. 
 




God’s interpersonal encounter with the nondivine is thereby just the manifestation of God’s 
immanent personal subjectivity, i.e. the inner life of the Trinity. 
 
3. Divine Will 
3.1 Introduction 
 Divine intelligence, however, is not enough to bring extradivine being into reality; will 
also is necessary: “The eternal knowing of the extradivine or merely possible being is of itself 
not the only cause of finite being, but above all this belongs to the divine will, which decides in a 
free way that merely possible being shall become actual being.”129 Indeed, the divine will is 
necessary for the realization of every aspect of the nondivine: “From the divine willing 
everything finite has its origin, through the divine willing everything is determined and ordered, 
and the divine will is the law according to which everything finite is directed”130 It is through the 
divine will, then, that created essences exist as the sorts of things they are and are moved to reach 
the end which is appropriate to the sorts of things they are.  
 In short, the divine will works to manifest the divine essence in and to the nondivine. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, Staudenmaier maintains that there is an irreducible difference 
between God and the created order. Therefore, Staudenmaier does not intend the self-
manifestation of the divine in creation in any pantheistic way, but rather in line with the standard 
Catholic view that the divine is mediated in the created order. Below, we will examine why the 
divine will acts to manifest the divine essence within the created order (3.2) and then how the 
divine is manifest within the created order (3.3). 
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3.2 Divine Willing of the Good: Holiness and Righteousness 
 The manifestation of the divine in the nondivine characterizes the interpersonal encounter 
between the two. Before we can explore this further, though, we must ask what it is that 
motivates the divine will to manifest the divine in the nondivine. Why not, for example, bring a 
created order into existence that will not manifest the divine? 
 In the previous chapter, we saw that God beholds His own essence and wills only in 
accordance with that essence. Indeed, we saw that God would not be ‘God’ unless He acted in 
accordance with His essence. If the divine will works to manifest the divine in the nondivine, and 
if the divine will wills only in accordance with the divine essence, then in order to understand 
why the divine will manifests itself in the divine, we must understand what it is about the divine 
essence that demands that it be manifest in the nondivine.  
 As noted in chapter one (section 3.3), Staudenmaier believes that the self-manifestation 
of the divine in the nondivine is not a requirement of the divine essence in the sense that the 
divine essence necessitates that God create so that the divine essence can manifest itself in the 
nondivine. Rather, Staudenmaier wants to maintain that the divine act of creation is a free act – 
and so not necessitated by the divine essence – but that if God has created, then this created order 
will exist in accordance with certain laws prescribed by the divine essence (and in that sense will 
necessarily manifest the divine essence). 
 The nature of the divine self- manifestation in the finite has its root in the fact that the 
divine essence is the good. According to revelation, Staudenmaier says, “God is good and holy 




God’ (Mt. 19:17). God is, according to this expression, not only the good, but it is included in 
Him still further that He is in Himself the good alone.”131  
 Staudenmaier argues further that, by definition, goodness entails that it should be. “The 
good is that which ought to be, consequently, the ought-being (Seinsollende).”132 Staudenmaier 
notes that the notion of ‘ought-to-be’ entails [1] that it can be, for if something ought be done 
then this implies that it can be done, and [2] that it must be. As he puts it, “In the concept of the 
ought-to-be lies both the concept of the could-be (Seinkönnens) through freedom and the concept 
of the must-be (Seinmüssens) through necessity.”133 Therefore, God is obligated to will the good 
(since the good must be willed). 
 It is not the case, however, that God is merely obligated to realize the good. Rather, God 
freely wills this good. Indeed, Staudenmaier notes that God wants to realize the good: “God 
wants to realize the idea of the good just as much as He must realize it. Or: the idea which God 
must realize God also wills eternally to realize.”134  
 Thus, in the divine will, freedom and necessity are united. The unity of freedom and 
necessity in willing the good Staudenmaier refers to as the divine holiness: “The unity of 
freedom and necessity, or the unity in willing and obligation in God is, however, the divine 
holiness.”135 God’s external expression of holiness is God’s righteousness: “The divine 
righteousness is the divine holiness which works and appears outwardly. Righteousness can 
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therefore be defined as divine holiness in its application. Both are related to one another as 
disposition and activity: holiness is the disposition, righteousness is the activity.”136 
 The divine, therefore, cannot tolerate unholiness. “Above all it is now clear how God, 
through His inward essence as an absolute holy essence, is deterred already from either himself 
positing an action, or allowing an action to be posited with necessity through a finite essence, 
which is evil and sinful.”137 Because God both always freely wills the good and is obligated to 
will the good, God’s ordering of creation can only be in line with this good: “But also the plan 
and the order which ought to be developed out of the divine idea can only be a plan of the holy 
and an order of the good.”138  
 Because it is in willing the good (which, again, is identical with just His own essence) 
that God possesses holiness and righteousness, and because the divine plan and order vis-à-vis 
the nondivine can only be in line with this good, God’s acts ad extra (because God’s acts involve 
His will) must necessarily manifest the divine holiness and righteousness in the created order. 
Below, we will explore precisely how God’s holiness and righteousness – indeed how God 
Himself – becomes manifest in and to the nondivine. 
 
3.3 Creaturely Righteousness as Manifesting the Divine Will 
 As we saw above, righteousness is just the external expression of holiness. Holiness 
consists in the willingness to realize the idea of the good. Divine righteousness, therefore, 
consists in God’s willingness to realize the idea of the good externally, i.e. to realize the idea of 
 
136 CD II §71.1 (p. 401). 
137 Ibid., §70.3 (p. 399). 




the good in the created order. Thus, Staudenmaier says, “The righteousness which exists in God 
becomes, through the divine willing, an imperative for the human will, and consequently the law 
for human life: it [righteousness] is what ought to be.”139  
 We saw above that God Himself is the good. If divine righteousness is the external 
manifestation of the willingness to realize the idea of the good (or better, the actual realization of 
the good), and if the good just is God Himself, then righteousness is the realization of God in 
creation. But what does it mean for God to be ‘realized’ in creation?  
 Staudenmaier has emphasized that the created order and the divine are not to be identified 
with one another. Thus, the realizing of God in the created order is not a conversion of created 
essences into the divine essence. Rather, God “steers and leads the development of the divine 
reign as ethical through omnipresent activity.”140 Because, as we saw above, God can will only 
the holy and the good, “that which according to the holy plan of the Godhead should come to be 
through development can itself only be holy and good, holiness at the same time becomes a 
divine imperative for the human spirit.”141 “Just in this imperative, or through this imperative,” 
Staudenmaier continues, “the holiness of God becomes the eternal prototype of man”142 
 The divine will is ‘realized’ in creation, therefore, because God himself is the prototype 
of love for the good – of love for God –which creatures are to copy. In obeying the divine 
imperative to love the good, which is just to love God, the creature renders to God what is due to 
Him. Therefore, the divine righteousness is manifest in creation by the creature rendering to God 
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what is due to Him, and the imperative that justice be rendered to God – that creation manifest 
righteousness – is itself just the manifestation of the divine will in the created order. 
 That there is an imperative in the created order which demands obedience to the highest 
good (and thus love for the highest good) – in short, that there is ethical law in the created order 
– is a manifestation of the personal characteristic of the will, since a law demands obedience of 
the will. As we will see in chapter three, this notion of rendering what is due to God – namely, 
righteousness – is a feature of the triune life itself, i.e. of the interpersonal relations between the 
divine persons. 
 
4. The Presence of the Divine to the Nondivine: Omnipresence 
4.1 Introduction 
 In sections 1.2 through 1.6, we saw that Staudenmaier characterizes the divine with the 
qualities of singularity, aseity, necessary existence, infinity, and transcendence, and such 
qualities establish God’s being-for-self – and so irreducibility – to the nondivine. These qualities 
manifest fundamental differences between God and creatures, differences which are necessary 
for an encounter between the two to occur. Although encounter between things requires some 
level of difference between them, difference – and only difference – occludes the possibility of 
encounter as much as pure sameness. An encounter between personal subjects therefore requires 
something that is shared between the two. That is, an encounter between subjects requires that 




 The presence of the divine to the nondivine is a long-standing topic of Christian 
theological reflection.143 Due to the absoluteness of the divine vis-à-vis the nondivine, 
mainstream theological reflection has spoken of this divine presence to the creaturely as that of 
omnipresence. Staudenmaier is here no different: “The divine causality, regarded as extending 
itself in living efficacy in the universe, gives the concept of the omnipresence of God. In it lie the 
principles of divine revelation and of the government toward their goal of the divine ideas which 
develop themselves in space and time.”144 
 For Staudenmaier, the encounter between the divine and the nondivine through 
omnipresence has two aspects. The first aspect consists in the divine presence in the nondivine. 
He says, “If God, according to the category of aseity, affirms Himself eternally in His essence 
which exists from and through Himself, then now, according to the category of causality, He 
affirms Himself in, for, and through the creature, and this divine self-affirmation is the revelation 
of God. God affirms Himself, however, by positing Himself in the creature…as that who, as its 
cause, so also is its goal and end.”145  
 However, divine omnipresence not only consists in God’s self-positing in things, “but 
also [in] His appearing in things; indeed, His working is in particular a working of His 
appearance. As manifold as natural divine revelation is, just as manifold is this appearing 
through omnipresence.”146 Thus, the second aspect of divine encounter through omnipresence 
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consists in the divine presence to the nondivine: God ‘appears’ – reveals Himself – to the 
nondivine. 
 
4.2 Omnipresence and the Characteristics of Divine Personality 
 How is omnipresence related to the divine intelligence? Staudenmaier links the two this 
way: “If above, we have called divine omnipresence the absolute causality of God which 
continues itself in and continually influences the world, then – in order to use the right scientific 
expression – we would be obligated to call divine omniscience the intellectual omnipresence of 
God in the world.”147 Omniscience, then, is not utterly different from omnipresence. Rather, it is 
just the divine omnipresence in its intellectual aspect. 
 Omniscience is the intellectual presence of God with regard to all aspects of the creature: 
internal, external, and the span of its relations. As Staudenmaier puts it, “the divine intelligence 
as absolute knowledge of extradivine being is related to the latter in the first place as the world-
creature, or as the creature in its entirety. In this relation, however, it is the present beholding of 
the entire creature both according to its inner essence, as well as its external manifestation, and 
finally, according to all relationships and all sides of the creature. Therefore, divine knowing is 
the absolute science of everything – omniscience.”148 
 While Staudenmaier makes the connection between the divine intelligence and 
omnipresence fairly obvious, the relation between being-for-self on the one hand, and will and 
omnipresence on the other, is not as obvious. Thus, we need to do a bit of exegetical work to 
show how he sees the relation between these two aspects of personality and omnipresence. 
 





 We have seen that the divine being-for-self is constituted by God’s aseity, which ensures 
the irreducibility of God and creature to one another. Staudenmaier then roots God’s causal 
efficacy with respect to the nondivine in aseity: “In divine aseity, as the absolute power (Macht) 
to be from and through itself, lies, at the same time, the absolute power (Macht) to cause merely 
possible being [actually to be]. This gives the concept of the absolute causality of God which, as 
a [thing] which fulfills itself in reality through causal power (Macht), is the Ur-essence.”149 
Because God has the ability to exist from and through Himself, God thereby has the ability to act 
causally vis-à-vis that reality which does not have to exist. 
 God’s causality ad extra, Staudenmaier notes, has two aspects: ability and will. He says, 
“The concept of absolute causality is therefore such a concept as consists of two elements, that of 
ability and that of willingness, which already in the concept are not one. For it is one thing to be 
able to create the world, and another to be willing to create the world.”150 This ability to cause 
the existence of the nondivine is the divine ‘almightiness’: 
In the concept of causality above, we have found a twofoldness, and have distinguished 
from one another an ability (ein Können) and a willingness (ein Wollen). If we now 
extract the divine ability (Können) as an element existing for itself, then the concept [of 
this ability] is the concept of the divine almightiness. This the absolute power (Macht) 
and strength of the Godhead to posit life outside of itself, in general, to create and to 
effect everything which it wills.151 
 
Thus, because God’s ability to act causally towards the nondivine (His almightiness) is rooted in 
His aseity, and because His aseity ensures His irreducibility to the nondivine (and vice versa), 
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God’s ability to act causally ad extra – His almightiness – is just the presence of the divine 
being-for-self within the nondivine. 
 As the passage above indicates (and as we saw in the section on the divine will [3.1]), the 
actual existence of the nondivine also depends upon the divine will. Thus, God’s causal relation 
to the nondivine involves almightiness and will: 
If, however, the divine omnipresence is only the causality of God extended [into the non-
divine], then  omnipresence is constituted simply as causality which is abidingly 
continued through the very elements we have detected above as elements of causality. As 
elements of causality we have discovered absolute ability (Können) as almightiness, and 
the willing of the Godhead which determines and calls forth everything with absolute 
freedom. Almightiness and will, or absolute ability (Können) and absolutely free 
willingness (Wollen) are therefore also the constitutive elements of divine 
omnipresence.152 
 
The characteristics of personality, therefore, each function within God’s presence to creation. 
The divine omnipresence to the nondivine involves almightiness, will, and omniscience, 
corresponding to the personal characteristics of being-for-self, will, and intelligence, 
respectively. 
 We have seen that all three aspects of God’s personal subjectivity are present to the 
nondivine in the interpersonal encounter between the two: the divine intelligence is present to the 
nondivine in terms of its theoretical aspect (viz., creatively in imagining the various nondivine 
essences), as well as its practical aspect (viz., in ordering these created essences to their 
appropriate ends); the divine being-for-self is present to the nondivine through the divine ability 
to bring the nondivine into existence as well as uphold it in existence; the divine will is present to 
the nondivine in that it is only through God’s willingness to perform the above acts that these 
acts actually occur. We saw above that Staudenmaier conceives two aspects of divine 
 




omnipresence: divine presence in creation and divine presence to creation. The very existence 
and determination of the finite order thus manifests the presence of the divine in creation. 
 
5. Divine Absoluteness and Divine Personality 
 We have seen how the elements of the divine personality – being-for-self, intelligence, 
and will – are manifest in the encounter between the divine and the nondivine. Here we will see 
how God’s being is related to the divine personality, specifically how the eternity of God’s being 
has implications for understanding the nature of the divine personality. Understanding how the 
eternity of God’s being relates to the divine personality will set us up for seeing exactly why the 
Trinity is necessary for personality as being an immanent feature of the divine. 
 Since God is constituted by and through Himself, God is thereby not constituted by the 
created order. As Staudenmaier puts it, “Because God has neither the ground of His being (Sein) 
nor the goal of His life outside of Himself in another, rather His absolute self-affirmation is also 
the affirmation of His being (Sein) as eternally grounded in itself and eternally complete in itself. 
Thus in Him no movement is thinkable through which He could strive to fulfill Himself in a 
ground and goal which lay outside of Him.”153 And in a text which we have already had 
opportunity to examine in chapter one, he says, “As the one who for Himself, or as a personal 
being-for-self, God is also the one of whom it can be said neither that the world is an essential 
and necessary element of Him, nor is He Himself an essential and necessary element of the 
world, and finally just as little can it be said that He would not be God without the world, which 
definitions, as is known, are the philosophy of modern pantheism.”154 
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 Because God’s being is not constituted by the created order, God’s personality is also not 
constituted by the created order. Rather, Staudenmaier insists, God is eternally personal: “there 
was no moment for Him in which He was not personal.”155 Indeed, Staudenmaier argues that the 
divine personality is as eternal as the divine being. Thus, he says, “Indeed in God the personal is 
not added to being (Sein) in order to combine with being (Sein), but God is, as eternal being 
(Sein), also eternally personal being (Sein) and life, so that with the concept of divine being 
(Sein) is already combined within itself the concept of personal life.”156 
 In fact, Staudenmaier argues, it is only because God is already personal – personal apart 
from the nondivine – that there can be nondivine persons at all: “Consequently it already lies in 
the concept of God as the absolutely perfect that He is personal, and not only that He is personal, 
but also that He is already absolutely personal insofar as He is the causal principle of all other 
personality which is extradivine. In God, therefore, is the essence (Wesen) already beforehand 
necessarily and eternally a personal essence (Wesen). Therefore, personality is no addition, or 
something nascent which might arise later through an unfolding.”157 Personality, therefore, is an 
eternal feature of the divine. 
 Given the fact that personality is an eternal feature of the divine, personality is thereby an 
immanent feature of the divine. For Staudenmaier, then, the characteristics of intelligence, will, 
and being-for-self are characteristics which belong to God eternally – i.e., apart from the created 
order. These personal characteristics – manifest in God’s interpersonal interaction with the 
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created order – do not have their genesis in God’s interpersonal interaction with the created 
order, but are revelations of what is eternally true of God. 
 
Conclusion 
 We have seen that personality is constituted by otherness, by other personalities. But in 
the case of the divine, however, we see that personality is an eternal feature of God, and so that 
personality is not constituted by the otherness of the created order. If personality is constituted by 
otherness, and yet if the divine personality is not constituted by the otherness of the nondivine, 
then this raises the question as to how God can be a personal subject without the presence of the 
otherness of the nondivine.  
 The only solution to this question is that there must be a presence of otherness that is 
within the divine itself, a presence of otherness which is eternal and thus an immanent feature of 
the divine. God’s being-for-self – God’s irreducibility to the created order – blocks the created 
order from providing the otherness that is constitutive of divine personal subjectivity, and 
therefore forces the locus of such otherness to be within the divine itself. That the divine 
personality requires otherness and yet is not constituted by its relation to the nondivine will form 
the crux of why, for Staudenmaier, the Trinity is necessary for ensuring the presence of otherness 





THE TRINITY AS THE ACTUALIZATION OF DIVINE SUBJECTIVITY 
 
Introduction 
 We left the previous chapter faced with a question. On the one hand, subjectivity – 
comprised of the elements of personality – requires something beyond the individual person for 
its actualization, i.e. something beyond that individual locus of divine being-for-self, 
intelligence, and will. As we saw, Staudenmaier sharply distinguishes between God and the 
created order. Thus, the created order cannot be identified with the locus of divine being-for-self, 
intelligence, and will. It would seem, then, that the created order would prove a likely candidate 
for that which could actualize divine subjectivity. 
 On the other hand, we have seen that Staudenmaier makes much of divine aseity as 
facilitating divine transcendence. Because God possesses aseity, He not only cannot be identified 
with the created order, but He also requires nothing from it in order to possess the full perfection 
of His divinity. Therefore, this rules out the possibility that divine subjectivity could be 
actualized through the created order, because if the created order cannot be identified with God, 
then actualization through the created order entails that God does not possess the perfection of 
His divinity immanently.  
 The problem before us, therefore, is this: one the one hand, how does Staudenmaier 
understand the divine subjectivity to be actualized immanently, while on the other hand 




to this question. Here, I argue that Staudenmaier solves this problem through the Christian 
understanding of God as a Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, three irreducibly distinct 
persons sharing a numerical sameness of essence. 
 A trinitarian constitution of the divine resolves the dilemma in the following way. 
Because the Christian doctrine of the Trinity consists in the claim that God is immanently both 
one divine essence as well as three distinct persons, the presence of personal otherness – 
necessary for the actualization of personal subjectivity – is a feature of the divine apart from the 
created order. And it is precisely because the components for such actualization belong to the 
divine apart from the created order that the personal subjectivity of the divine can be actualized 
immanently. 
 In section 1, I make an exegetical case that Staudenmaier actually sees connections 
between the Trinity, divine transcendence, and personal subjectivity. We will see that 
Staudenmaier associates the notion of the Trinity with the notion of divine transcendence (1.2), 
and that he sees the Trinity as the condition by which divine subjectivity is possible (1.3). Thus, 
the Trinity operates in Staudenmaier’s theology as the solution to a problem about how God can 
be a personal subject, and is thereby the necessary solution to this problem such that the Trinity 
must be rationally demonstrated if one is to believe that God is a personal subject at all. 
 The task of section 2 is to examine how the Trinity is that by which divine subjectivity is 
actualized, i.e. what it is about the Trinity which occludes God’s engagement with the finite as a 
means of His own self-development. 2.1 treats Staudenmaier’s correlation of the Trinity and 
divine transcendence with what he refers to as the ‘concrete unity’ of the divine. In 2.2, I give a 





 Having examined what ‘concreteness’ consists in, the task of section 3 is explore how the 
notion of ‘concreteness’ ought to be applied in the case of the Trinity. 3.1 explores how 
Staudenmaier conceives the Trinity as a dialectic, and thus how the concreteness of the divine 
life is achieved dialectically. 3.2 examines what dialectical movement consists in when the 
category in question is that of persons. In 3.2.1, I offer an apologetic for once again utilizing 
Hegel as a guide. 3.2.2 presents Hegel’s dialectic of personal subjectivity, which provides a 
model by which Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic can be understood. In 3.3, Staudenmaier’s 
trinitarian dialectic is then interpreted along Hegelian lines. In 3.3.2, it is argued that 
Staudenmaier’s understanding of the Trinity parallels the Hegelian notion of “mutual 
recognition,” an important aspect of Hegel’s understanding of personal intersubjectivity. Then, in 
3.3.3, it is shown how the interpersonal encounters of the divine persons of the Trinity result in 
the formation of a community. 
 Finally, in section 4, we will consider the implications of the actualization of divine 
personality via the Trinity. There I will demonstrate that Staudenmaier sees the Trinity as that 
through which divine subjectivity is actualized immanently, and so as that which prevents God 
from having to actualize His subjectivity by means of the finite. I will also demonstrate that, for 
Staudenmaier, because the Trinity is the locus of interpersonal encounter by which divine 
subjectivity is actualized, the Trinity also serves as the model for interpersonal encounter 
between the divine and the non-divine. 
 
1. Trinity, Transcendence, and Subjectivity 
1.1 Introduction 
 Our thesis is that for Staudenmaier personal otherness is requisite for the actualization of 




the divine (resulting in the divine Trinity), the divine Trinity is that in virtue of which divine 
subjectivity is actualized and actualized immanently. Our first step in showing that Staudenmaier 
believes this to be the case is to demonstrate that he associates the concepts of divine Trinity, 
divine transcendence, and divine subjectivity. More precisely, our first step is to demonstrate that 
he associates the notion of the Trinity with the notion of divine transcendence, and to 
demonstrate that it is the Trinity with which Staudenmaier associates the actualization of divine 
subjectivity. 
 
1.2 Trinity and Divine Transcendence 
 How is it that God is able to transcend the created order? In a few key places in CD II, 
Staudenmaier associates the Trinity with God’s transcendence over creation, and particularly 
God not needing the created order. He speaks of the Trinity as forming a ‘world’ unto itself, and 
thus as forming a self-enclosed milieu. He says, “For precisely because there are not one, but 
three divine persons, is the divine life a world for itself (eine Welt für sich), a whole and 
complete world (eine ganze und volle Welt), which precisely in this way stands by itself (durch 
sich selber) over the finite world, as it does not require the latter for itself.”158 Staudenmaier 
clearly maintains here that, in virtue of God being three divine persons, God does not require the 
created order for His development or perfection. 
 A few sentences later, Staudenmaier posits the counterfactual – that if God was not a 
Trinity of persons, then God would require the finite for His self-development. He puts the 
matter this way: “If God ceases to live as divine person in the divine person, through the divine 
person, and for the divine person, to know Himself and to be in the divine person, then the 
 




consequence is necessary, namely that God knows Himself in the finite, develops Himself by the 
finite, loves Himself through the finite and in the finite, and lives in the finite. With the 
annulment (Aufhebung) of the divine tripersonality, pantheism is introduced.”159  
 Staudenmaier’s descriptions of a divine person living and knowing Himself “in a divine 
person, through the divine person, and for the divine person” are, as we will see later, a way of 
referencing the divine as trinitarian. We will see that Staudenmaier thinks of the Trinity as a 
‘concrete unity,’ and this requires what he thinks is a more intimate relation between the persons 
than sharing one and the same essence, namely a union in which they relate as ethical subjects. 
 
1.3 Trinity and Divine Subjectivity 
 In section 1.2 above, we saw that Staudenmaier associates the divine Trinity with God’s 
transcendence over the finite milieu. Further, I have suggested that it is in virtue of a fully-
developed subjectivity that God possesses transcendence over the finite (since God would 
thereby not need the finite to actualize His subjectivity). But how do we know that it is divine 
subjectivity which would be actualized by the finite if God were not Trinity?  
 Here we must admit that Staudenmaier is not as straightforward as we might hope in 
correlating divine triunity with the actualization of divine subjectivity, making subjectivity the 
cause – or explanation – of the Trinity. Indeed, in the hundreds of pages of Die christliche 
Dogmatik, he nowhere puts the link between divine Trinity and subjectivity as baldly as I have. 
However, his lack of explicitness on the matter need not mean that we reject our thesis out of 
hand. What his lack of explicitness does mean is that we will have to look for suggestive links 
between the Trinity and divine subjectivity by which we can build a cumulative case. 
 




 Save for one instance (which we will examine momentarily), although Staudenmaier does 
not explicitly state that divine triunity is a necessary condition of the actualization of divine 
subjectivity, in several places he associates the Trinity with those personal aspects of intelligence 
and will. As he puts it in the heading of CD II §93, “The trinitarian life of the Godhead consists 
in the mutual being in-, through-, and for-one-another of the three divine persons, indeed 1. in 
the immanent movement of knowing, through which Father, Son, and Spirit reciprocally know 
themselves in the absolute identity of their essence; 2. in the immanent movement of willing, 
through which they, in eternal accordance with their essence, mutually will themselves.”160 
 As the text above demonstrates, Staudenmaier sees the acts of personal subjectivity – 
knowing and willing – as constitutive of the divine life, and thereby constitutive of the Trinity. 
The reason that knowing and willing are constitutive of the Trinity is because the divine life is 
characterized by an ethical unity between the divine persons, and such unity is achieved through 
the exercise of knowledge and will. As he puts it a bit later, “the three divine persons, since they 
are bound indissolubly to unity through the one divine essence, present the same unity as a 
living-personal [unity] by the three persons being mutually in-one-another, through-one-another, 
and for-one-another, by them mutually sounding themselves through their properties, and 
forming an absolute spiritual unity in knowledge, will, and love.”161 
 We see this same association between the trinitarian life and the acts of knowledge and 
will again at the end of §93. “Through love,” Staudenmaier says, “the divine persons mutually 
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posit themselves in one another through knowing and willing, through love they pour themselves 
out into one another, through love they mutually give and receive their being and life, wholly and 
without reservation. Through love, finally, the trinitarian life forms itself as a united [life], a life 
in which unity pervades all abilities of knowing and willing, and thereby creates a single life.”162 
 Admittedly, one can argue from the above quotations that although they demonstrate a 
correlation between divine subjectivity and Trinity, where the divine persons utilize their 
abilities of intelligence and will, their utilization of such abilities within the triune life does not 
mean that the triune life is the means by which they are actualized. Indeed, one could argue that 
the above quotations do not rule out the possibility that divine subjectivity may be actualized 
independently of the triune life, and the triune life is merely the locus of their expression. 
 If the above quotations merely correlate divine subjectivity with the Trinity, there is one 
instance where Staudenmaier suggests an even stronger relationship between the two, indeed a 
causal relationship. He says, “If, therefore, God is certainly a personal God, i.e. if personality 
certainly belongs to God, then He is necessarily (notwendig) a tripersonal [God], because 
without tripersonality in the life of the Godhead the properly personal elements are not able to 
occur (vorkommen) and are not able to satisfy (befriedigen) themselves.”163 
 Here, Staudenmaier indicates that there is a primal element of divine subjectivity – the 
divine personality – which demands to come to fruition. The personality can come to fruition 
only if there are multiple loci by which it is instantiated, that is, only if there are multiple divine 
persons. Here, then, the existence of multiple of divine persons is explained by their being 
vehicles for the fruition of personality. Given that there is a causal relation between the divine 
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personality and the Trinity, this suggests that the quotations previous to the one above ought to 
be read such that intelligence and will are not merely epiphenomenal to the Trinity, but in fact 
are constitutive of it. As Staudenmaier puts it, “The one divine essence presents itself as 
concretely personal in a threefold personality, or: the one absolute essence of the Godhead is 
eternally actual and truly personal only in three divine persons.”164 We can say, therefore, that 
for Staudenmaier, that divine subjectivity naturally unfolds itself as Trinity.  
 Given that Staudenmaier believes divine subjectivity necessarily takes the form of a 
Trinity of divine persons, our next task is to examine how the Trinity is that by which divine 
subjectivity is actualized. We have seen that it is in virtue of God being a Trinity of persons that 
He does not need the created, finite milieu in order to develop or perfect His divinity. We must 
now figure out what it is about the Trinity which occludes God’s engagement with the finite as a 
means of His own self-development. 
 
2. The Trinity as Concrete Unity 
2.1 The Correlation of Transcendence, Trinity, and Concrete Unity 
 We have seen that Staudenmaier correlates the Trinity with God’s transcendence, and 
that such correlation is due to the Trinity being the locus of the actualization of divine 
subjectivity. This correlation, however, sheds little light on precisely how the Trinity actualizes 
divine subjectivity. In order to get a better understanding on the matter, we must examine a 
further correlation made by Staudenmaier, namely his correlation of the Trinity and divine 
transcendence with what he refers to as the ‘concrete unity’ of the divine. 
 




 “The unity (Einheit) of God,” Staudenmaier notes, “is consequently no abstract, but a 
concrete, unity, and this concreteness consists not only in each of the divine persons being one 
with the divine essence, but also and chiefly in the fact that the one essence of God emerges in a 
threefold personality and is spiritually living.”165 Here we encounter the terms ‘abstract’ and 
‘concrete,’ terms which are not novel with Staudenmaier, although the sense in which he uses 
them may be (and certainly are not traditional in the history of Christian trinitarian theology). In 
this passage, we see that although ‘concrete unity’ describes the divine persons ‘being one with 
the divine essence,’ it chiefly describes the essence of God emerging in a ‘threefold personality.’ 
And here it is ‘unity’ which bears the description ‘concrete.’ 
 As we can see in the passage above, this concreteness which describes the divine unity is 
at least in part on account of the ‘threefold personality’ which emerges from the divine essence, 
viz. the three divine persons. Thus, there is something about the divine being a threefold 
personality which has a bearing on the divine unity so as to make it ‘concrete.’ 
 Further, we saw above that Staudenmaier describes the Trinity as “a world for itself (eine 
Welt für sich), a whole and complete world (eine ganze und volle Welt), which stands by itself 
(durch sich selber) over the finite world, as it does not require the latter for itself.” Staudenmaier 
further describes this ‘world’ as characterized by ‘concrete unity.’ He says, “This complete 
world (vollkommene Welt) which God is in Himself is just the divine unity (Einheit) as a 
concrete [unity], i.e. the tripersonality of the one God.”166 
 If concrete unity is a property immanent to the divine, then “the Godhead does not need 
to mix itself with the world out of hunger for life and concreteness, so to speak, to posit and to 
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love itself as a world, thereby at the same time to make itself dependent on the finite, and to 
grasp this dependence as an essential and necessary element of the divine nature itself , like 
Hegel, who confesses without embarrassment that he can conceive no God who could be God 
without the world.”167 
 We see from these passages, therefore, that Staudenmaier correlates the divine as a 
‘complete world’ with the divine as a ‘concrete’ unity, and that he correlates this ‘concrete’ unity 
with the divine as ‘the tripersonality of the one God.’ This suggests that the Trinity is 
characterized by a particular form of unity (viz., ‘concrete’ unity), and it is precisely this sort of 
unity which engenders divine transcendence. Specifically, because concreteness is immanent to 
the divine, God does not need to obtain concreteness for Himself by means of the finite order. 
 
2.2 The Nature of Concreteness 
 The term ‘concrete’ – and its opposite, ‘abstract’ – are not traditional semantic terms in 
Christian theology of the Trinity. Further, although Staudenmaier describes the divine as a 
concrete unity in several places, he nowhere defines what ‘concreteness’ is as such. Interestingly, 
the utilization of this term that is most proximate to Staudenmaier is that of Hegel. This is 
interesting given Staudenmaier’s fierce criticisms of Hegel.168 Thus, it might seem that to utilize 
Hegel hermeneutically for understanding Staudenmaier is wrongheaded from the outset. 
However, as critical of Hegel as Staudenmaier was, one cannot ignore Staudenmaier’s use of 
such language. 
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 In examining Hegel’s utilization of the term ‘concrete,’ we can speak only in very 
general terms.169 This is because for Hegel, the categories of logic develop immanently, and 
therefore relate to one another in different ways, depending upon the specific category in 
question. It is difficult, therefore, to say much regarding the criteria for what constitutes a 
category’s abstractness and concreteness without taking into account the specific category in 
question. Thus, here I can give only basic criteria for abstractness and concreteness. 
 Generally speaking, the term ‘concrete’ was utilized by Hegel to describe a particular 
concept or category insofar as it was viewed in relation to other concepts or categories. (Thus, its 
opposite, ‘abstract,’ describes a particular concept or category that is viewed in isolation.) What 
makes a concept ‘concrete,’ however, is not a relation to any other concepts whatsoever, but its 
relation to a concept which is seemingly its opposite. This opposition is then mediated by a 
subsequent concept, where such mediation shows how the (seemingly) oppositional concepts are 
in fact intimately related, for each is comprehensible only in the light of its opposite. 
 On the one hand, this mediation does not dissolve the (seemingly) contradictory concepts, 
for then there would be nothing to mediate between, and there would be no dialectical 
progression, but a collapse back into indeterminate, abstract sameness. On the other hand, the 
mediating concept that emerges from the opposition is a subsequent stage of the dialectic, which 
provides a fuller, truer picture of Being than its less determinate stages. This is due to its 
incorporation into a more comprehensive framework of the truths of its preceding concepts, 
precisely because it is able to resolve the contradictions between its preceding concepts. 
 
169 Unfortunately, there is not much discussion specifically on the terms ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ in the secondary 
literature on German idealism. One exception is the essay by Philip T. Grier, “Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s 
Logic,” in Essays on Hegel’s Logic, ed. George di Giovanni (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 




 It should be noted, though, that the movement from the initial concept to its opposite, and 
then to their mediating concept, does not occur arbitrarily (as if the thinker begins with some 
concept and then consciously tries to come up with what its opposite would be). Rather, when 
thought entertains a concept, it simply perceives an instability, and this instability naturally leads 
thought to the subsequent concepts of the initial thought’s opposite and their mediation. Thus, 
the movement from concept to concept is not due to choice, but rather to thought’s following its 
own immanent logic (which is, in the end, the same thing as being following its own immanent 
logic). 
 Hegel’s dialectical logic, therefore, forms a chain of concepts that develop immanently, 
where each subsequent concept incorporates the truths of previous concepts into an increasingly 
comprehensive framework. The logical-dialectical process ends at the concept which 
incorporates the truths of all previous concepts and which there are no further stages. This final 
stage is ‘absolute’ because the framework as a whole is comprehensive, in that it has 
incorporated the truths of all its preceding concepts and mediated their opposition, and there is 
no further mediation possible. 
 We can see a paradigm example of this logical-dialectical opposition and mediation at the 
beginning of Hegel’s Logic in his discussion of being, nothing, and becoming. We will briefly 
examine this dialectical movement so as to get a picture of what this logical-dialectical 
progression looks like.  
 The first, most indeterminate thought which one can still think is the thought of ‘being.’ 
When we think of ‘being’ in this indeterminate state, we have nothing at all in mind (e.g., we do 
not have the thought of being insofar as it exists in a determination like ‘plant’ or ‘dog’ or ‘red’). 




 Yet note that, when we think simply of ‘being’ – and thus have nothing at all in mind – 
we literally have the thought of ‘nothing’ now in our mind. In thinking the thought of ‘being,’ 
our thought automatically slips into the thought of ‘nothing.’ However, consider the thought of 
‘nothing’: it is just the thought that there is nothing that is determinate before our mental gaze, 
i.e. that whatever is before our mental gaze is content-less. But note that, when thinking the 
thought of ‘nothing,’ we are actually now thinking of ‘nothing’ in terms of being: that whatever 
is before our mental gaze is content-less (thus what is before out mental gaze is ‘being’ that is 
without content)  
 Thus, the thought of ‘nothing’ automatically slips into the thought of ‘being.’ In thinking 
of ‘being,’ then, thought moves from ‘being’ to ‘nothing,’ and then from ‘nothing’ to ‘being.’ 
Therefore, in thinking of being, thought thinks of the transition from the one to the other. Thus, 
the indeterminacy of being – in its movement back and forth between itself and nothing, where 
‘being’ becomes ‘nothing’ and ‘nothing’ becomes ‘being’ – just is the thought of ‘becoming.’ 
Being, therefore, has now moved from indeterminate to something more determinate (viz., 
‘becoming’). 
 Recall that, when thinking the thought of ‘nothing,’ we thought of ‘nothing’ in terms of 
being: that whatever is before our mental gaze is content-less (and so the ‘nothing’ that is before 
our mental gaze is ‘being’ that is without content). Further, recall that, when thinking the thought 
‘being,’ we thought of ‘being’ in terms of nothing: in thinking of ‘being,’ we had nothing at all in 
mind. Thus, when we think of either one of these two thoughts, we can only think of the one in 
terms of the other: in order to successfully think the thought of ‘being,’ we must think the 




we must think the thought of having something in mind that is content-less, and so must think the 
thought of ‘being.’  
 The upshot of this is that the successful thinking of either of these thoughts requires 
mediation by its opposite thought. Ordinary thought (what Hegel refers to as ‘the understanding’) 
simply regards the difference between ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ as automatic. More precisely, their 
difference seems to be ‘immediate.’ But we saw that, in fact, the successful thought of the one 
requires the other to be latent ‘in the background’ so to speak. So, the explicit thought of ‘being’ 
is mediated to us by the latent presence of the category ‘nothing,’ and the explicit thought of 
‘nothing’ is mediated to us by the latent presence of the category ‘being.’ If, then, the thought of 
one is mediated by the thought of the other, then the determination of one requires mediation by 
the other. Determination, in Hegel’s view, is just something becoming explicitly what it is 
implicitly. Therefore, for a thing to become explicitly what it is implicitly requires difference, 
otherness. 
 Finally, though, note that the explicit thought of ‘being’ requires the mediation of the 
latent thought of ‘nothing’ (and vice versa), and so displays both difference and unity or identity. 
The thought of one is mediated by a different thought, and so the thought of one is united to 
something (viz. its opposite), yet what it is united to is nonetheless other than it (in this case, its 
opposite) and so is different than it. Thus, what we see here is what Hegel referred to as an 
‘identity of identity and difference.’ 
 Having proceeded through this dialectic, each of these categories – being, nothing, and 
becoming – are now concrete, in that they are viewed in their relations to one another. And the 
category of becoming mediates between the categories of being and nothing, and in so doing 




the truth of being and nothing.  Each of these concepts, therefore, become concrete because the 
thought of each is mediated by the thought of the other two. 
 If concreteness consists in mediation, and if the Trinity is characterized by ‘concrete’ 
unity, then the sort of unity which obtains in the Trinity must be a unity that occurs through 
mediation of distinct aspects of the Trinity. Further, apparently it is this sort of unity – concrete, 
or mediated, unity – which engenders divine transcendence vis-à-vis the created order. There is, 
therefore, something about the mediation of distinct aspects of the Trinity which precipitates 
divine transcendence. Our next task, then, is to investigate how concreteness might apply to the 
Trinity. 
 
3. The Trinitarian Divine as Forming a Concrete Unity 
3.1 The Trinity as Dialectic 
 Now that we have an understanding of abstractness and concreteness, we are in a better 
position to explore how the divine, conceived as tripersonal, might form a ‘concrete unity.’ 
However, it is not yet obvious how the notion of concreteness ought to be applied to the Trinity. 
We saw that the movement toward concreteness begins with a particular concept or category, 
proceeds to its seeming opposite, and continues to the mediation of the two. And although we 
have seen that Staudenmaier utilizes the Hegelian language of ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete,’ we have 
yet to show that he sees such concreteness as following the logic which we have described 
above. In other words, we must show that Staudenmaier sees the Trinity as manifesting 
concreteness via a movement, a movement that issues in otherness and then resolves through a 
movement of mediation. In short, we have to show that Staudenmaier sees the Trinity as 




 Fortunately, Staudenmaier gives textual evidence that he conceives the Trinity 
dialectically. He says that “in the trinitarian life of the Godhead there is indeed a living dialectic 
(Dialektik).170 He begins the ‘speculative’ part of the doctrine of the Trinity (CD II §§91-93) – 
whose first section is entitled “The Dialectic (Dialektik) of the Essential Moments of the 
Trinitarian Being of the Godhead” – with “the express remark that a dialectic (Dialektik) of those 
determinations which belong essentially to this dogma [viz., the Trinity] is no subjective, but is 
an absolutely objective dialectic (objective Dialektik).”171 (It should be noted, though, that 
Staudenmaier explicitly contrasts this objective, trinitarian dialectic with “sheer dialectic,” with 
what “in modern times, in total misjudgment of the divine being (Wesen), the being (Sein) and 
acts of God have been determined by philosophy as a mere dialectical process, indeed better, as a 
process of the logical idea.”)172 
 What, then, is the dialectic that pertains to the Trinity? Staudenmaier says: “In the 
objective dialectic (objectiven Dialektik) of the trinitarian life of God there is a movement which, 
beginning with the principle passes from oneness (Einheit) over to twoness (Zweiheit), and the 
movement itself comes to its rest only in threeness (Dreiheit).”173 Staudenmaier uses the term 
‘movement’ (Bewegung) to describe the motion of life in the divine, that is, the movement of the 
divine essence from the Father, to the Son, and from them both to the Spirit. “[W]ith the Father, 
who has life in Himself,” Staudenmaier notes, “the entire movement of life (Lebensbewegung) 
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begins.”174 Again invoking Gregory Nazianzus, he says, “[T]he immanent process of the 
trinitarian life as it is posited through the equally immanent relations…is at the same time that 
inner movement (Bewegung) through which ‘from the oneness (Einheit) of the principle moves 
to twoness (Zweiheit) and goes forth into threeness (Dreiheit).’”175 The dialectical movement 
that leads to the concrete unity of the divine is therefore just that movement of the divine essence 
in the procession of the Son from the Father and the procession of the Spirit from the Father and 
the Son. 
 We saw that dialectical movement begins with an initial concept or category and 
naturally issues in otherness. Thus, that dialectical movement (in this case, the Father’s 
generation of the Son) yields otherness: “Certainly through personal contrast (Gegensatz) 
consists an otherness (Anderheit).”176 We also saw that this issuance which yields otherness 
creates an opposition which must be overcome. Just as in the Hegelian dialectic, where the 
concept of being automatically leads thought to the concept of nothing, and so there is an 
opposition which must be overcome, so also here we have an opposition between the Father and 
the Son (created by the Father’s generation of the Son). 
 Unfortunately, Staudenmaier does not go into much detail regarding the nature of this 
opposition. (For example, he never indicates that there is a conceptual instability regarding the 
Father that automatically leads to the thought of the Son.) What seems to drive the trinitarian 
dialectic is that there is a truth in threeness that is not present in twoness. Of a system of twoness 
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he says, “Because, however, dualism is no true and complete system, the Godhead overcomes 
twoness and goes over to threeness.”177 Later, he notes, “Twoness (Zweiheit) is not yet complete; 
it therefore strives for reconciliation in a third, in which it becomes true.”178 Regarding a system 
that goes beyond threeness, Staudenmaier says, “First, threeness is the true system… Were it to 
go beyond threeness, then it would fall into boundlessness (Maaßlose), into indeterminate 
manyness, and therefore fall into polytheism.”179 
 What Staudenmaier seems to be getting at here is that threeness manifests the truth of 
otherness. As he puts it, “This otherness consummates itself not in twoness but in threeness.”180 
True otherness does not consist in total otherness, but in otherness which nonetheless contains 
familiarity (and we will explore this particular point in detail in 3.2.2 below). On the one hand, 
twoness alone is just bare otherness (where what is other appears as alien), rather than an 
otherness in which one person can nonetheless see themselves in the other (and so does not 
appear as alien). On the other hand, anything beyond threeness dissolves the truth of otherness 
because it simply issues in indeterminacy, and so one is no longer faced with otherness. 
  If we follow the logic of dialectic, this would indicate that the Holy Spirit is the one in 
whom the truth of the otherness between the Father and Son becomes manifest. This seems to be 
precisely how Staudenmaier frames the matter: “For this reason the Spirit is often called the 
Spirit of the Father and the Son in Holy Scripture. The person of the Spirit is everywhere the 
confirming person, so-to-speak, the affirming person, the consummating person, the person who 
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concludes or resolves the entire life-organism (Lebensorganismus) of the sublime Godhead.”181 
 The preceding paragraphs have presented enough textual evidence to demonstrate that 
Staudenmaier conceives the Trinity as a dialectic, and thus that the concreteness of the divine life 
is achieved dialectically. However, our investigation thus far has yielded only the formal features 
of the concrete unity of the tripersonal divine life, in that we have simply considered dialectical 
movement without any specific categories or concepts in mind. Thus, we still do not know 
exactly how the dialectical movement which emerges from the Father, to the Son, and from them 
both to the Spirit actually precipitates a concrete unity. In short, we do not know what dialectical 
movement looks like when the category in question is that of persons. To that task we now turn. 
 
3.2 Dialectic of Persons 
3.2.1 Introduction: Justification of Utilizing Hegel as a Guide 
 We have utilized the basic pattern of Hegelian dialectic to guide our reading of 
Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic. We have seen that, for Staudenmaier, the dialectical 
movement in the Trinity is a movement from person to person. In order to understand the 
dialectical movement from person to person in Staudenmaier’s Trinity, we will utilize a Hegelian 
dialectic that is also concerned with persons. This model comes from Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit, although it reaches its fullest extent in his Philosophy of Spirit (the third part of his 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences) and Philosophy of Right. 
 One concern must be addressed at the outset. Above, our utilization of Hegelian dialectic 
as a hermeneutical lens for interpreting Staudenmaier was very formal and so very basic. But 
here we will be utilizing Hegelian dialectic not merely formally, but also materially. The more 
 




content we appropriate from Hegel for our hermeneutical lens, the greater risk we take in 
distorting Staudenmaier. This is all the more a possibility given Staudenmaier’s trenchant 
criticisms of Hegel. What, then, justifies our material use of Hegel for interpreting 
Staudenmaier? 
 My answer twofold. First, such justification comes through certain parallels that arise 
between Staudenmaier’s language of the divine persons and Hegel’s language in the 
Phenomenology, as well as through various thematic parallels. In my view, although 
Staudenmaier criticized Hegel, such parallels between the two cannot be written off. Indeed, 
relations between thinkers are complicated, much more often exhibiting a both/and quality of 
appropriation and rejection rather than an either/or quality. 
 Second, my material use of Hegel is still quite modest. I am not arguing that 
Staudenmaier was a Hegelian in any robust sense. Hegelianism was no doubt ‘in the air’ and 
notions of intersubjectivity were certainly not confined only to Hegel. Thus, my utilization of 
Hegel here is more properly viewed as utilizing one example of a model of subjectivity that was 
common within the larger philosophical climate. With this preliminary behind us, we can now 
examine Hegel’s dialectic of intersubjectivity. 
 
3.2.2 Presentation of Hegel’s Dialectic of Intersubjectivity 
In the Phenomenology, Hegel seeks to demonstrate that the identity of thought and being is the 
truth of consciousness on consciousness’ own, immanent terms.182 Thus, he begins from 
everyday self-consciousness. In everyday self-consciousness, one has a consciousness of oneself, 
 
182 Thus, unlike Fichte, Hegel’s task in the Phenomenology is not a transcendental argument for the possibility of 
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Phenomenology of Spirit an Essay in Transcendental Argument?,” in The Transcendental Turn, ed. Sebastian 




but also a consciousness of what is not oneself. Indeed, consciousness of self is possible only in 
relation to what is other than the self. 
 This introduces a paradox: self-consciousness can be what it is only in relation to what is 
other than itself. Self-consciousness sees this as a contradiction and tries to resolve this 
contradiction by turning away from otherness back onto itself. It can do this because, although it 
certainly views its object as real, it nevertheless views it as subordinate to itself, as existing for 
self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, in other words, can be what it is – aware of itself – only 
in relation to what is other, but it views this other object merely as the instrument by which it is 
what it is, the instrument by which it is aware of itself. 
 Thus, self-consciousness affirms, or satisfies, itself by turning away from its object (by 
‘negating’ it) and thereby becoming aware of itself alone. But such satisfaction can occur only 
through negating the other. Thus, self-consciousness must continually negate other objects in 
order to satisfy or affirm itself. Self-consciousness, in other words, can be conscious of itself 
only through negating what is other than itself. 
 Since self-consciousness can satisfy itself only through this continual negation of 
otherness, it comes to realize that otherness has a degree of independence. Self-consciousness 
must therefore relate to otherness in a new way: otherness can still be negated, but it is 
something independent that can be negated. More precisely, self-consciousness can be conscious 
of itself through its negation of an other, but through negation of an other which has a degree of 
independence from it. 
 This, however, precipitates another contradiction. Self-consciousness is satisfied by being 
what it is, by being conscious of itself alone. Yet awareness of oneself alone must occur through 




contradiction can be resolved if the independent other is capable of self-negation: this allows for 
the negation of otherness (leaving self-consciousness aware of itself alone), yet without self-
consciousness having to engage with otherness (which is what precipitates the contradiction). 
 The only thing that is capable of self-negation, however, is another self-consciousness. 
Thus, the desire of the first self-consciousness can be provided only by another self-
consciousness. As Hegel puts it, “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another 
self-consciousness.”183 In negating itself for the sake of the other, the second self-consciousness 
thereby enables the first self-consciousness to have awareness of itself with minimal engagement 
with the second. The second self-consciousness is merely a mirror for the first, for the first sees 
only itself in the second. The second self-consciousness recognizes the first, but the first does not 
recognize the second. 
 In seeing itself in the other, however, the first self-consciousness feels alienated from 
itself because its identity is located outside of itself. To remedy this, the first self-consciousness 
reclaims its identity from the second. This leaves the second self-consciousness no longer a mere 
mirror for the first – the first self-consciousness recognizes the full independence of the second. 
Self-consciousness is therefore achieved through another self-consciousness, but precisely 
through recognition of that other as a free and equal self-consciousness. Thus, each self-
consciousness is mediated by the other self-consciousness. As Hegel puts it, each self-
consciousness  
is aware that it at once is, and is not, another consciousness, and equally that this other is 
for itself only when it supersedes itself as being for itself, and is for itself only in the 
being-for-self of the other. Each is for the other the middle term, through which each 
mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an 
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immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this 
mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.184 
 
 The dialectical movement above began with sameness, moved to difference, and then this 
sameness and difference were mediated. At first, the consciousness took what was before it not 
as independent, but rather as an instrument for itself. Subsequently, the consciousness came to 
see the other as independent, but such independence was viewed as alien to itself. Finally, each 
consciousness realized that its very self was mediated by otherness, that otherness is constitutive 
of itself (and this is why it can see itself in the other).  
 It is in this third phase that a concrete unity emerges, for there comes to be (as Hegel 
often put the matter) an identity of identity and difference. Mere sameness without any 
difference whatsoever would be static and indeterminate, and total difference would preclude 
any unity. In concrete unity, however, difference is mediated by sameness (and vice versa). 
 
3.3 The Trinity as a Dialectic of Concrete Unity 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 Now that we have a model before us of interpersonal dialectical movement, we can 
examine Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic. We have seen already that his trinitarian dialectic 
begins with mere sameness (the Father), which issues in otherness (the generation of the Son 
from the Father), and this otherness is subsequently mediated (the spiration of the Holy Spirit 
from both the Father and the Son). The task now before us is to examine how Staudenmaier’s 
understanding of the triune life of God manifests those features of interpersonal dialectic 
examined above. This will enable us to consider how the Trinity forms a concrete unity and how 
such a unity funds divine transcendence over the created order. 
 




 Interpersonal concrete unity, as we have seen, consists in a unity amongst difference. As 
Hegel put it, there is an identity of identity and non-identity. As such, Staudenmaier’s notion of 
the interpersonal concrete unity of the Trinity is what I call an ethical unity: a unity (= identity) 
between different individuals (= difference) who share one and the same universal (= identity). I 
refer to this type of unity as “ethical” because it involves the use of what Staudenmaier refers to 
as the “ethical” attributes of intelligence and will. Through intelligence, the individuals come to 
possess knowledge of their common universality, and through will the individuals yield their 
own individualities for the sake of the greater whole. 
 In Hegel’s dialectic, this ethical unity amongst persons occurs through “recognition” by 
different individuals of their common universality.185 Admittedly, Staudenmaier does not use the 
term “recognition” (Anerkennung) in his trinitarian dialectic. Nonetheless, he does speak in 
similar terms (as we will see below), most often using the verb erkennen (to know), but 
occasionally using the verbs begreifen (to grasp) and schauen (to behold). 
 
3.3.2 Mutual Recognition 
 Concrete unity, as an identity of identity and difference, involves identity in two different 
senses. One sense of identity, which we have already seen, is what I have called a ‘common 
universality’ amongst the individuals. In Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic, this sense of 
identity is the one common essence that is shared by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  
 The concrete unity of the triune life of God, however, is more than a unity of essence: 
“The unity (Einheit) of God is consequently no abstract, but a concrete, unity, and this 
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concreteness consists not only in each of the divine persons being one with the divine essence, 
but also and chiefly in the fact that the one essence of God emerges in a threefold personality 
and is spiritually living.”186 “What mediates the being-in-one-another and the living-in-one-
another of the three divine persons, alongside the unity of substance is, in addition, love, which 
posits personally, i.e. for intelligence and will, what is already posited eternally through the 
eternal nature.”187 
 Concrete unity indicates a unity of the trinitarian persons not simply in terms of their 
sharing of a common essence but, in addition, a unity in terms of personal subjectivity (achieved 
through the capacities of intelligence and will). We saw in our examination of Hegel’s 
interpersonal dialectic that the ethical unity of persons is grounded in a mutual recognition 
between the persons of their common universality. Such recognition, we saw, consists in each 
person seeing herself ‘in’ the other person, in the sense that she recognizes that the other person 
is a human just as she is. And it is in virtue of seeing herself in the other that she suspends her 
will as merely her own and yields her will to the greater whole of which they are all a part. 
 In Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic, we see an interesting parallel with Hegel’s notion 
of mutual recognition, where Staudenmaier speaks of the divine persons as knowing or 
discerning the commonality between themselves. Indeed, Staudenmaier speaks of the divine 
persons discerning themselves in the other persons: “The Father knows (erkennt) Himself not 
only in the Son and the Son in the Father, they are not only known (erkannt) mutually by one 
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another, but both of them know (erkennen) themselves and are known (erkannt) in the identity of 
their essence in a third like person.”188 
 Staudenmaier utilizes this language in other places as well: 
Knowing (erkennend) Himself, each person knows (erkennt) Himself in the essence 
which is one and the same for all the persons; grasping (begreifend) Himself each person 
grasps (begreift) Himself in the other: no one knows the Father except the Son, and no 
one knows the Son except the Father. If the Father turns His vision in upon Himself, and 
His spiritual essence reflects itself, it replicates itself, so to speak, in this vision. Then this 
reflection is not itself a mere reflection, but by recognizing (erkennt) Himself, He 
recognizes (erkennt) the Son, and by recognizing (erkennt) the Son, He recognizes 
(erkennt) Himself. The essence, which He knows as His own, He knows also as the 
essence of the Son, when he knows the essence of the Son as His own.189 
 
And again:  
 
 In absolute vision he Father, from whom emerges the movement in the trinitarian life, 
places His essence in the Son, recognizes (erkennt) Himself in the Son, and is recognized 
(erkannt wird) by the Son in turn in the identity of essence, and…these two behold 
(schauen) their identical essence in a third person, and are recognized (erkannt werden) 
again by this third person and are ratified through this recognition (Erkenntniß), through 
which the self-knowledge of the Godhead completes itself.190 
 
 As we saw in our examination of Hegelian interpersonal dialectic, mutual recognition 
between persons results in each opening herself up to the others, where each no longer wills 
merely for herself, but each directs her will to ends that are mutually beneficial. Or more 
positively, through a free individual’s mediation that occurs via its relation to other free beings, 
certain ways of acting become closed-off, yet new ones are opened. 
 In Staudenmaier’s trinitarian dialectic we see a similar notion, where the will of one 
becomes the will of another and vice-versa. As Staudenmaier puts it, “Each person wills Himself 
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as an independent essence; however, the person wills Himself just as much in the other persons, 
and finally He is willed by the other persons as He wills Himself in them. Thus there is a mutual 
willing and being willed, and indeed this willing in the divine persons is a willing from, through, 
in, and for one another, just as it is with knowing.”191 And again: “The Father wills Himself in 
the Son and Spirit, and is willed by the Son and Spirit; the Son wills Himself in the Father and 
the Spirit, and is willed by the Father and the Spirit; the Spirit wills Himself in the Father and the 
Son, and is willed by the Father and the Son.”192 
 The unity is clear when Staudenmaier says, “The divine persons always will the same 
thing, and they will it in the same way. In fact, this will is here exactly the same in the intention 
of being and willing oneself in another.”193 As we will see in the next section, these acts of 
mutual knowing and willing result in the formation of a social structure which is more than the 
sum of individuals – the acts of mutual knowing and willing result in the formation of a 
community. 
 
3.3.3 Trinity as Community and the Actualization of Personal Subjectivity 
 What we saw in Hegel’s interpersonal dialectic is that there is a socially-guiding 
principle, a principle which transcends the individuals as such. This principle pushes the 
individuals to abrogate their individualities as such and form a socially cohesive structure which 
transcends their individualities. In short, the Hegelian interpersonal dialectic results in the 
formation of community. Each individual is not meant to be an isolated individual but, instead, is 
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meant to be mediated to herself through her relations with other persons, relations constituted by 
mutual respect. This is precisely why in Hegel’s dialectic, for example, self-consciousness can 
only properly be self-consciousness if it is mediated through its relation with another self-
consciousness.  
 Staudenmaier himself uses language that is reminiscent of this dialectic when speaking of 
the triune life: “Through this mutuality (Gegenseitigkeit) and reciprocity (Wechselseitigkeit) [of 
the divine persons], the rigidity of being-for-self (Fürsichseins) as posited in the mere I dissolves 
itself and personality stands in its place.”194 According to Staudenmaier, therefore, the 
individuality of each divine person is dialectically transformed into an openness toward the other 
persons. Here we see that the divine person abrogates His individuality as such so as to form a 
socially cohesive structure. 
 The name for this opening of self to others is love. Love draws the divine persons out of 
their rigid individualities and opens them to one another: 
If the particular essence of good and love consists in the going out of one person over to 
another, as well as in the incorporation of the life of the other person into one’s own, then 
the divine person can fully be love only if with it is a second person, and with and beside 
the second a third person, in which the tripersonal life completes itself as an absolutely 
perfect life. The multiplicity of persons is demanded by the essence of love itself. As the 
divine person is able to love completely only its like, and is able to be truly loved again 
by another like [thing]…so can the divine person only again be love toward a divine 
person. The perfection, truth, purity, integrity, holiness, and eternity of the divine love 
demands, therefore, tripersonality, and indeed this eternally.195 
 
As Staudenmaier puts it elsewhere, “What posits, and therefore mediates, the being and living in-
, from-, through-, and for-one-another of the three divine persons, considered inwardly, is 
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love.”196 It is through love, Staudenmaier insists, that unity occurs: “Love is itself unity, and it is 
at the same time the law of unity, namely the law according to which life forms and presents 
itself as a unity.”197 
 Because concrete unity amongst personal subjects is the end by which is mediated by 
love, and because love is just the exercise of the personal capacities of intelligence and will 
toward concrete unity, Staudenmaier at times even speaks of love and unity as the teleological 
explanation for the multiplicity of persons (recall the text we just examined where Staudenmaier 
says that “[t]he multiplicity of persons is demanded by the essence of love itself.”) 
 Indeed, love is what drives personal subjects to seek other personal subjects: “The infinite 
disposition (Gemüth) of the divine person can find its satisfaction (Befriedigung) only in the 
equally infinite disposition of the other divine person.”198 Without a multiplicity of persons in the 
Trinity, Staudenmaier notes, love would be abstract: “If the divine essence is mono-personal 
(Einpersönlich), then the eternal love of the Godhead can relate only to itself. But the love which 
relates purely to itself is abstract love, which is likened to self-seeking.”199 Therefore, the 
subjectivities of the divine persons are actualized only insofar as they are engaged in relations 
with one another characterized by love. Because the subjectivities of the divine persons are 
actualized through mutual relations of love, their subjectivities can be actualized only if the 
divine is comprised of multiple divine persons. 
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 We have seen that the subjectivity of an individual divine person is actualized only 
insofar as the person is engaged in relations of love with the other divine persons. It is because 
the divine consists of multiple divine persons that the subjectivities of each can be actualized and 
a community can be formed. We will see below that this has important implications for how God 
relates to the created order, our final topic of consideration. 
 
4. Implications of the Actualization of Divine Personality 
 In the previous chapter, we saw that, for Staudenmaier, the divine engages the created 
order as a personal subject (i.e., a subject who displays the features of being-for-self, 
intelligence, and will). We have also seen Staudenmaier’s insistence that God does not develop 
His personal subjectivity through or by means of the created order, and thus that the created 
order does not actualize divine subjectivity. Rather, because the divine consists in a concrete 
unity of personal subjects – and this as an immanent feature – there are important implications 
for how God relates to the nondivine. 
 Indeed, because God is Trinity – and so because divine subjectivity is actualized 
immanently – God does not need to actualize His own subjectivity through the created order. As 
Staudenmaier puts it, “Because only thereby, that God as triune forms for Himself a ‘complete’ 
world (eine vollkommene Welt) can He, without Himself becoming the world, posit a creation 
outside of Himself, and stand lofty and elevated over this creation as its Lord, leader, ruler, and 
sanctifier.”200 
 It is precisely because divine subjectivity is actualized immanently – apart from the 
created order – that God can engage the created order as a personal subject. This is because God 
 




cannot relate to the created order through His intellect and will if the created order is that 
through which His intellect and will are developed. As a result, divine engagement with the 
created order – particularly with created persons – can be an interpersonal engagement. 
 We saw above that each divine person recognizes Himself in the other divine persons, 
and recognizes the other divine persons in Himself. As Staudenmaier puts it, each person ‘posits’ 
Himself in the other persons:  
The Father, in an absolute way, posits (setzt) the Son through eternal generation, and with 
the positing (Setzung) of the Son is combined the self-positing (Selbstsetzung) of the 
Father, while He, generating the Son, posits (setzt), wills, and loves Himself in the Son. 
Further, the Son posits (setzt) Himself in the Father, as He posits (setzt) the Father in 
Himself, while He recognizes Himself as the Son. The Father and the Son posit (setzten) 
particularly the Spirit, as they posit (setzen) themselves in Him and He posits (setz) 
Himself in them.201 
 
Staudenmaier relates this inter-trinitarian phenomena to God’s acts ad extra, noting that it is in 
virtue of the positing of the divine persons within the Trinity that the divine is capable of 
positing the extradivine. If the divine persons can posit themselves outside of themselves and in 
each other, Staudenmaier notes, “then we have three eternal, absolute principles which exist 
from, through, in, and for one another which, since they exist from, in, and through one another, 
also possess the absolute power (Macht), in union with one another, to posit (setzen) the world 
outside of themselves.”202 If the positing of something outside of God is possible only in virtue 
of interdivine positing, and if interdivine positing is what accounts for fully-developed divine 
subjectivity, then it is only in virtue of fully-developed divine subjectivity – and so only in virtue 
of God being Trinity – that there can be a positing of something outside of God. 
 





 If the encounter between God and the created order is interpersonal, and if the possibility 
of God’s encounter with creation as interpersonal is dependent upon the immanent interpersonal 
encounter within the Trinity, then the encounter between God and the created order – as 
interpersonal – will be a reflection of the trinitarian interpersonal encounter. Thus, Staudenmaier 
says, “The absolute self-positing (Selbstsetzung) in the trinitarian life which exists from and 
through itself reflects itself in the positing (Setzung) of the world as the free creation of the 
world.”203 
 What we see above is that God being triune is the condition for the possibility of God’s 
ability to posit a world other than Himself. We also see, however, that God’s actions ad extra 
reflect the characteristics of the inner life of the Trinity. In chapter one, we examined the 
elements of personal subjectivity, viz., being-for-self, intelligence, and will. In chapter two, we 
examined an element of interpersonal encounter (that of presence), and how the elements of 
personal subjectivity and interpersonal encounter obtain in the case of God’s interaction with the 
created order. Finally, here in chapter three, we have seen how the members of the Trinity 
themselves possess the elements of personality, as well as how the interpersonal encounters 
amongst them occur. Since the subjects of interpersonal encounter within the Trinity are just the 
very same divine persons who act ad extra, the very same aspects of interpersonal encounter 
within the Trinity are construed by Staudenmaier as manifest in God’s interpersonal encounter 
with the nondivine. 
 We see Staudenmaier’s insistence on the correspondence between trinitarian 
interpersonal encounter and the divine-creaturely interpersonal encounter in ways other than just 
that of the positing mentioned above. In the previous chapter, we saw that the mode of God’s 
 




interpersonal presence to the created order is that of omnipresence. Interestingly, Staudenmaier 
utilizes this same mode of presence as characteristic of the interpersonal encounter within the 
Trinity: “If the divine persons reciprocally know themselves in one another, know and grasp 
themselves each undividedly and entirely in the others, and the others equally in themselves, 
each has opened itself entirely for the others…then this mutual personing, this reciprocal 
sounding-through-self (Sichdurchtönen) and self-permeating (Sichdurchdringen), is the 
omnipresence in the trinitarian life.”204 The omnipresence which characterizes the interpersonal 
encounter between the trinitarian persons themselves, Staudenmaier continues, simply manifests 
itself in God’s interpersonal encounter between Himself and creation: “This omnipresence [in the 
trinitarian life] expands itself by coming into the world, which is the work of the triune God, and 
which the triune God itself permeates (durchdringt), dwells though (durchwohnt), and sounds 
through (durchtönt).”205 
 We saw in the previous chapter as well that the intellectual omnipresence of the divine to 
the created order is the divine omniscience. Curiously, Staudenmaier will speak of divine 
omniscience not only as God’s knowledge of the created order, but as characteristic of the 
trinitarian interpersonal encounter. As Staudenmaier puts it, 
As the three divine persons know (erkennen) themselves most deeply and completely in 
and through one another according to their particularities, and with this knowledge 
combine the equally complete knowledge of that which they think, will, and accomplish 
concerning the world, this knowledge, which permeates the entire Godhead in its 
complete scope and deepest ground and in the same way grasps the world through and 
through, is the divine omniscience. . . . The divine omniscience extends therefore, as we 
have seen earlier, not only to the world, but just as much and already previously, to the 
Godhead itself, and this precisely as the triune Godhead.206 
 







Again, that the characteristics of the interpersonal encounter between God and creation are 
described as characteristics of the interpersonal encounter between the divine persons of the 
Trinity suggests that Staudenmaier regards the two sorts of encounter as merely two species of a 
shared genus. Or perhaps more neutrally, Staudenmaier regards the Trinity as the model which is 
exemplified in creation. 
 Of course, the interpersonal encounter between God and created personal subjects is not 
an encounter between equals, but between the infinite and finite, between the Absolute and the 
relative. As such, the creature’s relation to God is not a neutral relation because her creation, 
existence, and destiny are ordered to the divine. The interpersonal encounter between God and 
creature is such that the former is the telos of the latter. 
 We saw in the previous chapter that the interpersonal encounter between God and 
creature, insofar as God is the telos of the creature, is characterized by God implementing the 
means by which creatures can reach Him as their telos. God imparts wisdom – the truth about 
Himself as their end and how they may reach Him as their end – which is subjectively 
appropriated by creatures through religion. Interpersonal encounter with the divine, therefore, is 
characterized by seeking God as one’s ultimate goal, by offering oneself to God so as to exist in, 
through, and for Him.  
 Significantly, though, Staudenmaier speaks of the divine as telos not only for creatures, 
but as telos for the divine itself. In other words, there is a telos which is within the divine that is 
also for the divine. God realizes Himself as His own goal. As Staudenmaier puts it: 
If wisdom is practical knowing, and consists not only in knowing the goal to which one 
strives, but also in knowing the means which lead to this goal; and finally, if wisdom is 
not only this just described knowing, but in addition the actual self-completion of that 




because in God knowing is an eternally consummating and eternally completing 
knowing, the goal is an eternally fulfilled and eternally achieved goal.207 
 
Wisdom, therefore, does not describe only a presence of the divine in the created milieu, but also 
describes the immanent life of God. 
 Wisdom, as we have seen, is that by which a telos is appropriated by a personal subject 
just through those personal characteristics of intellect and will. Further, as we have seen, the 
Father, Son, and Spirit are each personal subjects. Finally, as the text above shows, wisdom is a 
characteristic of the immanent life of God. This sets up Staudenmaier for rendering the wisdom 
of the immanent life of God in a trinitarian register. Thus, referring to that goal of which he 
spoke in the above text, Staudenmaier continues by saying, “This eternally fulfilled and achieved 
goal is no other than the trinitarian life of the Godhead itself in its unending unity, in the 
harmonious being in-, through-, and for-one-another of the three divine persons, which being in-, 
through-, and for-one-another we can name the absolute wisdom as the achieved in God: it is 
wisdom as absolute complete life in which the idea of the Godhead is seen as eternally 
achieved.”208  
 What Staudenmaier is saying, therefore, is that the interpersonal encounter within the 
Trinity is characterized by wisdom – wisdom by which the divine persons are led to one another 
as the telos of each. As a personal subject, each divine person seeks and reaches the other divine 
persons through intellect and will. To be sure, Staudenmaier speaks of the wisdom within the 
divine as eternally fulfilled and eternally achieved, and so distinguishes wisdom within the 
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divine from wisdom within creation. Nonetheless, Staudenmaier is making a radical move by 
describing the divine persons as telos for one another. 
 It is in this notion of wisdom that we can see again that Staudenmaier regards the 
interpersonal encounter between the divine and creature as a reflection of the interpersonal 
encounter between the divine persons. Thus, Staudenmaier says, “This same wisdom [viz., the 
wisdom by which the divine persons are led to one another as the destination of each] turns 
outwardly as the wisdom which leads the world to its destination, which destination is God 
Himself.”209 Interestingly, here Staudenmaier notes that the wisdom “which leads the world to its 
destination” is just the outwardly-turned wisdom of the inner divine life. The interpersonal 
encounter between God and creature is therefore an outwardly-turned manifestation of the 
interpersonal encounter of the divine Trinity.  
 In Staudenmaier’s theology, therefore, we see that the Trinity is of vital importance. As I 
hope I have shown over the past three chapters, for Staudenmaier, the Trinity is not simply a 
more proper way of describing the God of the Christian tradition; more than this, the Trinity 
performs a function, in that it is the means by which divine subjectivity becomes actual and 
thereby the means by which divine transcendence is preserved. Of course, whether or not the 
performance of a function is indeed a good thing in understanding the Trinity is debatable, and 











DORNER’S THEOLOGICAL PROJECT 
Introduction 
 Over the next three chapters I will present Isaak August Dorner’s doctrine of God and, in 
this chapter specifically, its attendant theological methodology. Dorner’s doctrine of God 
culminates in his doctrine of the Trinity, the significance of which, I will demonstrate, lies in 
how it functions as the ground for so many of his other theological claims. An important theme 
that runs across the entire presentation is that of God as ‘love.’ According to Dorner, the 
Evangelical (i.e. Protestant) experience of Christian faith demands that God must be 
experienced, above all, as love.  
 Although such a description of God hardly seems novel (and, in fact, perhaps even 
saccharine), for Dorner neither is the case. Although God has been described as ‘love’ since 
biblical times, it is only since the emergence of Protestantism, and more proximately, only since 
Schleiermacher, that this designation of God has begun to be taken seriously. Further, Dorner 
understands ‘love’ as predicated of God not in a sentimental way, but in a quite robust, 
philosophically-grounded sense, as a union of freedom and necessity.  
 Thus the Evangelical experience of faith, as Dorner understands it, demands that God be 
experienced as love. More specifically, in the Evangelical experience, there is a union of 
freedom and necessity in the human person: the human person freely (hence, the aspect of 




experience has its archetype in God: “Our aim must be that the Trinity legitimate itself to 
believing apprehension as the objective foundation (Fundament) in God of the Christian 
personality, and especially of that which is peculiarly evangelical.”210 In God Himself, therefore, 
there must be some union of freedom and necessity if God is to be thought of as love and 
therefore if the Evangelical experience is to be vindicated: 
The proper evangelical union of these opposites [viz., freedom and necessity] must have 
its eternal necessity in God Himself, nay, must have in Him its eternal archetype (Urbild) 
and its supreme principle. And since the opposites, the union of which is perfected in the 
Christian personality, are of an ethical kind, it must follow that the fundamental 
Reformation knowledge of the Christian personality is to be placed theologically securely 
and objectively in the ethical idea of God, seeing that the necessity of these opposites, 
like their union, is shown in their absolute verification (Begründung), i.e. in God Himself 
in His ethically thought triune being.211 
 
 That God Himself is love, however, entails certain metaphysical requirements. God 
cannot be merely a lifeless substance, for example, but rather must possess a robust form of 
agency, having properties like consciousness and will (which will be accounted for in the 
following chapter). But beyond the possession of a robust form of agency, to be love, God must 
be able to view Himself as His own object of love, God must be able to freely will the highest 
good that He Himself is. And this is just the aspect of freedom and necessity which must 
characterize God if the Evangelical experience of faith is to be vindicated. 
 As we will see, in Dorner’s theology, that God is able to freely will the highest good that 
He Himself is – that God can possess this union of freedom and necessity within Himself – 
requires the particularly Christian understanding of God: that God is the Trinity. The Trinity for 
Dorner, therefore, operates as the subterranean foundation for his robust theological claims. In 
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Dorner’s theology, without the Trinity, God cannot love Himself, and thus God cannot be the 
archetype for the Evangelical experience of faith. 
 In the current chapter, we will explore how Dorner understands his own theological 
enterprise. In section 1, we will examine three concepts that will be operative in the presentation 
of Dorner’s theology over the next three chapters, namely the ‘physical,’ ‘logical,’ and ‘ethical’ 
aspects of being. In section 2, we will examine how Dorner understands these concepts to have 
operated in the history of theology, specifically their arrangement in the theologies of Martin 
Luther and Friedrich Schleiermacher. Dorner lauds these two Protestant thinkers because he sees 
them as privileging the ethical aspect of God over the physical and logical aspects. It is in Luther 
that an ethical conception of God begins to arise (2.1). Although theology begins to languish in 
subsequent generations of Protestantism (see 2.2), the arrival of German Idealism and 
Romanticism breathes new life into understanding the primacy of the ethical in God. Dorner 
lauds Schleiermacher specifically (as we will see in 2.3.1) because his ethical conception of the 
divine pertains not merely to the doctrine of justification, but is systematically worked out in his 
doctrine of God. Therefore, some attention will be given to Schleiermacher’s doctrine of God 
(2.3.2). 
 In section 3, we will examine Schleiermacher as a theological precedent to Dorner. This 
will help us understand how Dorner conceives of God as love (3.1). We will see, though, that  
Dorner finds unsatisfactory certain aspects of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of God (3.2) and 
therefore he will seek to amend Schleiermacher on these points (3.3). 
 In exploring how Dorner understands the theological enterprises of Luther and 
Schleiermacher as well as his own in relation to them, we will then be in a position to understand 




terrain will be covered over the next three chapters, the goal is simple: to show how an ethical 
understanding of God requires that God be Trinity. 
 
1. Aspects of Being: Physical, Logical, and Ethical 
 As mentioned above, Dorner seeks to arrive at a conception of the Christian God –
reached through the Evangelical experience of faith – that is ‘ethical.’ But what, exactly, does he 
mean by ‘ethical’? The term ‘ethical’ here is to be contrasted with ‘physical’ or ‘logical’ notions 
of being.212 The ‘physical’ aspects of being involve those aspects which are constitutive of it as 
the type of thing it is, i.e. given its nature. In the case of God, for example, this would include 
properties like omnipotence. The ‘logical’ aspects of being include those aspects of being which 
designate an intellectual component. In the case of God, this would designate properties like 
consciousness, intellect, and knowledge. Finally, the ‘ethical’ aspects of being involve those 
aspects which regard goodness.  
 As an agent, my physical aspects consist in the fact that I am a being with a particular 
nature or particular capacities. If I consisted of merely, say, logical aspects, then I could only 
think or will, but such thinking or willing could never terminate in actions. Similarly, if I 
consisted of merely physical aspects, then I would possess certain capacities for acting, but 
would have no ability to direct such capacities in logical ways. 
 As we will explore in greater depth in the next two chapters, Dorner believes that for an 
agent to possess the fullness of ethical subjectivity requires a union of two elements: necessity 
and freedom. Here I will treat them in that order. First, an agent’s ethical subjectivity requires 
that there be a good which is present to the agent and to which the agent is to pursue as a good, 
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something to which the agent has an obligation. As Dorner puts it, “Certainly nothing can be 
shown to be moral which may not in some way be or become duty; the whole realm of morals 
must be brought under the aspect of duty; and this is accordingly an essential side of the 
matter.”213 
 However, there must be a particular relationship between the good and the agent’s will: 
“The idea of duty indeed, although it itself represents that which is morally necessary, 
presupposes freedom, self-determination…”214 However, there are certain actions I might 
perform which may objectively be good (it is good that I breathe), but which I did not 
deliberately choose to pursue. It would be odd to think of me as ethically good simply in virtue 
of, say, breathing. Such oddness issues from the fact that, in the act of breathing, my will is not 
involved at all. We think of a person as ethically good when they have performed willful, or 
deliberate, actions which we recognize as good. We might describe a person as good if we know 
that she saved a drowning person, for example. Such an act cannot be performed without the 
involvement of the person’s will. 
 Of course, the involvement of the will is a necessary condition of ethical goodness, but it 
is not sufficient. There are many actions that people perform which involve their will, yet such 
actions may not be considered good. A person might deliberately murder another, for example, 
but such an act would not be considered good. Thus, the involvement of the will covers the 
subjective aspect of the ethically good, but an objective aspect must also be present. The 
individual who saves a drowning person is deemed good not just because she utilized her will 
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and deliberately acted to save another, but also because we recognize that helping others to stay 
alive is objectively good. Thus, the person is thought of as good because she recognized the 
objective good and pursued this good deliberately.  
 For me to be an ethically good agent, therefore, I cannot just decide that whichever acts I 
perform or whichever goods I desire are good simply in virtue of my performing such acts or 
desiring such goods. Rather, for me to be ethically good means there are objective goods which 
are not immediately in my possession and which I must pursue in order to be good. (Thus, for 
example, Dorner describes the subject of Christian ethics as “the morally good, or the absolutely 
worthy, as existing for the human personal will, and as attaining reality through it, i.e., by means 
of the self-determination of the will.”)215 
 To put the matter positively, for the agent to be considered ethically good requires that 
she freely will this good; she must desire to make this goodness a part of its own being. (To use 
the language of some ethical theories, she must endorse the act in question.) If I perform the acts 
which I ought but did so unaware, or only because I was forced to by another, I cannot be said to 
be an ethically good agent. As Dorner puts it, “The playing of a child upon whom the 
consciousness of an ethical rule has not yet dawned, is not yet to be placed under the category of 
the ethical, although will, self-determination, and consciousness need not be wanting in it…”216 
 Thus, freedom is involved in being an ethically good agent. 
 For the agent to be considered ethically good, then, requires a union of freedom and 
necessity: on the one hand, there must be a good which is not identified with whatever the agent 
happens to will, a good which is not up to the agent to decide, and this constitutes the element of 
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necessity. On the other hand, this good must be freely chosen and willed by the agent, and this 
constitutes the element of freedom. 
 Now that we have defined what the physical, logical, and ethical aspects of being entail, 
we will examine how they relate. Conceptually, there is nothing about these three categories per 
se which entails how they ought to be related to one another. Religiously, however, Dorner sees 
the ordering of these categories as extremely important. Indeed, the way in which these three 
categories are ordered within God determines whether or not one is speaking of, say, a pagan, 
Jewish, or Christian understanding of God, and – amongst Christian understandings of God – of 
a Catholic or Protestant understanding of God. 
 To be sure, each of these various conceptions of God include all three aspects, physical, 
logical, and ethical. What distinguishes them, however, is which of these aspects is privileged. 
To privilege the physical aspects of God would mean, for example, that the components which 
are natural to God’s being would direct what God wills. Thus, for example, it is part of God’s 
nature to have ability or fullness of strength, to have the capability of doing anything. If such 
physical elements were privileged over, say, the ethical elements, then because God could do 
anything, God would will to do those things. On the other hand, to privilege the ethical aspect 
would mean that God’s willing is not dominated by the components which are natural to God’s 
being. To privilege the ethical aspect of God, in other words, means that although God possesses 
the capacity to do anything, God does not act blindly and can choose to direct this capacity. 217 








2. Physical, Logical, and Ethical Conceptions of God in the History of Theology 
 According to Dorner, a conception of God which privileges the ethical has not always 
been operative in the Christian theological tradition. Indeed, in Dorner’s reading of the history of 
theology, it is only in the emergence of Protestantism where such a conception begins to arise. 
This is not to imply that Dorner believed a Roman Catholic conception of God to include no 
ability of God to direct His physical aspects by His ethical aspects.218 But for Dorner, the 
Catholic doctrine of God, generally speaking, allowed for too much privileging of the physical 
aspects of God over the ethical. 
 To make these nuances clear, we will examine Dorner’s understanding of these 
developments in the history of theology. To this end, there are two Protestant theologians in 
particular which we will examine in order to get a sense of what Dorner is up to, namely Martin 
Luther and Friedrich Schleiermacher. I have selected these two to look at because Dorner sees 
them as important turning-points in the history of Christian theology with respect to a primarily 
ethical understanding of God. 
 
2.1 The Beginning of the Evangelical Principle of Faith: Martin Luther 
 Of Martin Luther, Dorner says, “The personality of Luther is one of those great historical 
figures in which whole nations recognize their own type…in which the germ of a new moral and 
religious perception is as it were embodied.”219 In the following section, we will explore how 
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Dorner understands this ‘new moral and religious perception’ which becomes distinctive of 
Protestantism, and which provides for thinking of God in a more ‘ethical’ manner compared to 
Catholicism.  This new conception of the relation between God and the human Dorner refers to 
as the “Evangelical Principle of Faith” or the “Reformation Principle of Faith” (consisting of a 
“material” side – viz., justification through faith alone – and of a “formal” side – viz., the sole 
authority of scripture). 
 According to Dorner, what is distinctive about Luther is that he “seeks to see in Christ the 
bringing of the divine and human into perfect union...”220 For Dorner, the union of the divine and 
the human in Luther’s Christology is not simply a metaphysical doctrine of Christ’s two natures. 
What is novel in Luther’s Christology, as Dorner sees it, is that the hypostatic union reveals an 
inherent correlation of God and human beings. Here we quote Dorner at length: 
For the unity of the person of Christ, in which God and man are united, [Luther] finds a 
basis by remoulding the conception regarding God and man according to the standard of 
the principle of faith. Under the old conception of God, the ‘old wisdom,’ wherein 
majesty, might, and infinitude passed for the highest and innermost essence of God, it 
must have appeared unbefitting that God should not only act upon a man, or accept and 
bear a man, so to speak, as His revelation and figure, but should make humanity His own 
and impute it to Himself as Himself to it. But, says Luther, God is not content with the 
glory of being the Creator of all creatures... He seeks also to be known in what He is 
inwardly. His glory is His love, which seeks the lowly and the poor. ‘This is the new 
wisdom’ [Luthers Werke von Walch, vii 1826-43; x. 1372, 1402]. God’s good pleasure in 
the incarnation consists in this, that therein He pours out His nature, reveals His heart. . . . 
Not less, in ‘the old language,’ does creature signify something which is infinitely 
separated from the highest divinity, so that the two are directly opposed to one another. 
But in the new language or wisdom humanity signifies something different, unutterably 
nearly connected with Divinity... The new wisdom accordingly gives first the true 
conception of man, according to which he in himself, i.e. by nature, is not a complete 
whole, at least does not correspond to the idea for which God destined him; but it belongs 
to His idea, and insofar also to the truth of his nature, that he should enjoy participation in 
God through the communion of God with him. It belongs, however, to the ‘old wisdom’ 
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to represent God and man, according to their relative conceptions, as mutually 
exclusive.221 
 
What exactly about this is novel? For Dorner, the ‘old conception’ of God took the primary (and 
thus normative) divine attributes to be those such as God’s majesty, might, and infinitude. (Note 
the difference between these attributes and the attribute that Dorner will proclaim as “the 
supreme, the only adequate definition of the essence of God,” that of love.)222 The ‘old 
conception’ of God, in other words, emphasized God’s distance from creatures and God’s 
difference from creatures. In virtue of such difference, God and humanity are ‘directly opposed 
to one another’ and ‘mutually exclusive.’ 
 But the ‘new wisdom’ of the Reformation emphasized God’s meeting of humanity 
despite such distance and difference from it. We see this in descriptions of God wherein He 
‘seeks the lowly and the poor’ and ‘pours out His nature’ to humanity. We also see that the ‘true 
conception of man’ is to ‘enjoy participation in God through the communion of God with him.’ 
 We see this same way of characterizing God in the medieval period in another passage 
from Dorner. God, according to the view of the middle ages,  
is the Majestic One, the Unapproachable, the Sinner-consuming, the Holy One and the 
Just. Christ Himself is, according to the view of the middle ages, the stern Judge; the 
God-man is, as it were, lost in God. . . . With this majestic God, who is in His essence 
unknown to mankind, communion is not possible; He is void of love in Himself, else He 
would not require that love and pity should first be excited in Him from without by the 
saints; He is in His exalted position only just and holy, but righteousness and goodness 
come not in God to mutual interpenetration in holy love, and even the grace to which 
God is moved by Mary has the appearance rather of caprice and partiality.223 
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What makes this such an un-ethical or non-ethical conception of God is that there is no 
correlation between the divine and the human. This lack of correlation between the two is 
apparent in such descriptions of God as “the Unapproachable” and “majestic.” Correlation 
between two entities is possible only if they can draw near one another. 
 Such a view of God, Dorner believes, is characterized above all by God’s righteousness 
(thus the descriptions of God as “sinner-consuming,” “Holy One,” and “the Just”). Due to the 
sinfulness of human beings, a God who is concerned above all with righteousness cannot be 
correlated with humanity. Because this conception of God is concerned with righteousness, love 
and pity must be ‘excited in Him from without by the saints.’ 
 We also must draw attention to how Dorner characterizes Christ in this understanding of 
God. On a Reformation view, Christ brings about for us what he himself is: the union of the 
divine and the human. Thus, on a Reformation view, Christ is how God has revealed Himself to 
humanity. The view of God in the Middle-Ages, by contrast, portrays Christ himself as ‘hidden,’ 
and thus our communion with God is hidden with him. Indeed, on this view, Christ is not the 
meeting point between God and humanity, but is instead the ‘Judge.’ 
 Here, we can point out two aspects of this characterization which will become thematic. 
First, Dorner speaks of this God whose essence is ‘unknown’ to mankind. Second, Dorner notes 
that this God is ‘void’ of love, in strong opposition to the Evangelical understanding of God, and 
to his own position that the best characterization of the divine essence is love. As we will see in 
subsequent chapters, one of Dorner’s worries is voluntarism, which is the mark of the divine 
whose ‘physical’ aspects are primary. If, however, Christ is how God has revealed Himself to 
humanity, and if Christ is the union of the divine and human, then God has revealed Himself to 




known. Further, if God has revealed Himself as seeking union, then God has revealed Himself as 
love. 
 Dorner’s summary of Luther’s doctrine of justification nicely articulates a view of God 
that Dorner will embrace, where the attribute of love is not bound by the attribute of 
righteousness: 
This therefore is the sum of his doctrine. To the purity of the grace, which undertakes the 
cause not of the righteous but of sinners, and thus seems to disregard the law, because it 
is gracious to the unworthy, and gives bountifully to them, not simply in advance, [not] in 
anticipation of future payment, but freely and for nothing – it is precisely to this 
prevenient love that it is given to kindle in us also a love which deserves to be called so, 
because it too loves freely, not for reward, not even for the reward of salvation.224 
 
The human person fears when he is worried about his own justification. When he fears, he 
cannot love God, he cannot do good works out of love, but only out of fear. When one performs 
good works out of fear, one does them because he is supposed to do them in order to get a 
reward. Thus, it is an external authority which imposes itself on man. 
 But if God has preveniently justified man, as Luther holds, he no longer has to fear or 
worry about his own justification. If he is not worried about his justification – because it is 
already a fact – then he does not do good works in order to receive a reward. And thus his good 
works are not done not at the command of an external authority, but they are done 
spontaneously. In other words, the nature of man is such that he will act out of love when he is 
acting freely; or he will act naturally when he acts freely. Thus, if God grants prevenient 
justification, God’s desire for good works from man will be congruent with man’s disposition to 
do good works when not in fear regarding his salvation. 
 




 In this passage we can see the normativity of the ethical attributes of God over the 
physical and logical, precisely in the words “and thus seems to disregard the law”: if the law had 
primacy over the ethical, then God could not “disregard” the law.225 But because, in a Protestant 
understanding of God, the ethical attributes are primary, the law appears to be disregarded, 
although in fact it is moved to the background: following the law (i.e. doing good works) does 
not make one ‘good’ (justified), but being declared ‘good’ (justified) enables one to follow the 
law (do good works). 
 Thus, Dorner sees the fruit of the Reformation as making manifest that the divine and the 
human are not in fact heterogenous but homogenous, that there is a correlation between the two. 
And this homogeneity of the divine and the human is global in scope: nature is correlated to 
grace, reason is correlated to faith, the historical is correlated to the ideal. This notion of 
correlation is precisely what makes a union possible between God and the human being. That 
this correlation is possible is due to giving primacy to the ethical in God. 
 
2.2 Protestant Thought between Luther and Idealism 
 In Dorner’s reading of Protestantism’s subsequent history, however, the insights of the 
initial Reformers entered a sclerosis. According to Dorner, in seventeenth-century Protestantism, 
“The subjective factor [viz., faith], which – as is expressed by the material principle of the 
Reformation – essentially belongs to the character of evangelical piety and theology, was 
abridged, and received but trifling cultivation.”226 In its stead, the ‘objective’ elements – 
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scripture and Protestant doctrine – came to dominate. The result was that “Faith, formerly so free 
and vigorous, occupied but a passive position with respect to [scripture and Protestant doctrine], 
which yet are not God, but things given.”227 
 The eighteenth-century brought about a reaction to the era of objectivity which preceded 
it. This era consists in thinkers such as Leibniz, Wolff, Klopstock, Hamann, Claudius, Lessing, 
Herder, Kant, Fichte, and Jacobi. In this era of subjectivity, Dorner says, “Antiquated theology 
went down to its grave, but the Christian faith remained, nay, was even now reviving with fresh 
vigor, to bring forth in due time a new theology.”228 
 Although sharply critical of Christianity, this ‘subjective’ philosophy nevertheless aided 
it. Dorner notes, “[P]hilosophy, even in its specially critical period, furnished its contribution. Its 
attitude indeed was, during the above-mentioned period, for the most part alien, nay, antagonistic 
to Christianity. Its labors nevertheless subserved a higher cause than its own, and formed a 
regularly advancing process, which was not at all loss, but also profit, because it showed 
beforehand how intrinsically akin were the factors of the human and the divine, of nature and 
grace.”229 
 How, exactly, did this period of subjectivity show how ‘intrinsically akin’ the divine and 
the human were to one another? Dorner says,  
The whole process was inwardly connected with Protestantism and its intrinsic tendency, 
especially with the material principle [viz., justification through faith alone]. For as the 
material principle promises inward assurance and freedom in God, nay, makes these a 
duty, so also the fundamental feature in this subjective process is, that whatever would 
exercise authority over man, or claim his submission, must be homogenous with his 
nature, feeling, perceptions, and will, and capable of being assimilated thereby, that so it 
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may become his personal possession and his personal assurance. Even the essential 
affinity between the human and the divine was brought to light by the efforts of that very 
subjectivity... For the absolutely valuable predicates of knowledge of truth, desire of 
good, and feeling for the infinite and the divine, being acknowledged not to transcend 
human nature, but to be elements of the true nature of man, so many lines of 
communication were thus drawn between the idea of the human and the Divine, in 
opposition to their traditional separation. Hence the idea of their mutual exclusion and 
alienation appeared no longer tenable.230 
 
The accomplishment of subjective philosophy was to globalize what was merely a germ in 
Luther: the correlation between the divine and the human. It lay in the next important era – that 
of nineteenth-century German Idealism – to unify the objectivity and the subjectivity. 
 
2.3 Friedrich Schleiermacher 
2.3.1 Dorner’s Praise for Schleiermacher 
 Of the nineteenth-century, Dorner says, “A new era of German science in general was 
inaugurated, first by Schelling and Hegel, and then by Schleiermacher. But it was the latter who 
laid the foundation for a revival of theology by establishing principles which overcame the 
twofold partiality of the preceding epoch, viz. the partiality of objectivism, which had prevailed 
from 1600, and that of subjectivity, which had been dominant since 1750, and by raising to the 
rank of a ruling idea the persuasion of the intrinsic connection between the objective and the 
subjective.”231 
 Dorner has much praise particularly for Schleiermacher in terms of his contributions to 
theology. Indeed, according to Dorner, Schleiermacher was the fulcrum to a renewal of 
Protestantism which had languished during the period of subjective philosophy. He says, “His 
heartfelt piety, nourished in the midst of the Moravian Brotherhood, together with his great 
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talents, and the methodical power of his constructive genius, fitted him to form a point of 
transition to a revived evangelical theology.”232 
 Schleiermacher’s contribution to theology, which forms an important precedent for 
Dorner’s theology, is that the ethical aspects are not limited to the doctrine of justification but 
extend into the doctrine of God itself. Dorner notes this: “The first stage of the new era [viz., 
German idealism] grasps the absolute with physical, the second with logical, the third with 
ethical precision. The first result was brought about by Schelling as the founder of natural 
philosophy, the second by Hegel, the third especially by Schleiermacher.”233 
 
2.3.2 Schleiermacher’s Doctrine of God 
 Because Dorner lauds Schleiermacher’s ‘ethical precision’ in his doctrine of God, and 
because this is the task Dorner sets for his own doctrine of God, we will take a brief look at 
Schleiermacher’s understanding of God, as well as some of Dorner’s specific criticisms of it. 
Such a step is necessary because it will shed light on how Dorner both appropriates and deviates 
from Schleiermacher. Specifically, we will explore those issues which are most proximate to 
Schleiermacher’s novel understanding of the divine attributes. This exploration is crucial, for 
Schleiermacher’s elevation of the ethical attributes – culminating in his identification of God as 
love – will be followed by Dorner. 
 Situated in the Romantic tradition, Schleiermacher’s elevation of the ethical aspect of 
God is bound up with an understanding of human subjectivity which was common among 
Romantic thinkers. It was a basic conviction of Romantic thought that human subjectivity 
 
232 HPT, vol. 2, p. 374. 




requires that the human person be conscious of herself as capable of influencing and being 
influenced by the world. Human subjectivity, therefore, involves the ability to think self-
referentially: a subject must be able to treat herself as an object of thought in order to be able to 
act in the world. Thus, self-referential thought involves an agent’s ability to distinguish between 
two aspects of itself, what we might call its ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ aspects. As 
Schleiermacher puts it, “In self-consciousness there are only two elements: the one expresses the 
existence of the subject for itself, the other its co-existence with an Other.”234 
 On the other hand, although a distinction between the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ aspects 
of the self is necessary for subjectivity, there also is a need for the two aspects to be united in 
some way. The human agent cannot direct herself unless she has an awareness that the one who 
is being directed is in some sense identical with herself as the one directing. 
 But how does the human agent have an awareness of this identity? She cannot appeal to, 
say, empirical observation of herself, for such an act already depends upon her directing herself 
to observe herself, which itself depends upon a prior awareness of this identity. In other words, 
an appeal to data regarding oneself which comes to the subject empirically through 
consciousness has already been mediated by an awareness of the identity between the subjective 
self and the objective self.  
One of the fundamental tenets of Romanticism, of which Schleiermacher shared, was that 
a person’s ability to identify her subjective self with her objective self cannot be the result of 
mediated knowledge, but can only be immediate (non-mediated).  
 
234 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. MacKintosh and J. S. Stewart, First Paperback Edition 





 To use a common example, I cannot deduce that the person in the mirror in front of 
which I stand is me simply by appeal to empirical data.235 There is no way that I can move from 
observation of this empirical data to the conclusion that its content is identical with the one who 
is undergoing this conscious experience. My certainty that the person in the mirror is identical 
with myself is grounded in an immediate way, and thus in a way in which I cannot inspect 
without thereby mediating this unity. 
 On the one hand, then, reflexive, or mediated, thinking is necessary in order for the 
subject to direct herself. On the other hand, the subject must assume a non-reflexive, non-
mediated identity between her subjectivity and objectivity. Thus, there is a discrepancy between 
the two aspects of the self: the non-mediated identity can only be rendered to the human person 
in a mediated form.  
As a result, the unity of the two aspects of the self, and so the very ability to be a subject at all, 
cannot be grounded in the subject herself.  
 Schleiermacher notes, however, that the subject possesses an awareness of this fact. This 
awareness of being grounded in a source which is outside of oneself Schleiermacher refers to as 
the “feeling of absolute dependence”:  
But the self-consciousness which accompanies all our activity, and therefore, since that is 
never zero, accompanies our whole existence, and negatives absolute freedom, is itself 
precisely a consciousness of absolute dependence; for it is the consciousness that the 
whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source outside of us in just the same 
sense in which anything towards which we should have a feeling of absolute freedom 
must have proceeded entirely from ourselves.236 
 
 
235 I borrow this example from Andrew Bowie. See Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to 
Nietzsche, 2nd edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 76-7. 




 For Schleiermacher, that source which is outside of the subject, that source which the 
human person is dependent upon for the possibility of her subjectivity, is God: “The whence of 
our receptive and active existence, as implied in this self-consciousness, is to be designated by 
the word ‘God,’ and…this is for us the really original signification of that word.”237 This feeling 
is ‘absolute’ because the human person exercises no degree of influence upon God vis-a-vis her 
own subjectivity, for her own subjectivity – and thus the capacity to exercise freedom – 
presupposes this dependence: “Any possibility of God being in any way given is entirely 
excluded, because anything that is outwardly given must be given as an object exposed to our 
counter-influence, however slight this may be.”238 
 In Schleiermacher’s theology, this relation of absolute dependence constitutes the human 
subject’s perception of the divine, and thus how the divine attributes can be understood. Since 
God is the correlate of the feeling of absolute dependence, and since such a feeling does not arise 
through the human’s interaction with mundane objects (because the human person has a relative 
freedom and a relative dependence vis-a-vis mundane objects), the divine causality cannot be 
like the temporal or spatial causality of such objects. As Schleiermacher puts it, “...it is self-
evident that the contrast between the feeling of absolute dependence and the feeling of either 
partial dependence or partial freedom (both being equally spatial and temporal) includes in itself 
the implication that the causality which evokes the former feeling cannot be temporal and 
spatial.”239 Indeed, for Schleiermacher, the divine causality transcends the temporal and spatial 
precisely by its being the very condition of the temporal and spatial. Such conditioning of the 
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temporal is designated by God’s ‘eternity,’ and such conditioning of the spatial is designated by 
God’s ‘omnipresence.’240 
 Although the divine causality is unlike finite causality, Schleiermacher also notes that the 
divine causality is equal in compass to the finite: 
We experience the feeling of absolute dependence as something which can fill a moment 
both in association with a feeling of partial and conditional dependence and also in 
association with a partial and conditioned feeling of freedom; for self-consciousness 
always represents finite being as consisting in this mingling of conditioned dependence 
and conditioned freedom or of partial spontaneity and partial passivity. But whenever 
dependence or passivity is posited in a part of finite existence, then spontaneity and 
causality is posited in another part [of finite existence] to which the former is related, and 
this condition of mutual relation of differently distributed causality and passivity 
constitutes the natural order. It necessarily follows that the ground of our feeling of 
absolute dependence, i.e. the divine causality, extends as widely as the order of nature 
and the finite causality contained in it; consequently the divine causality is posited as 
equal in compass to finite causality.241 
 
As we have seen, with respect to finite causality, the human person feels relative dependence and 
relative freedom. Thus, as the feelings of relative dependence and freedom have their ground in 
the feeling of absolute dependence, and the ‘whence’ of this feeling of absolute dependence is 
God, so the causes of the feelings of relative dependence and freedom are those objects of finite 
causality, which has its ground in the divine causality.  
 Since the feeling of absolute dependence is the ground of the feelings of relative freedom 
and dependence, and since the feelings of relative freedom and dependence occur wherever there 
is finite causality, the divine causality must occur wherever there is finite causality. And as we 
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will examine below, Schleiermacher will claim, the divine causality must be ‘equal in compass’ 
to the finite causality. 
 The divine causality as equal in compass to finite causality is designated by God’s 
‘omnipotence.’242 Omnipotence so understood is expressed in two sub-ideas: first, that finite 
causality is founded upon divine causality; and second, that the divine causality is completely 
presented in finite causality.243 We will examine these two ideas in turn. 
 The first statement – that finite causality is founded upon divine causality – means that 
there is no finite causality which is not grounded in the divine causality. He says, “As now 
everything that we can regard as a separate thing for itself within the totality of finite being must 
be ‘cause’ as well as effect, there is never anything of any kind which can begin to be an object 
of the divine causality, though previously – hence somehow independent of God and opposed to 
Him – in existence. Rather on such a view...the foundation feeling of religion would thereby be 
destroyed.”244  
 In other words, if there were some thing within the level of finite causality, which was 
not originally an object of the divine causality, then this means that it would exert some level of 
counter-influence upon the divine causality. If it exerted some level of counter-influence upon 
the divine causality, it would not be absolutely dependent upon the divine causality (for it would 
be exercising some level of partial freedom towards the divine causality). If anything within the 
 
242 “The divine causality as equivalent in compass to the sum-total of the natural order is expressed in the term the 
divine omnipotence; this puts the whole of finite being under the divine causality” (CF §51.1 [p. 201]). 
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omnipresent is in contrast to all finite causality; and second, that the divine causality, as affirmed in our feeling of 
absolute dependence, is completely presented in the totality of finite being, and consequently everything for which 
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level of finite causality exercised some level of partial freedom towards the divine causality 
(however small), this would destroy the feeling of absolute dependence, for the idea of such a 
feeling is based on the notion that everything finite exercises no freedom towards the divine 
causality, and thus is absolutely dependent. 
 The second statement – that the divine causality is completely presented in finite 
causality – means that all divine causality is expressed in the finite causality. In other words, 
there is no aspect of God which is not involved in God’s causality vis-à-vis the finite. For 
Schleiermacher, this has an important implication for how we understand God: in God, there can 
be no distinction between the general and the specific (§54.2), between the actual and the 
possible (§54.3), between absolute power and ordained power, between absolute will and 
conditioned will, between freedom and necessity, and between the active and the inactive 
(§54.4). In other words, the divine causality which is displayed in the created order simply 
reveals God as He is all the way down. 
 For Schleiermacher, the divine attributes which were given above denote merely the 
‘general relationship between God and the world.’ Thus, they are generic, derivable from any 
religious consciousness whatsoever. While the above gives a rendering of the formal components 
that shape our understanding of the divine attributes, it does not give a rendering of a 
consciousness associated with a particular religious community.  
 According to Schleiermacher, what is distinctive about the Christian consciousness is its 
Christocentricity. For the Christian consciousness, “all other things have existence only as they 
are related to the efficacy of redemption – either as part of the organization in which the 




organization is to elaborate.”245 For the Christian consciousness, then, the government of the 
world is directed towards a particular end, namely redemption. And since redemption entails a 
redeemer, the Christian consciousness sees the divine government of the world as ‘aimed’ at the 
appearance of a redeemer: “The Christian faith that all things were created for the Redeemer 
[Col. 1:16] implies …that by creation all things (whether as prepared for or as overruled) were 
disposed with a view to the revelation of God in the flesh, and so as to secure the completest 
possible impartation thereof to the whole of human nature, and thus to form the Kingdom of 
God.”246 
 As we saw above, because there is no dualism between God’s underlying disposition and 
the form in which the underlying disposition of God is given effect; and because the form in 
which the underlying disposition of God is given effect  is aimed at incarnation and redemption; 
it follows that there is no dualism between the incarnation of and redemption through Christ, on 
the one hand, and God’s underlying disposition, on the other hand. Thus, it is only the 
consciousness that has been determined by the consciousness of redemption that can adequately 
characterize the divine essence. It follows, then, that the characterization of incarnation and 
redemption is just the characterization of the divine essence itself (and further, that there can be 
no creation without redemption).  
 How, then, does Schleiermacher characterize the incarnation and redemption? They are 
characterized, he maintains, by love. “Love,” says Schleiermacher, “...is the impulse to unite self 
with neighbor and to will to be in neighbor; if then the pivot of the divine government is 
redemption and the foundation of the Kingdom of God, involving the union of the divine essence 
 





with human nature, this means that the underlying disposition cannot be conceived otherwise 
than as love.”247 Because love is what is manifest in the incarnation and redemption, and because 
there is no ‘dualism’ between God’s underlying disposition and the form in which it is given 
effect to, that love characterizes incarnation and redemption means that one can rightly predicate 
it of the divine essence: “...we have the sense of divine love directly in the consciousness of 
redemption, and as this [viz., the consciousness of redemption] is the basis on which all the rest 
of our God-consciousness is built up, it of course represents to us the essence of God.”248 As will 
be shown in chapter six, Schleiermacher’s assertion that love is the highest characterization of 
the divine essence is appropriated wholeheartedly by Dorner. 
 
3.1 Dorner’s Understanding of Love 
 We can get a sense of why Dorner finds Schleiermacher’s doctrine of God compelling by 
briefly investigating Dorner’s understanding of the concept of love. Dorner conceives of love as 
the unity of self-assertion and self-impartation (or, as he sometimes puts it, ‘self-preservation’ 
and ‘self-communication’).249 ‘Self-impartation’ is the giving of oneself to another. But it must 
be noted that ‘self-assertion’ here does not mean selfishness. Rather, self-assertion is one’s 
recognition of oneself as worthy of being loved. Thus, it is the recognition that in giving oneself 
to another in love, one is not an instrument for that other. It is a recognition that a relation of love 
requires an acknowledgment of the intrinsic worth of the other party, and thus a recognition that 
– as one of the two parties – oneself must thereby possess an intrinsic worth. In recognizing that 
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one is not an instrument, then, one recognizes that there are aspects of oneself which is not to be 
annihilated, for intrinsic worth implies that those aspects have worth and thus ought not to be 
annihilated. Love, therefore, involves the impartation of oneself to another, but without the 
annihilation of oneself. 
 Dorner insists that, to communicate oneself to another as love – to love another – can 
only occur between persons (hence such communication of God to humanity can occur only 
through divine incarnation).250 Before the incarnation, what communicated the divine – the 
medium of divine self-impartation – was the natural world and the Law. Put differently, what is 
communicated by the natural world and the Law is are things like God’s omnipotence, God’s 
holiness, etc. Thus, the natural world and the Law communicate merely physical aspects of God. 
But the natural world and the Law, Dorner insists, are unable to communicate that love is a 
property of the divine.251 God, then, can only communicate himself to another as love by 
revealing Himself personally, that is, by becoming incarnate. 
 In identifying the incarnation as the medium by which love is identified as a property of 
the divine, Schleiermacher has recognized the primacy of God’s ethical aspect: to conceive of 
God as love apart from the incarnation is to conceive of love without self-impartation, and to 
conceive of the incarnation apart from love is to conceive of love without self-preservation. This 
is why Dorner believes that Schleiermacher gives ‘ethical precision’ to his doctrine of God. 
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3.2 What Dorner finds unsatisfactory in Schleiermacher 
 In characterizing the divine essence as love, Schleiermacher has given primacy to God’s 
ethical aspects over against God’s physical and logical aspects. Although Dorner will follow 
Schleiermacher in this, he will nonetheless deviate from him in some important respects. We saw 
that, for Schleiermacher, there can be no distinction in God between the general and the specific, 
between the actual and the possible, between absolute power and ordained power, between 
absolute will and conditioned will, between freedom and necessity, and between the active and 
the inactive. Dorner will argue, however, that eliminating such distinctions leaves one with an 
unsatisfactory doctrine of God. 
 Dorner gives an explicit treatment of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of God on this point in 
his essay on the history of the doctrine of divine immutability.252 Because we have established 
 
252 Isaak August Dorner, “The History of the Doctrine of the Immutability of God,” in Divine Immutability: A 
Critical Consideration, trans. Robert R Williams and Claude Welch (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2009), 
82-130 (hereafter abbreviated as “History…”). This essay is the second of three which comprise Dorner’s work on 
divine immutability: “Über die richtige Fassung des dogmatischen Begriffs der Unveränderlichkeit Gottes, mit 
besonderer Beziehung auf das gegenseitige Verhältniss zwischen Gottes übergeschichtlichem und geschichtlichem 
Leben,” Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie I/2 (1856), 361-416; “Die Geschichte der Lehre von der 
Unveränderlichkeit Gottes bis auf Schleiermacher, nach ihren Hauptzügen historisch-kritisch dargestellt,” ibid., II/3 
(1857), 440-500.; “Dogmatische Erörterung der Lehre von der Unveränderlichkeit Gottes,” ibid., III/4 (1858), 579-
660.  
 Dorner makes some further criticisms of Schleiermacher in this essay, but they are criticisms of 
Schleiermacher’s own self-consistency and therefore are not relevant. The criticisms are in brief: If God is the unity 
of the world (as Schleiermacher maintains), this entails a contrast: God (as that which unites) in contrast to the world 
(as that which is united). However, if there is no distinction between cause and effect in God, then there can be no 
question of a contrast between that which unites and that which is united.   
 Schleiermacher’s insistence on a lack of distinction in God also causes him to posit that creation is a 
perfectly complete effect of God, since there is no distinction between cause and effect. Dorner points out, however, 
that according to Schleiermacher, the full communication of God to the world will only be accomplished gradually. 
This entails that there must be a distinction between God and God’s effects, for there is a discrepancy on the side of 
the effect. 
 Finally, Schleiermacher has asserted that divine causality must be uniform throughout – that is, that there 
be no special acts of divine intervention. The incarnation, according to Schleiermacher, is the completion of 
creation. However, the incarnation occurred at a particular time and place; it has not been a continuous effect. If it 




Dorner’s appreciation for Schleiermacher in privileging God’s ethical aspects, here we will 
simply focus on his criticisms of how Schleiermacher executed this task. 
 Dorner’s most devastating criticism of Schleiermacher on this point is that, if we 
eliminate the distinctions which Schleiermacher wants to eliminate, the result is acosmism (i.e. 
the only reality is God, and there is no creation). If there is no distinction to be made between 
God’s potentiality and actuality, and if God is beyond time (since there is no then and now for 
God), then what is actual (viz., creation) must itself not possess any temporal characteristics. 
Since there obviously is a temporal world, Schleiermacher must be wrong. 
 Thus the experience of temporal succession that creatures have would be an illusion:  
If one emphasizes the point that all that originates in a timeless way is not merely thought 
and willed, but effected, that is, has become actual – as one must if there is no distinction 
between God’s will and ability – then there remains nothing else but to regard temporal 
succession as merely an illusion. This agrees with Schleiermacher’s point that God 
strives after nothing that He does not already possess, because this would again introduce 
distinctions into God, if not God’s blessedness. But this is equivalent to acosmism and 
represents a flight to an ideal world apart from this world of temporal distinctions...253 
 
 This line of thought can be applied more broadly to any distinctions within the finite. If 
everything finite is due to God (because there is no finite causality which is not grounded in or 
independent of the divine causality), and if in finite causality there are distinctions, then such 
distinctions must be grounded in the divine. 
 Therefore, if there is no finite causality which is not grounded in or independent of the 
divine causality, then either there must be some sort of distinction within God (by which the 
distinctions in creation are grounded) or the distinctions within creation are, in fact, illusory: 
If nothing can be thought or willed in isolation from God, everything is what it is in 
distinction from everything else, by virtue of being thought or willed by God. It would 
then be the case that all real distinctions in the world...would have no basis in God and so 
 




would be merely illusions.”254 Thus Dorner says, “Schleiermacher’s doctrine is in this 
respect unsatisfactory. It offers no basis for thinking of God as the cause of what is 
empirically and historically actual, and thereby fails to secure the actual from the 
suspicion of being a mere illusion for religious consciousness.255 
 
 Dorner therefore finishes his essay on the history of divine immutability by rejecting the 
notion that God must be utterly devoid of distinction. He says, “Consequently Christian faith 
neither must, nor may, remain content with assertions such as divine simplicity or quiescence, or, 
what leads to the same result, assertions of an eternal and uniform vital causality that always and 
everywhere produces the same effects.”256 
 Dorner’s task is, on the one hand, to construct a doctrine of God in which the ‘ethical’ 
aspects are primary. This allows him to incorporate into his doctrine of God what he sees as the 
gain of the Protestant Reformation, namely, a correlation between the divine and the human. On 
the other hand, his critique of Schleiermacher demonstrates that such a doctrine of God cannot 
consist solely of those ethical aspects, but must also account for the physical and logical aspects 
of the divine. 
 
3.3 Dorner’s Amendments of Schleiermacher 
 The question is, therefore, how Dorner can maintain that God possesses physical, logical, 
and ethical aspects, and nonetheless privilege some of these aspects over the others. To have 
certain features of God as primary or normative over others entails some level of activity and 
passivity amongst those attributes. In Dorner’s case, as we will see, the physical and logical 
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attributes must be passive with respect to the ethical attributes because the physical and logical 
attributes are to be governed by the ethical attributes.  
 Therefore, instead of the divine essence consisting of an undifferentiated unity of the 
divine attributes, we have in Dorner’s doctrine of God an ordering of attributes, where the 
physical and logical attributes serve the ethical attributes as means to end. As Dorner puts it, 
“The non-ethical distinctions in the nature of God are related to the ethical as means to an end; 
but the absolute end can lie only in morality, because it alone is of absolute worth. The ethical 
principle is the ultimate reason for the fact that God eternally wills Himself, or is the ground of 
Himself, in all His attributes.”257 In the next chapter, we will examine Dorner’s attempt to 
construct a doctrine of God precisely along these lines. 
 




Chapter 5  
DORNER ON THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, we examined various background aspects which were pertinent 
to Dorner’s doctrine of God. In this chapter, we will examine Dorner’s actual treatment of the 
doctrine of God, particularly the divine attributes. A consideration of the divine attributes is 
important, for they are the ingredients, so to speak, for Dorner’s construction of the three 
trinitarian configurations (physical, logical, and ethical). 
 In order to avoid confusion, some comments need to be made at the outset. In chapter six, 
we will see that Dorner speaks in terms of a principle in the divine which demands that the 
divine actualize itself as an ethical subject. Ethical subjectivity, we will see, demands a 
trinitarian structure. Thus, in demanding that it actualize itself as an ethical subject, the divine 
demands that it be a Trinity. Thus, God is Trinity because God is to be an ethical subject. 
Ontologically, then, this principle of ethical subjectivity precedes the divine persons (since they 
are the means by which it is to be actualized), and the resultant ethical subject succeeds the 
divine persons (insofar as it is their result). 
 In this chapter, however, we will examine how Dorner arrives at the Trinity by a complex 
series of inferences based on various arguments. Through these arguments, Dorner constructs a 
theology wherein God is an ethical subject comprised in terms which are seemingly opposites 




reconcile these opposites because it will allow both ethical components to be ascribed to God. In 
this chapter, the divine attributes epistemically ground the claim that God is Trinity. As 
mentioned above, however, the next chapter will show that the Trinity itself is ontologically 
grounded in divine ethical subjectivity. 
 The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 gives a brief overview of Dorner’s 
procedure in establishing the divine attributes. Here I will describe some of the basic differences 
between the types of arguments he employs, and discuss how such arguments are for Dorner 
more of a single, cumulative argument. 
 Section 2 examines how Dorner establishes divine aseity, the notion that God has His 
existence from Himself and not from another. Here, we will see how he treats the ontological 
proof for God’s existence (2.2), which establishes that God is necessarily existent, and so as the 
original possibility of thought, being, volition, and knowledge, possesses the attributes of unity, 
singularity, simplicity, and infinity. We will then examine his treatment of the cosmological 
argument (2.3), where Dorner applies the concept of causation to the divine, establishing that 
God must have His continual actuality, always realizing His inexhaustible potentiality, from 
Himself. Through the ontological and cosmological arguments, therefore, Dorner establishes that 
God possesses aseity. 
 Section 3 examines how Dorner establishes that God possesses intellect. Here, Dorner 
treats the physico-teleological argument (viz., an appeal to the structure and purposiveness of 
empirical phenomena as evidence that there is a conscious subject responsible for such design 
and order) to establish that the divine is in possession of intelligence. 
 Section 4 examines how Dorner establishes God as an ethical agent. Here, we will look at 




Himself. Then we will look at his treatment of the moral argument (4.3) wherein he establishes 
that God is the absolutely worthy end. Throughout this section, we will see how Dorner 
establishes that the ethical in God be both a matter of the divine being as well as a matter of the 
divine will. Therefore, this section in particular is critical for understanding the issue that 
preoccupies Dorner regarding the Trinity: that both ethical freedom and ethical necessity must be 
present in God. This will set us up for the next chapter where we will see how Dorner will solve 
this problem by means of the Trinity. 
 
1. Proofs for God’s Existence and the Divine Attributes  
 As mentioned, the present chapter is concerned with Dorner’s doctrine of God, giving 
particular attention to the divine attributes. The divine attributes themselves are reached through 
an examination of proofs for God’s existence (ontological, cosmological, physico-teleological, 
juridical, and moral). These proofs can be divided into two types: a priori and a posteriori, that 
is, conceptual and empirical, respectively. The a priori argument, which consists solely in the 
ontological argument, begins with the concept of a most-perfect being, and from this concept 
derives that such a being must necessarily exist. For Dorner, because the ontological argument is 
the only argument that does not appeal to empirical data, it is the only argument that can 
establish that God exists. A posteriori arguments, on the other hand, begin with empirical data, 
and from such data supplement the concept of God obtained by the ontological argument. Thus, 
the empirical arguments do not establish God’s existence, but instead only enrich the initial 
definition of God established by the ontological argument.258 
 
258 This is a departure from the standard procedure wherein the argument presupposes a certain concept of God 
which serves as the first premise from which God’s existence may be inferred. At the conclusion of his treatment of 
the ontological proof, Dorner refers to the subsequent proofs by saying, “The remaining proofs for the divine 
existence lend their aid in order to obtain from absolute and infinite Being more intimate definitions of God. So far 




 From such arguments, Dorner derives various attributes to predicate of the divine. An 
examination of these divine attributes is important for our understanding of Dorner’s trinitarian 
theology, for each of them will be parsed in a trinitarian configuration: divine aseity is 
configured as the physical Trinity, divine intellect is configured as the logical Trinity, and the 
ethical attributes are configured as the ethical Trinity. 
 
2. Establishing Divine Aseity 
2.1 Introduction 
 Our goal in this section will be to examine how Dorner establishes the doctrine of divine 
aseity. Such an examination is crucial, for aseity is the essential attribute that is the basis of the 
personal properties of the divine persons as treated in the ‘physical Trinity.’ In his treatment of 
the ontological argument, Dorner argues that the idea of God indicates that such a being 
necessarily exists and that such an idea is necessary for any rational thought at all. In 
subsequently utilizing the concept of causality (from the cosmological argument) and applying it 
to the divine, Dorner then makes a case for how God’s necessary existence is an existence which 
is received by no other than Himself. 
 
 
certain predicates of God, they may indeed be too weak collectively to effect what they would. They cannot of 
themselves answer for the being of the absolute Essence, but they simply afford us categories or predicates which 
belong in the first place to the world, without being able to prove the being of God and the existence of those 
predicates in God” (SCD §19.3, observation [ET: v. 1, p. 247]). 
 The two types of arguments, when considered together, form something analogous to what has been called 
in 20th century analytic philosophy of religion a “cumulative case argument.” Historically, the cumulative case 
argument has been associated with establishing only God’s existence. But to utilize this terminology for Dorner’s 
context, the two types of arguments form a cumulative case not only for God’s existence, but for all the attributes 




2.2 The Ontological Argument 
 According to Dorner, the ontological proof shows us that God is the real original 
possibility of thought, being, volition, knowledge, and is absolute.259 If one thinks about the 
highest essence – that is, what the highest essence must be like – one must conclude that 
existence must be included in what it means to be the highest essence. He says, “The highest 
essence, when thought, is to be thought as unconditioned and independent of anything else, 
independent also of our subjective thought, but as unconditioned or absolute, self-existing, and 
consequently as existent.”260 The highest essence, in other words, cannot be conditioned by 
anything, and so must have its existence from itself and not from another. 
 Dorner then moves from the notion that, since the highest essence must have its existence 
from itself, it must exist. Here, he seems to assume the following: (1) things, or in his 
terminology, ‘essences’ do exist, and (2) of those things or ‘essences’ which exist, they have 
their existence either from themselves or from another. Since the highest essence must have its 
existence from itself, and since there are essences, this highest essence must exist. 
 Given that the concept of God necessarily includes that God exists, Dorner concludes that 
the concept of God is a necessary concept for thought. Dorner says, “Thus the only choice lies 
between leaving the idea of God unthought, or thinking it, when thought, absolute and self-
existing.”261 Notice, here, the choice is not between thinking of God as existent or thinking of 
 
259 “In the ontological proof we have found God to be the real original possibility of thought, being, and knowledge, 
and to be absolute” (SCD I §20.4 [p. 256]). In this particular text he does not mention volition, but in other texts he 
lists it. See section 1.1.3 below. 





God as non-existent, but between thinking of God as existent or not having any thought of God 
at all, whether as existent or as non-existent.  
 
2.1.1 God as the Original Possibility for Thought 
 However, one cannot not have any thought of God at all, because the idea of the Absolute 
is itself necessary for human thought. How is the idea of the Absolute necessary for human 
thought? Dorner begins his account by stating, “It is not optional, but necessary, to think an 
Absolute, which, in order to be thought, is to be thought as existent. It is necessary [to think an 
Absolute], that is to say, for him who wishes to think rationally, and whose thought is thought 
which would become knowledge…”262 The thought of an Absolute is necessary for rational 
thinking because without it, “there is no longer anything infinite for men, and also an absence of 
knowledge of the finite as such; for apart from opposition to the infinite, even the finite as such 
cannot be known. Thus understanding at most might remain, but not reason.”263 The thought of 
the Absolute is necessary for human thought, Dorner argues, because it provides a contrast 
between itself and all that is not it, between the infinite and the finite. Unfortunately, Dorner 
does not go into any further detail on this point. The assumption seems to be that a contrast is 
needed for the possibility of human thought, wherein the infinite (the Absolute) functions as a 
sort of horizon or background by which the finite can be present as foreground to the human. 
 A second argument for the thought of the Absolute as being necessary for human thought 
deals with the Absolute as ‘unity.’ Dorner notes that, without the thought of the Absolute,  
the point of unity is lost for all plurality of the existent and the possible. A consciousness 
which has got rid of the thought of absolute Being would become a prey to an endless 
atomicism and dissolution. The reason must by its nature seek unity, must maintain an 
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ultimate point of unity of the ideal and real for thought and existence; otherwise there 
would neither be rational thought nor volition. Without this principle of unity, thought 
falls apart. Even the copula between subject and predicate, this last relic of the ultimate 
principle of unity, would be consistently dissolved, and with it thought would also be 
extinguished.264 
 
Thinking is an act whereby distinct things are mentally related to one another (e.g., the thought 
‘This blanket is green.’). Distinct things can be related to one another, however, only if there is a 
bridge that allows for such relation. That a blanket can be a certain way (e.g., ‘green’) and that 
greenness can be a certain way (e.g., belonging to a blanket) entails that there is a reality more 
basic than either blankets or greenness – namely, being itself – which allows for the blanket and 
greenness to be a certain way. Human thought, Dorner supposes, must presuppose the thought of 
this basic reality in order to make mental relations between things. This basic reality just is the 
Absolute. 
 Dorner argues, thirdly, that the thought of the Absolute is necessary for human thought 
because the Absolute grounds the logic by which thought operates. “Thought is truly human,” 
Dorner says, “i.e. not visionary or sportive thought, but thought which would become knowledge 
– by the presupposition of an Absolute as the prototype of thought.”265 Dorner sees human 
thought as operating under certain norms: “Thought is what it should be only by the laws of 
thought, which form its regulative element and internal law, which thought has not first 
produced, but which constitute the immovable foundation, the absolute fortress and a power 
innate in the thinker.”266  
 






 Unfortunately, here too Dorner does not give a thorough argument, and so one must 
guess a bit at what he means. He seems, however, to be saying something like the following. The 
laws by which thought operates are not arbitrary or subjective, for thought is governed by these 
laws. Logic is authoritative over how we think, if we are to think rightly. Thus, because these 
laws are normative over thought, they are not something which thought merely produces. Rather, 
they are objective and independent of thought. Thus, there is a reality which transcends human 
thought and is that by which human thought can operate. As Dorner puts it, “Thus the Absolute 
as the logical power precedes all actual thought, and is not produced by thought; or, the Absolute 
is the primary logical element, the original possibility of logical thought to be presupposed as 
existent.”267 Since thought of the Absolute is demanded by thought as such, one must have an 
idea of a highest essence. And since a highest essence must be the source of its own existence, 
this highest essence – this Absolute – must exist. 
 
2.1.2 God as the Original Possibility of Being 
 Not only is the Absolute necessary for thought, but also for the possibility of being at all. 
The Absolute is “the original possibility of existence, of all realization according to form and 
matter. If an actual being is to be (and the thinker is already an actual being), its possibility is 
presupposed, whether that possibility is absolutely within itself or without. In the latter state it 
cannot remain; it impels toward an existence which has its possibility within itself. But that being 
which bears its possibility within itself, and which is thereby the possibility of all being, is called 
the Absolute.”268 
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 Dorner’s argument runs as follows. One who thinks already exists, and thus the one who 
thinks must presuppose that things actually exist. Given that things do actually exist, anything 
which actually exists logically presupposes the possibility – the potentiality – of existing. Things 
which cannot potentially exist could never actually exist, therefore things which do actually exist 
presuppose a potentiality of existence.  
 The next step of the argument is less clear, but seems to be something like this: 
everything which has a potentiality of existence has that potentiality either from themselves or 
from something other than themselves. At least in this argument, Dorner assumes that there can 
only be one thing which has its potentiality of existence from itself. That which has its 
potentiality of existence from itself, and not from another, is ‘the Absolute.’ Since one who 
thinks must presuppose the actual existence of things, and since the actual existence of things 
entails that there be something which has its actual existence from itself (viz., the Absolute), the 
act of thinking entails the thought of an actually existing Absolute. 
 
2.1.3 God as the Original Possibility of Volition 
 Of the four claims Dorner makes regarding the Absolute as a necessary presupposition of, 
the most obscure claim is that the Absolute is necessary for the possibility of volition, for he 
merely asserts this is the case without actually making an argument. The text in which he is most 
direct on this matter is still merely suggestive: “But if the existence of the Absolute is to be 
thought as the original possibility of all being, the world of volition, which has to do with the 
real, also presupposes the Absolute as its original possibility.”269 
 




 Because he notes a similarity between the Absolute as the original possibility for volition 
and as the original possibility of being, this suggests he is thinking something like the following: 
God is the original possibility of being because one who thinks must presuppose the actual 
existence of things, and since the actual existence of things entails that there be something which 
has its actual existence from itself (viz., the Absolute), the act of thinking entails the thought of 
an actually existing Absolute. Analogously, one who wills must presuppose the actual existence 
of things (since to will something is to seek to make a change with respect to being), and since 
the actual existence of things entails that there be something which has its actual existence from 
itself (viz., the Absolute), the act of willing entails the thought of an actually existing Absolute. 
 
2.1.4 God as the Original Possibility of Knowledge 
 The thought of the Absolute, fourth, is necessary for there to be knowledge. As Dorner 
puts it, knowledge “is the unity (not the identity) of thought and being.”270 Knowledge occurs, in 
other words, when some object (and thus some aspect of ‘being’) becomes an object of thought. 
Things cannot be objects of thought (and therefore cannot lead to knowledge), however, if the 
two are not correspond-able: the object must be cognizable to thought, and thought must have the 
ability to cognize the object.  
 A correspondence, of course, entails some level of likeness between the two. In other 
words, there must be something common between the potential object of knowledge and the 
potential knower at a level even more fundamental than the one in which knowledge occurs. 
Thus, there must be a basic unity between thought and being, a unity which accounts for the 
possibility of their correspondence that leads to knowledge. As Dorner puts it, “Were, then, this 
 




unity and harmony of being and thought generally and originally nowhere given (therefore also 
not once present) in a common primary basis of both, which is the real point of unity for the 
cognoscens and the cognoscibile, this harmony of both could not gain a place in us.”271 
 Thus, a basic unity between thought and being entails a reality which transcends both. 
This reality is the Absolute: “Therefore this absolute harmony must be originally given, and be 
presupposed, as truth. The ideal and the real must be originally united in themselves somewhere 
and somehow in order for the union of the two to exist in us, in our knowledge. If we call this 
unity of thought and being to be presupposed the Absolute, the Absolute is therefore the original 
possibility of all our knowledge, inasmuch as it is the self-existent unity in which they 
harmonize, or inasmuch as it is original truth.”272 
 Thus far, Dorner acknowledges that we have only a bare concept of God: “But we have 
certainly not treated strictly in our argument the full idea of that which we call God, but only the 
Godhead as the absolute Being, which is to be thought as necessary and existent, if thought, 
being, volition, and knowledge are to be."273 The next step will be to consider the entailments of 
the ontological argument in order to enrich this concept of God. 
 Four attributes of God immediately follow from what we have established: unity, 
singularity, simplicity, and infinity.274 The attribute of ‘unity’ – that the Absolute possesses a 
coherence or agreement with itself – can be arrived at from what we have considered thus far. 
We have seen that God is the possibility of all actual existence, and so God functions, therefore, 
 
271 SCD I §18.2 (p. 228). 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid., (pp. 229-30). 




as the single cause all of being: “That the absolute being is one follows immediately from the 
fact that it is the primary real possibility of all everything. By that inference all dualism at the 
ultimate sources is excluded.”275 Given that God is the single cause of all being, all being – 
despite it diversity – is held together coherently by this single thing. Thus, God must possess the 
attribute of ‘unity.’ 
 The attribute of ‘singularity’ – that there can be only one Absolute – is arrived at as 
follows. Dorner notes that ‘God,’ as the possibility of all actual existence and thus as the ‘unity’ 
of all actual existence, could simply refer to all that exists. Everything that exists, in other words, 
could just be ‘God.’ The advantage of this would be that God’s absoluteness would never be 
threatened: God cannot be made relative to something other than Himself since everything is 
God. 
 Dorner notes, however, that because God is the possibility of all actual existence, this 
distinguishes Him from all other things. If God were to create, that which is created would have 
to have its existence from God, and thus from something other than itself. Since there will 
always be this difference between God and everything else, even if God creates something other 
than Himself, that which is created can never threaten God’s absoluteness. 
 God, therefore, will always have a qualitatively different status than anything else that 
might exist: “The being of the Godhead as the Absolute is unique of its kind; the world therefore 
is, in this respect, of a kind absolutely dissimilar [to God]. The world cannot lay claim to His 
kind of Being, and thus He cannot be limited by the world. The world cannot, therefore, with the 
being that it has, be any limitation that could contradict His absoluteness, because He is and 
remains the primary possibility of everything. Generally, His being cannot be coordinated with 
 




another’s, for He must be the very possibility of that other’s existence.”276 Therefore, a second 
attribute follows from God understood as ‘absolute Being’: there can only be one Absolute, and 
so God possesses the attribute of ‘singularity.’ 
 The last two attributes are much simpler to treat. As we saw above, God is the unity of all 
being: there is the possibility of thought and knowledge because there is a primordial unity 
which allows the ideal and the real to be correlated. If God Himself was diverse, there could be 
no primordial unity by which the ideal and the real could be correlated. Thus, God understood as 
‘absolute Being’ leads to the conclusion that God possesses the attribute of simplicity, that God 
is not a composition of parts. 
 The final divine attribute that can be established from the ontological argument is 
infinity. As we saw above when treating of God’s unity and singularity, God cannot be made 
relative by the existence of another. The finite, therefore, cannot impose a limitation upon God as 
the absolute Being. For Dorner, this lack of limitation vis-à-vis the finite is denoted by the 
attribute of infinity.277 Therefore God, as necessarily existent, and so as the original possibility of 
thought, being, and knowledge, possesses the attributes of unity, singularity, simplicity, and 
infinity. 
 
2.3 The Cosmological Argument 
2.3.1 Introduction  
 The conception of God established above, because it is derived a priori, is the least 
determinate conception of God that is possible while still being thinkable. Dorner, however, 
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insists that human thought naturally seeks to move beyond such an indeterminate definition of 
God to one that is more determinate: “At the idea of the absolute essence, which, though not 
wholly indeterminate in contents, is yet poor and not particularly definite, thought cannot 
stop.”278 
 Dorner, however, is cautious here. On the one hand, he is convinced that thought 
necessarily moves to a more determinate concept of God than that provided by the cosmological 
argument. On the other hand, in arriving at a more determinate concept of God, he wants to 
proceed scientifically, and to do so requires that one proceed upon a principle of rational 
necessity. He asks, “How then are we to proceed from universal and infinite being to richer 
definitions, or from pure being to an onward movement, to a progress in knowledge and to 
definitions indeed, not introduced from without, but necessarily thought in the being of God, so 
that the concept of God may be further defined?”279 
 The ontological argument, recall, is the only a priori argument, and so the only argument 
that proceeds by rational necessity. Thought demands a more determinate conception of God 
than that provided by the ontological argument. The challenge, therefore, is to reach a richer 
definition of God, and to do so scientifically, yet having already exhausted the resources of the 
one a priori argument. 
 As we will see, Dorner’s solution is quite clever. Although he rejects the cosmological 
argument in its customary form, he will extract a component from the argument (the category of 
‘causality’), argue that this component may be applied validly to the divine, and so apply it to the 
conception of God already obtained in order to reach a more determinate conception. 
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 The cosmological argument, in its classical form, appeals to empirical data and reasons 
from this to God as first cause. But an appeal to empirical data assumes that there is a world to 
appeal to in the first place. Further, any reliance on the empirical is an appeal to something 
which is not the result of reason, i.e. it is an appeal to something which is not driven by logical 
necessity. As Dorner puts it, the cosmological argument (in its customary form) “presupposes the 
being of the world as a firm and certain being, in order to derive God as the cause of the world 
from that presupposition. But the world is not something of itself and by itself, as indeed the 
conclusion [of the cosmological argument] itself already acknowledges that the cause is found in 
God of the world which is ‘contingent.’ If the world is contingent, it may possibly not exist.”280 
 The cosmological argument, in its customary form, uses the category of causation as a 
bridge that links the contingent and the necessary, establishing the latter by means of the former. 
Necessity, however, cannot be established by contingency, and so Dorner rejects utilizing the 
category of causation to establish a link between the contingent (the empirical) and the necessary 
(the divine). Note, though, that what Dorner rejects is the utilization of the category of causation 
to establish the necessary from the contingent. However, Dorner sees it as legitimate to apply the 
category of causation to the divine itself (i.e. as something within the realm of necessity, and not 
between the realms of necessity and contingency).281 The concept of causation itself does not 
imply the empirical, and so is applicable to the divine. 
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2.3.2 Causation Applied to the Divine 
 Now that we have seen how Dorner secures the category of ‘causation’ for its application 
to the divine, we can proceed to the material results that it supplies for the conception of God. In 
basic terms, Dorner seems to think of causation as the reduction of potentiality into actuality. 
Since God must be thought of as always actually existing (rather than merely potentially 
existing),282 God can neither have an excess of potential existence over actual existence (for then 
something is limiting God283), nor can God have an excess of actual existence over potential 
existence (for then there would be a mere succession from one to the other, making God subject 
to time284). If, then, God is actually and absolutely existing, then the absolute potentiality cannot 
become extinct in God: the potentiality must be continual because actuality is realized 
potentiality, and God’s actuality is continual.285 
 When this notion of a continual potentiality-actuality relation is applied to the notion that 
God cannot receive existence from something other than Himself, it follows that God must have 
His continual actuality, always realizing His inexhaustible potentiality, from Himself. In other 
 
282 “But He cannot be thought as merely possibility of Himself, potentially existing, and not existing actu, just as 
little as He can be thought as passing over into actus, or into existent reality successively; He is actually and 
absolutely existent, He is absolutely in Himself realized potentiality (Potenz), actus purissimus” (SCD I §20.4 [p. 
256]). 
283 “And were the real and absolute potency, which He is, not to become actual, something restraining, conditioning, 
limiting must be assumed, which kept Him in the potential state, which is equally unthinkable whether that 
something be thought within or without Him” (SCD I §20.4 [p. 256]). 
284 “For did He first become actual, He would be subject to time…” (SCD I §20.4 [p. 256]). 
285 “But if, now, God is actually and absolutely existing, still the absolute potentiality (or causality), which He was 
eternally, cannot be extinct in the divine reality, cannot have ceased in the action, in that realization of deity. God 
must be the perennial and eternal cause of His absolute reality, and not merely the past and contingent cause” (SCD I 




words, God must possess aseity.286 Therefore, God is the ground of Himself: He provides 
Himself with the infinite supply of potentiality to be actualized.287 And given that God is both 
actuality and the source of this actuality, there is a distinction in God: the originator and that 
which is originated.288 
 Here a problem immediately arises. We saw that, as absolute, God cannot have an other; 
there can be only one absolute. Yet if there is a distinction in God, this would seem to imply that 
there are, in fact, two absolutes (thereby negating both in their claim to be absolute). To avoid 
this problem, God as originator and God as originated need to be seen as unified in some way. 
Dorner unifies these two elements by positing a reciprocal relationship between them. In other 
words, it is not that the effect is stagnant, but as effect relates itself back to its cause.289 This 
circular, reciprocal action between God as originator and God is originated Dorner expresses by 
the term ‘absolute life.’290 (In the next chapter, we will examine Dorner’s explicitly trinitarian 
 
286 “God must be ab aliquo [from something]; that the law of causation requires; and, because not ab alio [from 
another], necessarily a se [from Himself]. He has aseity” (SCD I §20.4 [p. 256]). 
287 “That means that…the center of gravity of absolute being does not lie outside of God, but falls within His own 
circumference. The infinite series of effect and cause, cause and effect, retrogrades, by the aseity, into itself; in the 
absolute the progressus in infinitum comes to the stand, which is predicated in the relation of cause and effect, and 
thus assumes these objective definitions into itself. God has not, so to speak, once, in the past, constituted Himself 
the absolutely and actually existent; He has thus constituted Himself eternally. He is and remains the real ground of 
His absolute reality. As that basis He is eternally the absolute and real potentiality or causality of Himself, the real 
possibility of His reality” (SCD I §20.4 [pp. 256-57]). 
288 “Therefore both facts are to be supposed to be equally necessary. God is the absolute reality of being, and the 
absolute originating power of His reality. Thus an eternal distinction is already gained in the absolute essence of 
God. He is at once originator and that originated. Not merely is He product or factum, but He is also factor, and 
conversely” (SCD I §20.4 [p. 257]). As we will see in the next chapter, such distinction is crucial in Dorner’s view 
for a trinitarian configuration of divine aseity. 
289 “But if that is so, the deity, as originated and made an effect, is Himself active in turn, He is so originated that He 
originates again. By this retrogression from the originated to the originating, the relation of causation is not broken 
through or violated, but continued and perfected in the reciprocal action. God as originated and as originator stands 
in the relation of reciprocal action. The deity as originated is eternally one with the deity originating, in this way, 
that the former is referred again to the cause, and is related in a causal and conditioning manner to that cause, just as 
the effect was immanent in the cause from the beginning” (SCD I §20.4 [p. 257]). 
290 “And thus God is not to be simply defined as absolute causality, but there is to be predicated of Him so to speak, 




texts which indicate that this action between God as originator and God as originated is just that 
of the procession of God the Son from God the Father. We will also see that the reciprocity 
between the two described above occurs in virtue of the Holy Spirit.) 
 The ontological argument, supplemented by aspects of the cosmological argument, 
establishes that there is a highest being – an Absolute – which exists necessarily and has this 
existence not from another but from itself: God is ‘absolute life.’ In the next chapter, we will see 
how Dorner configures this conception of the divine in a trinitarian manner, viz. as the ‘physical 
Trinity.’ Now, however, we will proceed to Dorner’s further elaboration of the divine attributes. 
 
3. Establishing Divine Intellect 
3.1 Introduction 
 Our task in this section will be to examine how Dorner establishes the doctrine of divine 
intellect. An examination of such a property is vital, for it is the essential attribute that is the 
basis of the personal properties of the divine persons as treated in the ‘logical Trinity.’ Dorner 
establishes that God possesses consciousness through his treatment of the physico-teleological 
argument. To that we now turn. 
 
3.2 The Physico-Teleological Argument 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 What Dorner calls the physico-teleological argument, in its customary form, is an 
argument that appeals to the structure and purposiveness of empirical phenomena as evidence 
that there is a conscious subject responsible for such design and order. Such an argument 
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absolute life. For God is absolute life in Himself, not by His being realized once for all, but by eternal self-




assumes that the empirical unambiguously displays harmony and order, and that such harmony 
and order is a direct expression of the mind that is responsible for it. 
 As we will see, Dorner modifies the customary form of the physico-teleological 
argument, asserting that, in fact, the empirical world does not unambiguously display order and 
purposiveness. What this means is that one cannot thereby move directly from nature to a mind 
behind that world. Dorner’s modification of the customary form of the physico-teleological proof 
is to assert that it is precisely the imperfection of the natural order which moves us to the thought 
of a perfect order, this perfect order being the divine. 
 
3.2.2 Application of Measure, Adaptation, Harmony, and Beauty to the idea of God291 
 “The world of nature,” Dorner says, “is full of wonderful contrivances, and relations of 
disconnected things with one another, for the production of certain results, so that a theologia 
naturalis may be projected with a collection of noteworthy instances of the designed and 
harmonious correlations of natural things.”292 However, Dorner notes a problem: “Still, more 
than one thing is lacking to the cogency of the physico-teleological proof of itself, both as 
regards content and form.”293 
 The problem is that, although we sense much order and harmony in the empirical, we 
also sense disorder and arbitrariness. “Adaptation or harmony is not everywhere represented to 
us,” Dorner says. “[W]ith the means at our disposal the induction is not to be perfectly 
established. Then in the statement of what is to be regarded as design, arbitrariness easily 
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comingles. There is much seemingly purposeless working. What from one side appears to be 
display of design, is neutralized again by other forces; for example, fruit or seed is the purpose of 
plants; they are destroyed.”294 Nature, Dorner continues, “is rather a cycle of rising and setting. 
Even man himself, if he regards himself as the end of nature, is devoured in turn by her, who is 
his mother, and thus forms an instance against the physico-teleological argument built on finite 
ends.”295 
 Dorner says: “This constitution of the world does not correspond with the idea of the 
perfect organism, in which there can be nothing superfluous or casual, too little or too much; this 
constitution [of the world] is contrary to such an idea.”296 Dorner therefore concludes that, 
because of the imperfection displayed in the natural world, we cannot arrive at the notion of the 
natural world as the finite effect of the infinite Absolute: “Consequently, even when the physico-
teleological proof is applied, it cannot possibly lead to an absolute intelligence, to design, etc., 
via causalitatis. Finally, an absolute intelligence distinct from the world is not to be thus 
reached.”297 
 However, the imperfection manifest in the world does not entirely preclude one from 
reaching a perfect designer. Dorner presents a clever way of reaching an absolute from the 
imperfection of the world: “The shortcoming, the imperfection of nature, shows us that we 
cannot stop at the design and harmony appearing therein as at an absolute thing, and thus an 
elevation above the world is needed to reach the Absolute and divine, which is free from 
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contradiction, which nature must acknowledge it is not. But still the world, as the entry upon the 
physico-teleological proof itself shows, may contain so much, that it urges to the conception of 
an absolute end, or a perfect harmony and beauty.”298 
 What does Dorner mean by saying that the world “urges to the conception of an absolute 
end, or a perfect harmony and beauty”? He seems to mean that the instances of imperfection in 
nature force reason to think of a perfect instantiation of life: “Now the world, upon whose 
suggestion of course these ideas [of order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and harmony] first come 
into consciousness, only presents them in an imperfect manner; therefore thought cannot rest 
content with the world, but only finds repose in the idea of the absolute and perfect design, 
beauty, and harmony.”299 
 That thought can be satisfied only with a perfectly ordered living whole means that the 
idea of such perfection is a necessary idea. Thus, since such an idea is necessary for thought, it 
must be associated with that we have already seen as necessary for thought, and thus what is 
necessarily existent. (Thus here, with the physico-teleological proof, Dorner builds upon what 
has already been established by the ontological and cosmological proofs.) Since there can only 
be one Absolute, this Absolute itself must be the perfect instantiation of life. (As Dorner puts it, 
God must be the ‘absolutely harmonious life.’300) 
 Given that God is this perfect instantiation of order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and 
harmony, the following can be said about God:  
The absolute life…is absolutely and essentially full of purpose in the fullness of its 
potentialities. It is not simply free from contradiction; the divine potencies of life are in 
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harmonious equilibrium, the divine life is essentially retrogressive purpose, self-purpose. 
The divine life, further, is essentially glorious, essentially forms a beautiful, eternal, and 
harmonious rhythm; and this primary beauty typically presents measure, the eternal order 
of the world, the perfect organism, and, if there is a world, the principle of all well-
measured equipoises, of everything that displays design or use, of everything beautiful 
and harmonious, in a word, of everything that is physically good in the world. The 
primary forms of things, and the primary ideas of adaptation and beauty, must be in 
God.301 
  
What we have, then, is an empirical sphere where order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and 
harmony are imperfectly realized, and yet lead to the rationally necessary idea of a perfect 
realization of order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and harmony. The only way to make sense of 
this imperfect realization is to relate it to a higher sphere, that of ‘spirit’: “So long as we remain 
in the realm of natural design, or good, or beauty, and know nothing of an absolute purpose, 
there remains something inadequate to the absolute life of God. Without spirituality the designed 
and beautiful is necessarily merely finite in value and manifestation.”302 
 Dorner thinks that this notion of ‘spirit’ can be obtained by considering teleology further. 
In the sphere of nature, we see teleology, and yet what is so vexing about teleology in this sphere 
is that it is not just the means that perish (which we might expect), but also the ends. In other 
words, everything in the sphere of nature – means and ends – seems to be transitory. “Now the 
physico-teleological argument brings ends before us relative to the sphere of the useful, the 
finitely good, and the beautiful, which are already of worth, but there is at the same time in these 
valuable objects transience and decay.”303 Thus one asks: “Wherefore this mutation and change, 
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however just it is in itself? Why are transience and change the only permanent things in 
nature?”304 
 The only way to make sense of this is to posit an absolute end, an end which does not 
undergo transience. As Dorner puts it, such an end “is only to be found, not in ends merely finite 
in value and power, not in transitory ends, but in a higher or absolute end, which asserts itself 
even in this change of the finite, and which, because it is absolutely and essentially worthy, is no 
longer inadequately related to the absoluteness of the divine”305 “Rational thought only finds a 
point of rest,” says Dorner, “by a non-arbitrary exaltation above the visible; that with which the 
exaltation has to do is, therefore, first of all, immaterial and non-transitory being, and so far 
already Spirit.”306 
 The sphere of spirit 
is the solution of the riddle, which always confronts rational thought in the consideration 
of natural life itself. Nature remains a contradiction to the reason which is in search of a 
final cause, unless there is a higher sphere than the natural, unless nature is broken 
through by the spiritual sphere, and by that means growth as well as decay, the 
consumption of the finitely purposed as well as the progressive renewal under new forms 
of what has been consumed, be justified and established. In that way, what was 
previously an end, although a finite one, enters into a greater coherence, into relation with 
a higher existence, with which it is incorporated as a medium.307 
 
 When we examined the sphere of nature, we were left with what seemed like an irrational 
sphere. Although we can discern order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and harmony in nature, 
these categories become questionable in light of the transience and decay that we also see in 
nature. 
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 But if this sphere is related to an absolute end, then the order of nature becomes rational 
to us. Relating the sphere of nature to an absolute end restores the categories of order, measure, 
adaptation, beauty, and harmony. With an absolute end, such categories have a permanent seat: 
“In this higher something, or in God as Spirit, the principles will be found of all those ideas of 
which the world forms the mere finite manifestation or type, the principles of measure, design, 
and order, of beauty and harmony.”308  
If this higher, absolute order provides rationality, then this means that this higher order is 
itself rational. Since rationality entails intelligence, the Absolute, therefore, must have the 
property of intelligence: “These categories [of order, measure, adaptation, beauty, and harmony] 
already presuppose a divine intelligence, an understanding, in which the eternal truths of logic, 
mathematics, and aesthetics are present as essential powers, so to speak, pertaining to the divine 
nature, already defined to be spiritual. Ends, whether finite or absolute, do not exist apart from 
intelligence; nor does beauty or order.”309 Thus, with the physico-teleological argument, Dorner 
has established that the Absolute possesses intellect. 
 
4. Establishing God as an Ethical Agent 
4.1 Introduction 
 With the juridical and moral arguments that are to be examined below, Dorner will 
establish the divine attributes that constitute God as an ‘ethical’ agent, and thus the attributes that 
concern the ‘ethical Trinity.’ Recall that for God to be ethically good, there must be some good 
which He freely wills. The juridical and moral arguments demonstrate that God is such in the 
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following way. In brief, the juridical argument establishes that God is just, i.e. that the rendering 
of that which is due is itself a property of God, and the moral argument establishes that God is 
the highest good, i.e. that God is an end only and not a means to some further end. In other 
words, the two arguments establish that God is just toward the good, that God Himself is the 
highest good, and therefore God is just toward Himself. God necessarily ensures that what is due 
to Himself is rendered to Himself. Since God is just towards Himself, God is thereby ethically 
good. 
 
4.2 The Juridical Argument: God Acts Justly Towards Himself 
 In his treatment of the ontological argument, we saw Dorner link necessary ideas of 
reason to the Absolute. Here, he does the same with the ideas of justice and right. The notions of 
‘justice’ and ‘right’ are not based on contingency, but on the inherent quality of that which they 
preserve. “The idea of right,” says Dorner, “is, in the first place, no mere subjective idea; it is 
neither a matter of a human mode of view nor a mere work of human liking, agreement, or 
convention, so that it is purely a matter of human choice to form right.”310 Although we may 
encounter injustice in the world around us, we know it as such precisely because the concepts of 
justice and right are necessary concepts.  
 Further, since the Absolute is the seat of the truths of reason, right and justice have their 
perfect exemplification in the Absolute: “The idea of right, when once it has been conceived 
upon positive or negative suggestion, cannot be again surrendered by the reason; it is a necessary 
idea of the reason, which cannot fail of existence in the Absolute, and of absolutely perfect 
existence therein. But the same absolute justice must also be acknowledged to be a good thing in 
 




itself, an essentially and absolutely worthy end in itself.”311 Dorner thus concludes, “But since, 
now, right and justice are necessary ideas of the reason, and something absolutely worthy is 
expressed thereby, they are also to be predicated of the divine essence.”312 
Thus, because God Himself is the origin of the necessary ideas of reason, the notions of 
justice and right have their origin in God. Yet it is not that the concepts of justice and right have 
their origin in the divine and manifest themselves in the finite. Rather, justice and right have their 
origin in God precisely because God Himself is right and justice – as Dorner puts it above, they 
are ‘to be predicated of the divine essence.’ 
What does it mean to say that God Himself is right and justice, that they are to be 
predicated of the divine essence? ‘Right’ denotes that certain things are due to a subject, that a 
subject is deserving of things based on its status. ‘Justice’ is simply the protection of such rights; 
the defense or guard that allows the subject enjoys its rights. For God Himself to be right and 
justice therefore means that God Himself is just, that God Himself upholds that which is due to a 
subject.  
Here it is tempting to move to the notion that God, as right and justice, simply means that 
God upholds that which is due to human beings. But Dorner, here, is not discussing the finite; he 
is discussing the Absolute. Justice and right are predicated of the divine essence, and the divine 
essence refers to God Himself. Right and justice, therefore, are predicated of God even apart 
from creation. Indeed, that God could be just only if He is in relation to something other than 
Himself is flatly rejected by Dorner: 
But if in the just action of God there is not revealed an internal and immanent justice, 
there would not be necessity in this just action: it would simply be arbitrary action, 
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because it would not have its roots in the divine essence; and thus, again, the concept of 
justice would become something subjective, it would be based in our mental 
representation, which is pressed upon us, although contingently, and thus the idea of 
objective right would vanish. But right belongs to the eternal truths as well as 
mathematics and logic, and those truths are maintained by God Himself, indeed they are 
united with His essence.313 
 
Dorner rejects the idea that God could be just only if there is an other because this would mean 
that, if there was an other to which God would relate, such relating would be based only on a 
divine will which would not be beholden to any law at all, even a law which is based in God’s 
very being. God could, potentially, act against His own essence. Dorner concludes, “We must 
therefore endeavor to apprehend God as just in Himself, or in relation to Himself, and apart from 
the idea of the world, or apart from the world.”314 
 Although Dorner rejects the idea that God would need an other in order to be just, he 
does recognize that the concept of justice entails a relation between two distinct things. For 
Dorner, God’s immanent justice is therefore possible only with a weak version of divine 
simplicity. Positively put, immanent justice entails a distinction of some sort within God: “The 
idea of justice at any rate presupposes a duality, and so, in order to be the original seat of justice, 
God cannot be thought as abstract simplicity, but only as distinct in Himself. But God is not to be 
abstractly simple; that point has already become clear to us by the divine self-origination.”315 
The question is: Where in the divine is this distinction relevant, i.e. what is to be distinguished 
from what when it comes to God’s immanent justice?  
 
313 SCD I §24.2 (p. 289). 
314 Ibid., §24.4 (p. 293). 
315 Ibid., (p. 294). Note, again, how Dorner posits the necessity of a distinction. This will help him parse the attribute 




That God is immanently just, and that justice entails a relation, means that God is just 
with respect to Himself. If God simply allowed His physical attributes free reign – if, for 
example, God simply asserted His will based on what He was absolutely capable of – then God 
would not be beholden to any law, any necessity. If, on the other hand, God is beholden to a law, 
then God must exercise His abilities and acts within the constraints of such a law. 
If justice is an immanent attribute of God, and if justice entails a respect for law, then 
immanent justice in God means that God must respect His own law. A self-constraint out of 
respect for a law means that one subordinates their abilities and actions to the law, that they see 
the law as normative over their actions. Thus, if this is the case in God, then this law in God is 
normative over God’s abilities and actions. Thus, although God’s abilities and God’s law are 
both included in God – are both aspects of God – nevertheless these two aspects are not to be 
given equal weight. Rather, if justice is indeed to be predicated of God, then there must be 
certain aspects of God which are subordinate to other aspects of God. In subordinating certain 
aspects of Himself to others, God is simply giving those various aspects of Himself their due. 
“God is just in Himself,” says Dorner, “seeing that He thinks and wills every single thing in 
Himself according to its value; that He gives and maintains its right, just, and harmonious 
position to each of the distinctions in Himself.”316 
Mere ability is simply part of the ‘physical’ aspect of God, whereas a respect for a law or 
norm entails something beyond and above God’s mere ‘physical’ aspect, namely the ‘spiritual’ 
aspect of God. God’s immanent justice, therefore, entails that God not be indifferent to the 
relation between His ‘physical’ aspect and His ‘spiritual’ aspect. As Dorner puts it, “The opinion 
that everything in God is of identical value, that nothing is superordinate and nothing 
 




subordinate, threatens the distinction between the physical, e.g. the divine power, and the 
spiritual; or it proceeds as if the distinction between the physical and the spiritual or ethical were 
merely subjective, and not given in the objective essence of God.”317 Thus, the ‘physical’ aspect 
of God is to be subordinate to, and servant of, God’s ‘spiritual’ aspect: “Everything in God 
accords with that justice which knows, wills, and preserves everything after its kind, and pre-
eminently so His life, His nature, and His fullness of might, as the servants of the spiritual, [as 
the servants of] the higher worth. There is thus also in God a subordination and a superordination 
by virtue of His justice, which penetrates the whole divine life, and is unalterable.”318 The 
distinction in God which justice preserves is therefore between the physical and the spiritual. 
We have spoken of God’s immanent justice as a relation of God to Himself, and that such 
justice gives each aspect of God its proper due. Specifically, we saw that Dorner is concerned to 
show that the spiritual aspect of God is preserved and not subordinated to the physical. Thus, the 
spiritual aspect of God has an absolute value since it can never be a means for a physical end 
(lest God’s justice be violated). God, therefore, respects His own divine law. God, as Himself 
right and justice, means that God upholds that which is due to Himself. 
Because right and justice are attributes of the divine, and therefore are the reason why 
God upholds that which is due to Himself, it is thereby necessary that God be just towards 
Himself. But here it will be important to pause and anticipate where the discussion is going. In 
the next section, we will see that God is just towards Himself not simply because He is God, but 
because He is the highest good, the absolutely worthy end. As a result, God is necessarily just 
towards Himself as the highest good. 
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Toward the end of the next section, however, we will see Dorner bring in a consideration 
which will directly challenge – indeed it will contradict – this line of thought he has been 
developing. The line of thought he has been developing, as we have seen, is that God is 
necessarily just towards Himself. But he will note that an important aspect of ethical goodness 
consists in an agent freely choosing to will the good. To look ahead, Dorner wants to maintain 
that both of these (contradictory) aspects of ethical goodness are present in the divine: God is 
necessarily just towards Himself and He freely wills to be just towards Himself. 
 
4.3 The Moral Argument: God as the Absolutely Worthy End 
 The juridical argument has yielded the conclusion that God upholds that which is due to 
Himself. Yet this really has only given us a negative characterization of the spiritual. What, then, 
is that which the divine justice protects? It is in SCD §26 where Dorner begins to offer a positive 
account of the ‘spiritual’ nature of the divine, of what the divine justice protects. He says, “That 
which is simply full of worth and purpose, and by means of which the just is just, and from 
which the just has its inviolability, is the holy, which exists for the sake of the intelligence and 
will, desires and attains in them positive realization, and thus becomes the ethically good”319 
Thus, this spiritual reality is ‘full of worth and purpose,’ and this is why it is protected by the 
divine justice. 
Dorner characterizes this spiritual reality more robustly as follows: 
The ultimate, holy, and positive idea of end, with which thought can and must be 
satisfied, is positive moral good alone, to which justice occupies the relationship of 
guardian, as the form which maintains that moral good as its essential contents. Or if we 
place ourselves at the position of ethical idea, justice is itself the negative side of the 
ethical, which, by virtue of its positive and unconditional worth and value, excludes and 
negatives in the just manner already considered (§24) everything inimical. Its obligatory 
force and strength, as has been shown, right derives, indeed, from the absolute worth of 
 




the positively good, as of the absolutely highest end, which as such is justly to be 
absolutely defended by justice. And thus the positively good, or the ethical, is the more 
deeply-lying ground or basis of all right which is unconditionally obligatory320 
 
Thus, it is what Dorner calls the ‘positive moral good,’ or ‘the ethical,’ which is the positive 
characterization of the spiritual. 
 Dorner confirms that it is ‘the ethical’ which is that which cannot be made into a means 
by noting how nothing can surpass it: 
In that idea [viz., ‘the ethical’], once thought, must the questioning cease as to the why, 
the cui bono, because the answer is that in that idea itself the bonum lies, and therefore 
the ultimate final cause, to transcend which is neither necessary nor possible. To 
transcend that idea would be to negative it. For if we thought anything to be higher than 
the ethical, the ethical would only be a means instead of the highest end. The ethical, 
when thought, is thought as that which is the essentially good, as its own absolutely 
worthy and positive end. In the idea of that absolute end and worth, thought can find its 
absolute point of rest.321 
 
We have seen that the divine justice guards the ethical, the absolutely worthy end. But 
what, precisely, is the relationship between the divine and the ethical, between the divine and this 
absolutely worthy end? Is the ethical an ideal which the divine justice guards, or is it the divine 
itself? Dorner argues that it is the latter: “If the ethical idea occupies this unique and necessary 
position, and if an absolute divine being is to be necessarily thought, the ethical, the thought of 
which is rationally necessary, cannot originally be outside of the Absolute, otherwise a 
something absolutely worthy would exist outside of the absolute being.”322 We have established 
that the ethical is an absolute end (rather than a relative end). Further, we saw that the 
ontological argument establishes an absolute being. If the ethical is something other than the 
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absolute being, then there are competing absolutes (or, rather, two things competing for the title 
of ‘absolute’). Thus, the ethical must be identical with the absolute being. 
The ethical, in other words, cannot be something which is merely potential in God. It 
cannot be something whose actuality is contingent upon, for example, the divine will. If this 
were the case, there would always be the potential that the ethical would not be actual. For 
Dorner, however, the status of the ethical entails its actuality: “But that the ethical should be 
thought as merely potential, as a law in or on the absolute being, is inadequate to the idea of the 
ethical as the absolutely highest idea. Potentiality as such is non-existence; if the ethical is 
merely potential, it is non-existent.”323 Dorner therefore concludes that “there exists in the 
absolute being and life the reality of the ethical.”324 The actuality of the ethical in God, therefore, 
is part of God’s very being. 
 There is, however, an important consideration regarding the actuality of the ethical as 
God’s being. Dorner captures this consideration nicely:  
But what is naturally or immediately good is not the true realization of the good. If God 
were only fatalistically and compulsorily determined in His being by the law of the 
ethical, or were He immediately at one therewith without conscious will, He would 
merely be a necessitated ethical substance, and not the God who is the prototype of 
holiness, whose image we ought to be. Indeed, apart from consciousness and volition, 
there could be no talk of the ethical, because good could not in that case be willed as 
such.325 
 
The objection to the ethical as merely identical with God’s being is that it would eliminate God’s 
will from what it means to be ethically good. One cannot say that an agent is ethically good if her 
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will is not involved, i.e. if there can be no sense in which this agent consciously and deliberately 
pursues ethical goodness.  
Does this mean, then, that the ethical in God must be a matter of divine will rather than of 
divine being? Dorner rejects this option. He says,  
If in the ultimate resort we built the ethical upon the divine will, without determining that 
will by the eternal ethical being God desires to be, such a will, because undetermined by 
the essence and being of God, would be ethically absolutely undetermined – that is to 
say, it would be mere caprice and absolute power (supremum liberum arbitrium), and 
would be quite as much of itself a merely physical category as that ethical natural 
disposition which is immediately and, so to speak, fatalistically determined.326 
 
If the ethical in God is due solely to the divine will, we have the same problem as before, just in 
a different form. The ethical identified solely with the divine being or solely with the divine will 
makes God only fatalistically related to the good: in the former case, nothing God wills is related 
to the good, and in the latter case, no aspect of God’s nature is related to the good. As Dorner 
puts it, “To think of God only as an actual and ethical will, and as only ethical substance or 
ethical being, leads essentially to the same result, and takes us back from the ethical sphere to the 
physical.”327 
 Dorner will conclude, then, that the ethical “exists in the deity in both ways, as eternally 
perfected ethical being, and as living ethical actuality, or will.”328 The ethical, therefore, exists in 
God both as part of God’s natural essence and as a product of divine volition. How these two 
aspects of the ethical fit together forms the summit of Dorner’s trinitarian thought: the ethical 
Trinity. It is to this topic that we now turn. 
 
326 SCD I §26.5 (p. 315). 
327 Ibid., (p. 316). 





DORNER ON THE TRINITY 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, we examined Dorner’s treatment of the physical, intellectual, and 
ethical divine attributes. There we saw that, for Dorner, God must be both naturally good, and 
yet an agent who freely wills the good. That God must be both, however, presents a problem, for 
the two at least seem to be mutually exclusive. The problem, in other words, lies in how we can 
predicate both of one and the same agent. The solution to this problem, Dorner thinks, can only 
be found in a trinitarian divine subject. In this chapter, therefore, we will explore exactly how 
Dorner tries to solve this problem (viz., in the ‘ethical Trinity’). As the solution to a problem, the 
Trinity is therefore grounded in the notion that God must possess ethical subjectivity. 
 The structure of this chapter runs as follows. Section 1 examines Dorner’s notion of the 
physical Trinity, the trinitarian configuration expressed by those physical attributes examined in 
the previous chapter that established divine aseity. Section 2 examines Dorner’s notion of the 
logical Trinity, the trinitarian configuration expressed by those logical attributes examined in the 
previous chapter that established divine intellect. 
 Section 3 examines Dorner’s notion of the ethical Trinity, the trinitarian configuration 
expressed by those ethical attributes examined in the previous chapter that established God as an 
ethical agent. We saw in the previous chapter that Dorner was particularly concerned to maintain 




both ethical components necessitates a distinction in the divine (which turns out to be the 
personal distinctions of the Trinity). In 3.2, we will see how Dorner maps the components of 
ethical subjectivity onto the Trinity. In 3.3, we will examine how the trinitarian persons function 
as the means by which divine ethical subjectivity is actualized. 
 Section 4 examines how, in virtue of being a union of freedom and necessity (4.1), God 
can be love. Section 4.2 then investigates how love is the primary attribute of the divine. Finally, 
in section 4.3, we will see how, for Dorner, love makes possible the perfect union of divine self-
communication and self-preservation vis-à-vis the created order – that is, how divine love 
enables God to give Himself to the created order without losing Himself in the created order. 
 
1. The Physical Trinity 
 In our examination of the divine attributes – specifically in our examination of the 
ontological and cosmological elements – we saw the following: Because God must be thought of 
as: [1] realized potentiality – that is, as actuality; [2] because such potentiality cannot be 
exhausted; [3] because the concept of causation entails a ‘from’; and [4] because God cannot be 
from something outside Himself; it follows that God must have His continual actuality, always 
realizing His inexhaustible potentiality, from Himself. That is, God possesses aseity. Further, we 
saw that Dorner unifies this inexhaustible potentiality with this continual actuality by positing a 
reciprocal relationship between the two, what he called a ‘double-sided causality.’ This circular, 
reciprocal action between God as originator and God as originated Dorner expresses by the term 
‘absolute life.’ 
 In his treatment of the ‘physical Trinity’ (SCD I §31B.I), Dorner seeks to demonstrate 
how divine aseity and its attendant double-sided causality requires a trinitarian structure of the 




his previous discussion of aseity: “That God is not a rigid but a living being, and is life in 
Himself by the fact that He lives a se, has been previously stated. He has and is not merely life in 
relation to what is distinct from Himself in which He loses Himself, but prior to everything He is 
so in and relatively to Himself; He does not even need, as we do, something distinct from 
Himself for His life, a material or a stimulus. By His own means He is the life, because He has 
aseity in Himself.”329 We will see that it is because God is ‘absolute life,’ as Dorner puts it, that 
God must be triune. 
 Since divine aseity is to be grounded in the triune structure of the divine, before 
proceeding to the Trinity explicitly considered, Dorner first briefly treats divine self-origination. 
Dorner notes that “if the divine self-origination is to be thought as real, a distinction, at least a 
dyad, is thereby supposed in God; God is the producer absolutely, but what is produced is not 
primarily the world, but is absolutely equivalent to the producer, an absolute effect which is itself 
efficient in turn.”330 The notion of a ‘double-sided causality’ which is constitutive of absolute life 
obviously implies a two-ness.  
In appealing to the notion of a ‘distinction’ in God (viz., God the ‘producer’ and the 
‘absolute effect’), and in noting that the effect is ‘absolutely equivalent’ to the cause, Dorner has 
begun to prepare the way for thinking about the causality of absolute life in trinitarian terms. 
God as ‘producer’ here alludes to the traditional trinitarian doctrine of God the Father generating 
God the Son, and the ‘absolute effect’ alludes to God the Son Himself. Yet the more explicit 
invocation of traditional trinitarian doctrine is Dorner’s assertion of the absolute effect being 
‘absolutely equivalent to the producer,’ a reference to the Son as homoousios with the Father. 
 





 To return to the issue of aseity for a moment, one of the most conspicuous aspects of his 
treatment of the physical Trinity is Dorner’s construal of what I will call the ‘principle of life.’ 
Dorner thinks of the trinitarian life of the divine after the manner of an organism. An organism 
consists of members and whole, wherein the whole logically precedes the members, and the 
members act as the vehicles which realize the whole. What we will see is that, in the physical 
Trinity, there is a principle of life which functions as the ‘whole’ – in that it drives the members 
– and the divine persons function as the ‘members’ insofar as they realize this principle of life. 
We will see, in other words, that there is a principle which necessitates that God be triune so that 
this principle can actualize itself. 
 In speaking about this principle of life as it occurs in organisms on a generic level, 
Dorner says, “In every living organism there is a reciprocal action without detriment to the 
distinction of the members; but this is only possible by the fact that life is not comparable to a 
straight line, upon which it is always producing something new and different, and is also not a 
mere movement backwards and forwards between two points, but is a circle which returns into 
itself.”331 We noted above that in an organism, on the one hand, the whole logically precedes the 
members, and on the other hand, the members realize the whole. Thus, in an organism, there is a 
reciprocity between the whole and the members. For the whole to be realized, the whole must be 
present in those members which realize it. Thus the whole must be present in the action of going-
forth, so that the going-forth is related to the purpose of the whole. The image of a circle in the 
above passage suggests that the going-forth of life is not unrelated to the whole. 
 The whole, of course, does not materialize apart from the members. Thus, the 
materialization of the whole must begin with one member of the organism (viz., God the Father), 
 




and it is through this materialization of the whole that the subsequent members of the organism 
(viz., God the Son and God the Holy Spirit) are produced. 
 Dorner then applies this organic imagery to the divine. Just as is the case with mundane 
organisms where the cause and effect are reciprocally related, such that the effect reaches back to 
its cause, so also must this be the case with the divine: “this second efficient cause cannot in its 
working continue to produce in a similar manner an endless series, a third which produces a 
fourth, and so on in an interminable theogonic series; that would be the heathen 
representation”332 Thus, he continues, the unity between God as cause and God as effect “is only 
permanently assured, insofar as the living effect or the life effected eternally finds its way back 
to the first efficient cause, and serves the end of eternally establishing God Himself as effect. 
God, as αἰτιατόν, is referred to God as αἴτιον, so that the relation of causation passes over into 
that of reciprocal action.”333 
 In other words, in the divine, God as effect must refer back to God as cause. Yet the 
referring back of the effect to the cause is not a feature of the effect as effect. There must be 
something beyond the mere going forth that relates the effect to the cause. How is it that in an 
organism the cause and the effect are related, such that there is not an endless series? How is it 
that an organism is not like a line that proceeds infinitely from a point, but rather like ‘a circle 
which returns into itself,’ where there is a reciprocal relation between parts?  
 The reciprocal relation, Dorner says, occurs by means of a third member: “the relatively 
independent and severed members are held together by a principle of unity which keeps the 
centrifugal force in equilibrium with the centripetal, a principle which is not one of the two 
 





members, nor is it the whole, but which preserves and confirms the members in their distinction, 
just as it unites them.”334 Such a principle of unity between God as cause (the Father) and God as 
effect (the Son) is the third member of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit: “This principle of union in the 
organism of the absolute Life we call the Holy Spirit, to whom even a physical importance 
attaches. He constitutes this organism together with the other two, just as He is Himself 
conditioned simultaneously with its members.”335 
 What is interesting here is that Dorner thinks of the act of life-origination in the divine, 
and thus the generation of one divine person from another, as something which would 
continually repeat itself were it not for the intervention of some principle which redirects it back 
(viz., the Holy Spirit). Indeed, Dorner’s words give the sense that this principle of life would be 
almost aimless were it not for the Holy Spirit: “To abide by a duality of principles would 
not…attain the end of self-origination, because without a principle which reconducted to unity 
either the second would produce a third, and the third a fourth, and so on ad infinitum, or God 
would be unable to attain any causality at all, because when starting from Himself He would not 
reach Himself again, and thus God would merely remain an absolutely simple, self-identical, 
rigid substance.”336 
 As Dorner notes, not only would an absence of the Holy Spirit result in an endless 
generation of divine persons, but further and paradoxically, an endless generation of divine 
persons would indicate not divine vitality but divine impotence. Dorner does not expound on this 
interesting point, but he implies the following. He has already noted that the Holy Spirit is the 
 






agent of unity vis-à-vis divine self-origination. As such, the Spirit brings about unity-in-
difference: unity between different divine persons (the Father and the Son).337 
 Divine causality, as we have seen, has both a component of duality (cause and effect) and 
a component of organicity (there is a whole, a teleological principle, which drives the parts and 
unites them). The Spirit, by uniting cause and effect – or more precisely, by relating the effect 
back to the cause – unites the goal of the act of life-origination with its purpose. More precisely, 
by relating the effect back to the cause, the Holy Spirit makes the act of divine life-origination a 
teleological act. 
 More broadly, by uniting cause and effect, cause and effect can no longer be thought of 
as discreet. The uniting of cause and effect allows for the discreet components to be predicated 
of one and the same thing. Because aseity involves self-generation, the generator and the 
generated must be predicable of one and the same self. Since cause and effect, considered merely 
as such, are by their nature discreet, there must be a component that relates them in a non-
arbitrary manner. This is similar to the idea that, where the motion of one’s foot and the 
movement of a soccer ball are related by the person’s intention to kick the ball, because the 
intention relates the effect (the motion of the ball) back to the cause (the motion of the foot) in a 
teleological way, allowing one to say that the person kicked the ball.) The teleological aspect 
allows for the Father, the Son, and the Spirit to be components of divine production, and thus 
allowing for the act of aseity to be predicated to none of them entirely individually, but to all of 
them collectively. For this reason, a trinitarian structure is needed for divine aseity. 
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2. The Logical Trinity 
 We saw in the previous chapter that if God is to be ethical, He must possess knowledge: 
We found earlier that God is not merely absolute thought, but also knowledge. 
Consequently, we must continue, God is also knowledge not only of things different from 
Himself, but of Himself primarily. The absolute energy of His knowledge must also 
penetrate His own depths, and indeed in such a way that He does not merely think His 
thought, but His being also, and His life, nay, that the whole fulness He has of real forces 
of life, of beauty, and of harmony, is illuminated by His self-consciousness.338 
 
 Just as Dorner, regarding the physical Trinity, grounded the trinitarian structure of the 
divine in the notion of divine aseity, it is in Dorner’s treatment of the ‘logical Trinity’ (SCD I 
§31B.II) that he grounds the trinitarian structure of the divine in the notion of divine intelligence. 
And just as we saw that it is in virtue of being triune that divine aseity is actualized, so we will 
see here that it is in virtue of being triune that divine intelligence is actualized. 
 Before we can examine how the Trinity relates to divine self-knowledge, we must first 
inquire not only into what is required for self-knowledge, but what is required for knowledge 
simpliciter. Dorner notes, “Now to all knowledge there pertains an antithesis of subject and 
object, of thinker and thought, and only by means of this duality and of their union does 
knowledge arise. The same thing is true of that knowledge which is self-consciousness. In this 
case the object is, it is true, no foreign object; but one and the same spirit, that it may become 
self-conscious, contrasts itself with itself.”339 
 For knowledge, there must be a subject – the one who does the thinking – and an object – 
that which is thought. Hence, for knowledge, there must be a distinction (an ‘antithesis,’ as 
Dorner puts it) between subject and object. The same is true for self-knowledge, although the 
 





object of thought is identical with the one who does the thinking. Yet, for self-knowledge to be a 
form of knowledge, there must be a distinction or ‘antithesis’ between the self as subject of 
knowledge and the self as object of knowledge. The self must ‘contrast’ itself with itself. 
 How does the self contrast itself with itself? Because it is self-knowledge, and thus one 
and the same agent making itself an object for itself, Dorner speaks of the agent ‘reduplicating’ 
itself: “In this objectivation, the spirit reduplicates itself, so to speak, within itself.”340 So, in 
making itself an object of knowledge for itself, the self doubles itself. This reduplication, as an 
act of objectification, creates something which is now distinct. 
 Thus, there is an important difference between knowledge of things other than the self 
and knowledge of the self. In knowledge of things other than self, there is no reduplication. In 
self-knowledge, however, the self, “does not primarily project something foreign to itself…but 
[it] projects [its] own counterpart or image”341 In self-knowledge, therefore, that which is 
projected (the object of thought), although necessarily distinct from the subject, has a certain 
likeness to the subject, for it just is the subject’s own ‘counterpart’ or ‘image.’ 
 Here, already, we can anticipate Dorner’s trinitarian articulation of divine self-
knowledge. Such a view of self-knowledge maps onto traditional trinitarian thought in that there 
is reduplication (which corresponds to the generation of the Son from the Father) and such 
reduplication occurs within the agent itself (which ensures the homoousios of the divine 
generator and the generated divine). 
 As we might guess, self-knowledge requires more than two components. Dorner says:  
Human self-consciousness does not really take place because the essence of man…has, 
amongst the objects of its consciousness and along with what is distinct and foreign, 
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apprehended itself, has made an object of itself, a circumstance which can only happen 
by self-objectivation or by diremption into subject and object. On the contrary, so long as 
there rises before the consciousness of a man, or his intuition, himself indeed, but only as 
one amongst other objects, so long he has not himself as yet, but speaks of himself as of a 
third, in the third person, he is estranged from himself, for he has himself, it is true, as an 
object amongst others, but does not know that he, the thinker himself, is one with the 
thought, and conversely.342 
 
Although the self-conscious agent makes himself an object of thought for himself, he nonetheless 
grasps that object of thought as himself. The self as object of thought, in other words, is 
understood by the self as subject to be not just another object amongst all the other objects of 
consciousness. 
 Dorner’s point here is that the dual components above (the self as thinker and the self as 
object of thought) are not sufficient of themselves for self-consciousness because there is no 
component by which the self as thinker might recognize itself as one and the same with the self 
as object of thought. There must be, therefore, a third component – distinct from the other two 
components – which unites the self as thinker and the self as thought, facilitating self-
recognition. Without this distinct, third component, the thinker “has not looked upon the thinker 
again as returned so to speak from the depths of the thought, and thus has not yet found himself. 
And thus he is not yet self-conscious spirit, he is not yet I. The spirit of the man is primarily 
related to itself as a natural object merely.”343 
 In self-knowledge, then, there is a component immanent in consciousness which relates 
the self as thinker to the self as object of thought, facilitating this self-recognition: “But it thus 
pertains to the essence of spirit as such that it is its own mediator, that it generates itself as actual 
 





spirit, and that apart from such mediation it is not actual spirit, but remains like a child at the 
commencement of the natural life”344   
 Unfortunately, Dorner is vague on what this third component is in the case of human self-
consciousness – he offers descriptions of it but never names what it is. Here, he may simply be 
drawing upon a discovery of Fichte that later became important for German Romanticism, where 
in human consciousness, we recognize the self of our empirical experience as identical with a 
transcendental aspect of ourselves, but the recognition of this identity cannot itself be empirical 
(for to prove it empirically would itself already require an intuition of this identity). Thus, the 
two aspects of the self must be united, but this unity can only be assumed and never proved. 
 We have already seen Dorner identify the subjective aspect of divine self-knowledge with 
God the Father and identify the objective aspect of divine self-knowledge with God the Son. And 
as we have seen, possession of self-knowledge requires a third component which unites the two. 
This is no less the case in the divine, and Dorner identifies this third, uniting component in the 
divine with the Holy Spirit: “Thus the absolute Spirit must also be this self-mediation or ideal 
self-reproduction, only that He has His effect ever with Him as eternally happening, and is not to 
be thought as first becoming in time.”345 In noting that the divine must be this mediation between 
itself as thinker and itself as object of thought, Dorner implies the trinitarian tenet that the Holy 
Spirit is homoousios with the Father and the Son. 
 In Dorner’s treatment of the logical Trinity, we see a similarity with his treatment of the 
physical Trinity. There, we saw that there was a principle which was not itself identifiable with 
any of the divine persons (viz., that of ‘life’), and which was actualized by means of the divine 
 





persons. Here we see a similarity in that, just as in the physical Trinity, ‘life’ was aimless were it 
not for the third member, so also in the logical Trinity Dorner speaks of the divine consciousness 
as if it were aimless were it not for the involvement of the third member. In the logical Trinity, 
therefore, there seems to be a principle which is actualized by the divine persons. He says: “It 
cannot suffice that God should simply be the Father’s consciousness of the Son, or vice versa, 
and that in both modes of being God should know the second to Himself merely as a second, and 
not know Himself in and through the second. In that case there would only be an infinite 
reflection and re-reflection of the divine essence on opposite sides.”346 Here, Dorner notes that 
without the mediation of the third member, the consciousness of God would infinitely bounce 
back and forth, so to speak, between the Father and the Son, without either being able to 
recognize Himself in the other. 
 We must pause to note that, with the above comments, Dorner has made a subtle shift in 
his thoughts about divine self-knowledge. Earlier, Dorner spoke of a single conscious subject 
(viz., ‘God’), and this subject’s self-knowledge was possible via three components (viz., [1] God 
as thinker, [2] God as object of thought, and [3] God as mediator between the two. Thus, all three 
components serve as conditions for the self-knowledge of a single subject. Each component, in 
other words, is not of itself identical to the single conscious subject. 
 Dorner’s comments about an infinite reflection and re-reflection, however, imply that the 
Father and the Son are themselves conscious subjects in their own right, rather than the 
components by which self-knowledge might occur. Dorner speaks of the Father and the Son as 
conscious subjects in their own right, but as conscious subjects who could not recognize 
themselves in the other – the divine essence that is their own as also present in the other – 
 




without the mediation of a third. As he puts it, “The spiritual divine essence or the Godhead, 
which actually exists therein in a twofold manner, would remain unrecognized as the common 
essence of both.”347 
 It is by the mediation of the third member, therefore, that the Father recognizes His 
common essence with the Son, and the Son recognizes His common essence with the Father: 
“Only by the thinking and determining Godhead, who is in both [the Father and the Son], 
knowing His own essence in what is different to Himself, in what is thought and determined, is 
self-consciousness constituted in God. But for that end a third and equally real principle of union 
is necessary in God, the Holy Spirit, to whom Paul ascribes exclusive dignity in the self-
knowledge of God in His depths.”348 
 Here, again, we see the results of the shift that we flagged above. Before, the possessor of 
self-knowledge simply saw a copy of himself in the object of knowledge. In other words, the 
object of knowledge was a reflection of the subject of knowledge, and so the subject recognized 
himself in the object (or the object as himself). Here, however, what is recognized by the subject 
in the object is not simply himself, but another who shares his essence. The conclusion of the 
logical Trinity is, therefore, that God is His own primary object of knowledge, and that this self-
knowledge must be mediated in some way. 
 
 





3. The Ethical Trinity 
3.1 The Necessity of Distinction within the Divine 
 We have now reached the pinnacle of Dorner’s trinitarian thought, that of the ‘ethical 
Trinity.’ We saw in the previous chapter that for God to be ethically good, He must be both 
aboriginally good – thereby possessing ethical necessity – and be one who wills the highest good 
–thereby possessing ethical freedom. This presents a problem, for it appears contradictory that 
God would somehow possess ethical goodness in both ways. It is here in his presentation of the 
‘ethical Trinity’ where Dorner resolves this contradiction, where he establishes how goodness in 
God can be both ethically necessary and ethically free – namely, by assigning the former to the 
person of the Father, assigning the latter to the person of the Son, and assigning the means by 
which they are united to the person of the Spirit. 
 Dorner begins by establishing that there is a particular sequence that obtains between 
ethical freedom and ethical necessity. Of the two, the logically prior component must be ethical 
necessity, for this ensures that goodness is realized:  
For if, with Duns Scotus, we suppose the first thing in God to be absolutely free will, 
without a necessity which logically precedes, without a conditioning and defining by 
means of what is ethically necessary or goodness simply, we could never arrive at an 
ethical realization or ethical freedom. For even if goodness were willed, or if something 
were willed to be good, but in an arbitrary manner, goodness would not be realized. What 
is good in itself, what is necessary, what is constituted without arbitrariness, must be 
willed in no arbitrary, but in a free way; only by such means is the ethical realized.349  
 
Here, Dorner speaks of ‘ethical freedom,’ that the agent freely choose to will the good. For the 
good to be freely willed by the agent, the agent must be presented with the good so as to be able 
to will it as such. Thus, there must be a goodness which exists prior to the agent’s act of will (as 
opposed to, say, the good just being identified as whatever the agent wills). If the agent must 
 




recognize the good as such so that she may thereby freely choose it, then, logically, the existence 
of good (viz., ethical necessity) must precede the recognition and willing of it by the agent (viz., 
ethical freedom). We must now examine how Dorner understands this sequence to obtain in God.  
 Since ethical necessity has logical priority over ethical freedom, the good as God’s being 
has logical priority over the good as a product of God’s will. We can say, therefore, that God just 
is ethical necessity: “If then we must begin with the ethically necessary,” says Dorner, “we must 
teach first of all that the ethically necessary must have an existence, and that in God Himself, or 
rather God must Himself be the ethically necessary or holy.”350 Again: “that which is morally 
necessary cannot be superior to God, as a law, power, or fate which is above Him; but, since it is 
in itself the highest truth, it falls within the circumference of the divine being. The ethically 
necessary has its eternal being so very largely in God that He is Himself moral law and morally 
necessary being.”351 God, therefore, must simply be goodness, for if God merely willed 
goodness, goodness would be superior to Him. 
 However – and it is here that the contradiction begins to arise – we have seen that the 
ethically necessary must be freely willed by God, that God not be compelled to choose the good. 
The contradiction, therefore, is this: on the one hand, God must be identified with the good, for 
otherwise He would be subordinate to the good; on the other hand, God cannot be necessitated to 
will the good, for otherwise God would not be able to will the good freely. How, though, can 
ethical freedom and ethical necessity be predicated of one and the same thing? Just as Dorner 
asserted that, for divine aseity and divine self-knowledge, the divine substance could not be 
rigidly simple, so now he asserts the same for the divine as ethical: “Both aspects [viz., necessity 
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and freedom] are to be supposed in the religious and scientific interest, but both can only be 
supposed at the same time, if the primary goodness, which is God, has no mere simple form of 
being, whether as ethically necessary or as free, but a manifoldly diverse being, absolutely 
correlated, however, and reciprocally conditioning itself.”352 Indeed, as Dorner puts it in the 
observation of this section, “as a divine triad underlies (zu Grunde liegt) the divine aseity and the 
divine self-consciousness, so would we also seek to apprehend the triad as the basis (Basis) for 
the divine love.”353 That God is triune, therefore, is the condition of the possibility of the divine 
as ethical. Or more precisely, the divine must actualize its ethical subjectivity, and to do this it 
must be triune. 
 
3.2 Identification of the Divine Persons as Components of the Ethical 
 Having established that, for Dorner, the Trinity makes possible the ethical life of God, we 
must now inquire further into its trinitarian rendering. Specifically, we must query the 
relationship between the various ethical components and their relationship to the divine persons. 
 Given the logical priority of the ethically necessary, a trinitarian configuration of the 
ethical components correlates this principle to the divine person who has logical priority vis-à-
vis the Trinity: God the Father. Dorner says, “This first form of being in God as the ethical one 
we call with the New Testament, and in accordance with ecclesiastical custom, the principle of 
fatherhood in God. Through God as Father it is that what is true, necessary, and good in itself has 
an existence, and that a knowledge of what is true and good in itself is possible.”354 
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 This second ethical principle, the principle of freedom, is therefore identified with God 
the Son: “This second principle we call God the Son, the mode of the existence of the spiritual 
God in the form of freedom, just as frequently in the New Testament and in ecclesiastical phrase 
the Son is the divine principle of the kingdom of freedom, of historical progress – the principle 
of movement without self-detriment, but of movement on the ground of a basis already existent, 
so that arbitrariness may ever be remote.”355 
 These two ethical components are, of course, reciprocally related: “For, far removed from 
a principle of freedom which must tear itself away from the first principle and constitute itself as 
a totality, a whole of itself, what is free in God is referred back to the ethically necessary as the 
logical first principle, just as the former is willed for the latter.”356 The principles of necessity 
and freedom, as reciprocally related, entail a reciprocal relationship between God the Father (as 
the principle of necessity) and God the Son (as the principle of freedom). 
 In speaking of the principle of necessity, and therefore of God the Father, Dorner says, 
If we start from goodness as necessary holy being, which is absolute in dignity and 
worth, its necessity cannot be blind ἀνάγκη, can by no means be ethically blind fate, but 
the ethically necessary is also simultaneously that which is true, rational, and luminous in 
itself. Because it (or God in it) maintains the ethically necessary, it is not mechanical 
coercion, caprice, or τυραννίς in spite of its own power. It is not adverse to freedom, but 
the ethically necessary desires its own idea, and much more its apparent opposite, 
freedom, as the absolute form which is alone adequate or conformable to the ethically 
necessary. The ethically necessary would have its realization by means of freedom and in 
it; it is a lover of freedom; and the free thus blossoms out of its apparent opposite.357 
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As the ethically necessary has its realization in freedom, this suggests that the Father has His 
realization in the Son. And in speaking of the principle of freedom, and therefore of God the Son, 
Dorner says, 
But, secondly, as the ethically necessary rejoices in the free, for the sake of which it 
desires to be, the free, the principle of freedom in God, also strives to get back to the 
necessary, and desires to condition itself by the necessary. For in itself the free has, it is 
true, the power to will what it likes. But if it renounces the ethically necessary, it cannot 
maintain itself, because it comes into contradiction with what is true and good in itself, 
which as such is at the same time what is rational and logical, and would thus become 
sheer caprice. But this free principle, of which we are speaking, is divine, being 
constituted the second mode of existence of the Godhead, and cannot fall outside of the 
divine sphere, because in its foundation it coincides with the same divine being, who also 
presents and is the ethically necessary.358 
 
Since the free cannot renounce the necessary without falling into contradiction, this entails the 
same about the Son in relation to the Father. As the free desires to unite with the necessary, so 
the Son desires to unite with the Father. 
 As we turn to the third member of the divine Trinity, we will see that it is the Holy Spirit 
by whom necessity and freedom, the Father and the Son, are united. We saw Dorner’s assertion 
in chapter four that the Evangelical principle has its foundation in the divine being itself. In the 
Evangelical principle, there is a correlation between the divine and the human, in that the human 
person freely wills the ethical necessity of the divine. The human person comes to see the 
ethically necessary not as something foreign to herself, but as that in which her humanity reaches 
its fulfillment. On the divine side, God sees in the human person – in the ethically free – not as 
something foreign to the divine, but as an expression of Himself. In the human person, the 
coincidence of the necessary and the free is wrought by the Holy Spirit. 
 




 Since the divine is the archetype of the Evangelical principle, just as in the human person 
freedom and necessity are united by the Holy Spirit, so also is it the case in the divine: “As then 
the absolute unity of the necessary and the free, by means of which man is raised according to 
the standpoint of the Reformation above caprice and above the standpoint of mere legality, is 
only completed by the agency of the Holy Spirit in the inward parts, so also in God this union is 
only perfected by the agency of the third principle; one and the same principle, namely, the Holy 
Spirit, originally and archetypically combines in God the ethically necessary and the ethically 
free, and consummates the same union as a kind of copy in man, the image of God.”359 
 Thus, the Holy Spirit is that by which the Father, as the ethically necessary, and the Son, 
as the ethically free, are united to one another. Dorner says: “It is the Holy Spirit who rules in the 
deep things of God in an ethical manner as well as a cognitive (1 Cor. 2), and by whose agency 
God as the Son beholds and finds in the essence, or in the depths of the ethically necessary of the 
Father, the volition of the being of the free, therefore the free, i.e. Himself; and by whose agency, 
conversely, God the Father in the free finds and beholds the ethically necessary as freely willed 
contents, that is, finds and beholds Himself.”360  
 
3.3 The Ethical Personality and the Divine Persons 
 We saw above that, with the physical Trinity, there was a principle which was not 
identifiable with any of the three members of the Trinity, and it was through or by means of the 
trinitarian persons that divine aseity was actualized. Similarly, we saw that, with the logical 
Trinity, there was a principle which was not identifiable with any of the three members of the 
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Trinity, and it was through or by means of the trinitarian persons that the divine intelligence was 
actualized. Here, in the ethical Trinity, the same pattern emerges: there is a principle which is not 
identifiable with any of the three members of the Trinity but which is actualized through or by 
means of them, what Dorner refers to as the ‘absolute ethical personality.’ 
 Dorner is sometimes discreet in characterizing the relation between the divine persons 
and this ethical principle which is actualized by their means. Speaking of the Holy Spirit, he 
says, “Love is the truth of the Spirit; formally, because it is the absolute unity of the divine 
intelligence and the divine volition; and as regards contents, because the absolutely worthy, 
goodness, is brought therein to eternally living realization (Wirklichkeit).”361 Referring to love as 
the “truth” of the Holy Spirit has a Hegelian ring to it, in that it suggests that love is the ultimate 
end to which the Holy Spirit acts as a vehicle for. This interpretation is strengthened by how 
Dorner elaborates the point, noting that the Holy Spirit is the truth of love because the Holy 
Spirit that by which goodness is realized. In describing the Holy Spirit as an agent by whom 
something is realized, it suggests that there is a principle above and beyond the Holy Spirit as 
such. 
 However, certain passages are more explicit in describing ethical actualization by means 
of the divine persons. Dorner says that God 
since He is spirit and since it contradicts Him to be merely naturally ethical and holy, 
does not will to be an ethical being which exists simply and is immovably rigid, but He 
wills to constitute Himself an ethical being in a living manner; He has therefore in 
Himself eternally the principle of ethical movement out of Himself or, as opposed to 
what is ethically necessary, the principle of freedom as the instrument (Werkzeuges) for 
His ethical self-production (Selbsthervorbringung) or self-realization 
(Selbstverwirklichung) so as to ensure His absolute ethical personality and His living 
love…”362 
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Here, Dorner mentions that it contradicts God to be solely ethical necessity. This suggests that 
there is a principle in the divine stipulating how the divine be ethically actualized 
(and thus a principle operating in God above and beyond the actual means by which the divine is 
ethically actualized). That there is such a principle above and beyond the actual instantiation of 
ethical freedom in God is further textually supported a few lines down, where Dorner speaks of 
the principle of freedom as the instrument (Werkzeuges) for the ethical self-production or self-
realization of the divine. The language of the principle of ethical freedom as an instrument 
indicates its role as a means by which a higher principle is actualized. 
 These notions of ethical actualization and means of actualization obviously signal 
something other than, say, the divine persons as merely instantiating the divine essence. Rather, 
Dorner uses terminology such as “process” and “result” to characterize the ethical life of the 
divine: “The ontology or metaphysics of love thus depicted forms the conclusion of the process 
(Proceß) by which God is eternally absolute personality.”363 Having just finished his treatment 
proper on the ethical Trinity in §31B, Dorner declares, “In what precedes, the eternal trinitarian 
process (Proceß) has been so considered that the absolute divine personality is the result 
(Resultat) of its three principles or factors. And thus no one of these principles has of itself a 
claim to the personality, which is rather their result (Resultat)…”364 
 Dorner recognizes the peculiarity of his descriptions on this point and recognizes that 
they could imply that, because the divine persons actualize the absolute personality, once it is 
actualized the divine persons would cease existing. He insists this is not the case: “It is requisite 
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to know that these three modes of the divine being do not become extinct in their product, the 
divine personality, but that they eternally endure…”365 
 Rather, Dorner sees the relationship between the divine persons and the divine 
personality as reciprocal. He says that the divine personality 
is their [viz., the trinitarian persons’] eternal result; it does not succeed in time the three 
principles in God, but like them is eternal. And being existent, it will produce them. 
Indeed, the cooperation of the eternally present personality of God is necessary to the 
process, which eternally renews its self-production. The divine unity eternally posits 
Himself in a threefold manner for the purpose of this eternally living self-production. . . . 
Therefore God is to be thought conscious and personal in the eternal activity of the 
reproduction of His personality. He is personal in the three hypostases, as He is personal 
by their means.”366 
 
He also describes their reciprocity this way: “The constitution of the divine life is an organism 
ever producing itself by means of the trinitarian members, and subsisting by their reciprocal 
conditioning. Its unity and eternal result is the absolute personality. But on the other hand, this 
result is eternally present, and therefore also cooperative in the self-production.”367 In these two 
passages, Dorner seems to be saying that the divine personality is both a result of the trinitarian 
persons (and so occurs by means of them) and is nonetheless present in them (such that, although 
it is a result, it is not successive to them). How can this be the case? 
 There is a reciprocity between the divine personality and the trinitarian persons, wherein 
the absolute personality is both the result of the individual persons and yet is eternally present 
within them, because the divine functions after the manner of an organism. As Dorner puts it, 
“Just as in every organism we know the single members serve for the production or 
reproduction of the whole, and that the complementary mode of consideration is no less 
necessary, according to which the whole, the organism, which enters as a result, precedes 
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the parts, or according to what is contrived and reproduced by the members, lives within 
them as the power of the whole and gives each its parts, so is it also here. The ever-
present result precedes the eternal process of renewal, co-operates and lives in the 
function of the single members as the power of the whole which makes those functions 
possible.”368 
 
The relation between the absolute personality and the trinitarian persons is such that, on the one 
hand, the whole is present in the parts in that the parts serve to realize the whole, and on the other 
hand, the parts are in the whole, in that the whole cannot be realized without the parts. 
 
4. God is Love 
4.1 Love as the Unity of Freedom and Necessity 
 As we will see below, Dorner argues that, through this union of freedom and necessity, 
love can be predicated of God. Love, Dorner says, “is the unity of ethical necessity and freedom, 
because it wills the ethically necessary as such, that is, with consciousness and absolute 
desire.”369 According to Dorner, ethical freedom, ethical necessity, and their unity are precisely 
the means by which love is actualized. And, because each person of the Trinity exemplifies one 
of these, it is by means of the persons of the Trinity that divine love is actualized. 
 Love – the freely-willed, conscious union with an other and the proper willing of self that 
describes the inner life of the Trinity – therefore describes God. As Dorner puts it, “God, who is 
love through the three trinitarian principles, necessarily loves Himself primarily. The primary 
love loves the primary goodness, which is God Himself, and thus the factors also by means of 
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which God is eternally absolute love; what has been previously described is nothing but the 
process of the divine self-love, which embraces all divine perfections.”370 
 We examined above that the union of divine freedom and necessity consists in God freely 
and willingly being just towards Himself. Because love consists in the unity of ethical freedom 
and necessity, God’s free and willing justice towards Himself is simply divine self-love. As we 
will see below, God’s freely-willed justice towards Himself – the divine self-love – means that 
the ethical aspects of God take primacy over the physical and logical aspects of God. 
 
4.2 Love as the Primary Attribute of God 
 Having arrived at the ethical conception of God, SCD I §32.4 is focused on how 
everything is put in a new light by the doctrine of divine love. He notes, “From this point we 
must now glance backwards at the divine attributes, which will appear in a new light and in a 
new connection. For they will all appear in a close unity, as necessarily verified and guaranteed 
by the absolutely supreme instance…which God as personal love necessarily and eternally has 
and wills for the eternal self-production of His own absolute ethical personality.”371 Love, 
therefore, is the supreme divine attribute, that which unifies all other divine attributes. Indeed, 
Dorner states that love is the only satisfactory description of God. As he puts it, “Love is the 
supreme, the only adequate definition of the essence of God, or definition of God, if it is rightly 
thought, namely, if it is thought as that unity of the ethically necessary and the free”372 
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 In chapter four, we saw how Dorner sought to follow Schleiermacher in privileging the 
ethical over the physical and logical attributes of God. Here in §32.4 he invokes him 
approvingly: “The scriptures ascribe the highest dignity to love. They never call God 
omnipotence, immensity, etc., but they do say θεὸς ἀγάπη. . . . Schleiermacher, otherwise 
inclined to regard the divine attributes as distinct in our thought only, says for all that of love at 
the end of his Glaubenslehre, ‘God is love.’”373 
 Love is the only adequate definition of God, according to Dorner, because it is normative 
over all other divine attributes. The physical and intellectual attributes, says Dorner, are related 
to love  
as presuppositions or means. As presuppositions they are not so related as if they had the 
absolutely sufficient ground of their necessity even apart from love and in themselves, or 
as if, regarded from the highest point of view, they were coordinate with love in God, or 
as if love were their product. Not life nor power, nor even knowledge, is an absolute end 
in itself, but only goodness. They therefore exist for love, as means thereto as the 
absolute end, and only find in love their absolute necessity or verification; they are willed 
by the eternally effected and yet eternally self-renewing divine love as the means for its 
eternal self-production, and if a world exists, for the approving of love. They have in 
love, as their highest causa finalis, so also the norm of their working.374  
 
 Here we need not give an exhaustive treatment of how all the divine attributes relate to 
one another in light of the privileging of the ethical. It is helpful, nonetheless, to at least briefly 
examine some of these relationships, if only to fill-in our understanding of what Dorner is doing. 
Of the physical attributes, Dorner says that “[i]f [they] are also to be placed in the light of divine 
love, it is of great importance that they be thought in their working or in their actual being to be 
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dependent upon love, but not that God or the divine activity be allowed to be necessitated by 
them.”375 
 Thus, the mere ability that the physical attributes provide can in no way force God to act 
as beholden to them. God has control over His attributes. Regarding, for example, the physical 
attribute of infinity, Dorner notes, “There is…no necessity in Him, not even because of His 
infinity, to be everywhere the same, to will and to work on His side everywhere and always only 
the same. Rather, if His love so desires, is a system possible of diverse revelations and modes of 
the divine being in the world, and even the singularity of His efficient being in one revelation, 
such as Christendom believes to exist in Christ.”376 And of omnipotence, he says, “As far as 
God’s might or omnipotence is concerned, there is in God no dark, irresistible, or necessary 
force, and not for a moment a superabundance, urged of itself or independently to realization, so 
that God, to will an ordered world, must restrain or limit it; God’s infinite fulness of life is 
illuminated and controlled by the might of His own love.”377 The same can be said for the logical 
attributes: “Knowledge does not exist in God for its own sake, whilst love is an absolute end in 
itself. Indeed, knowledge only perfects itself in God by means of love.”378 
 Having examined how love is the primary divine attribute, we can now examine how this 
characterizes the relationship between the divine and the creaturely. As we will see below, 
Dorner understands love to involve a proper relation to another and to oneself. In other words, 
proper love of self and of others stipulates how one relates to others, since one’s relation to 
 
375 SCD I §32.4 (p. 458). 
376 Ibid., Translation slightly modified. 
377 Ibid., (pp. 458-59). 




others involves both oneself and an other. God’s relation to the created order must be 
characterized by a divine love for the created order but, just as much, God’s relation to the 
created order must be characterized by a divine love for the divine. 
 
4.3 Love as Self-Preservation and Self-Communication 
 “In order rightly to understand the nature of love,” says Dorner, “these two elements must 
be united, and must be viewed as forming together a solid unity of blended opposites, viz. the 
choice of self, which we may call self-love, and an opening out to others in participation and 
impartation.”379 Because most characterizations of love focus on the latter feature, it is worth 
explaining why Dorner chooses to mention the former. 
 As we have seen, love occurs when one wills a particular good. But for Dorner, in a 
relation between personal subjects, between the self and the other, the other in this relation is not 
the only objective good. The self is also a good; the self has objective value. Given the 
objectivity of one’s own value, one ought to treat oneself as the objectively valuable thing that it 
is. To love oneself, therefore, means that a subject wills itself in accordance with its own 
objective value. Or in negative terms, in a relation with an other that is characterized by love, the 
self does not violate its own intrinsic worth. 
 Of course, Dorner is not advocating a love of self to the exclusion of love of others. 
Rather, Dorner is insisting that proper love unites love of self with love of other, where one is not 
forfeited for the sake of the other. Love “unites microcosmically in itself what otherwise appears 
only isolated, or in one-sided preponderance – existence for one’s self and existence for 
 




others.”380 Rightly-ordered love, then, requires that both self and other are loved in their proper 
proportions. This Dorner refers to respectively as ‘self-preservation’ and ‘self-communication.’ 
 The act of treating an other as an end satisfies the first requirement of love, namely, ‘an 
opening out to others in participation and impartation.’ Thus, trinitarianly rendered, the Son’s 
free obedience to the Father is just the Son’s ‘opening out’ of Himself to the Father. And so the 
Son’s free obedience to the Father, ethically rendered, is just God willing His own goodness – 
willing Himself – as His own end. 
 In this same act the second requirement of love, namely, ‘the choice of self,’ is also 
satisfied. Because love requires that the subject treat itself in accordance with its own objective 
value, and because the end which God wills is just Himself, God treats Himself in accordance 
with His own objective value. Because the Son is God and the Father is God, the Son’s free 
obedience to the Father is, ethically rendered, God’s willing Himself as His own end. 
 Because God is most properly understood as love, self-preservation and self-
communication, as aspects of love, are constitutive of God’s relation to an other, viz., the created 
order. Our final task, therefore, will be to examine how God’s self-communication and self-
manifestation is manifest in relation to the created order. In short, we will see how Dorner 
characterizes the relation between the divine and the created such that God can love the created 
order and also love Himself, that God can give Himself to the created order without losing 
Himself to it. 
 
 




4.4 Divine Self-Communication and Self-Preservation vis-à-vis Creation 
 Although God, as love, will necessarily manifest the components of self-preservation and 
self-communication, one problem immediately arises. We saw above that, as the ‘absolute 
personality,’ God is His own primary object of love. An important objection to Dorner is that, if 
God is His own primary object of love, then God would no longer be able to communicate 
Himself to that which is not Himself. As His own primary object of love, it seems that is God 
capable only of self-preservation. “God’s self-preservation would, it is true, be secured,” says 
Dorner, “but God by His absolute self-love would be enclosed, so to speak, in His own 
exaltation, and would thus again become a single being instead of the universal principle, His 
love again lacking perfection, namely, communicability.”381 
 However, this worry is met. Because the Father is goodness, and because the Son freely 
wills goodness, God, in willing Himself, thereby wills goodness itself. “For since God loves 
Himself, He loves goodness as such or generally; He is Amor Amoris; He loves it therefore, not 
merely as it is in Himself, in His own personality as distinguished from everything else whether 
possible or actual, but He rejoices in a life of love as such, i.e. He loves His goodness in itself 
with a universal love.”382 In willing the good that just is Himself, God wills goodness as such, 
and not goodness only insofar as it is limited to Him. Goodness as such is universal, and so it 
extends to God and anything else insofar as it originates in God: 
Goodness in itself as such is not particular, but its desire is to be and dwell everywhere, 
where there is a possible abode for it, and therefore to be efficient. God as holy love, and 
therefore self-willing and self-loving, desires Himself also to be communicable transeunt 
love, and with the volition of His self-preservation (as the universal goodness) there is 
also supposed the volition of His communicability. Therefore, although He is 
transcendent by virtue of His relation to Himself in ethical self-preservation, He is 
 





nevertheless, if there is anything distinct from Himself, able to exist in that distinct 
thing.383 
 
Although, therefore, God is His own primary object of love, this fact actually enables God to be 
the universal principle of love for all that is not God. 
 Since we have established that God can communicate Himself to creation, we will now 
look at how God does so in love, that is, how God engages creation through the union of self-
preservation and self-communication. We saw above that God freely wills the good that He 
Himself is (the Son’s embrace of the Father). Further, we saw that God is the highest good, and 
thus a good which cannot be violated, a good which is always treated justly. So, in willing the 
good that He Himself is, even God Himself cannot violate His own goodness. In other words, 
even God cannot treat Himself unjustly. 
 The inviolability of the good that is God means that God cannot dilute this good for the 
sake of something else, i.e. God will not make Himself a means for some other end (e.g., 
creation). As Dorner puts it, 
The love of God is essentially holy; it desires and preserves the ethically necessary or 
holy, which God is. . . . By virtue of His necessary self-preservation, which is at the same 
time His holy self-love, there can be in God no activity of love to the detriment of His 
self-preservation. Justice is eternally secured in the divine love. God can never sacrifice 
what is holy, what is ethically necessary, for the sake of approving His love, whether by 
communication or participation or pardon. For the ethically necessary is the basis in the 
triune God which can never be shaken.384 
 
Thus, creation is no less a locus for divine justice than God Himself: 
 
But finally, if a world exists, its constitution is not indifferent to God as the just God, but 
there is an internal necessity that He should know that the same righteousness which is in 
Him – indeed, which is He – is effective in the world. . . . And yet further, God desires, 
when He wills a world, not merely an involuntary regulation of the world by His just will, 
as the ultimate law of its being and its order; He also desires, by virtue of His love of 
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justice, that His desire and love of justice should exist in free spirits without Himself a 
multiplied life and love of justice, which is nothing but the spiritual existence of justice in 
the world. If, that is to say, there is a world of spiritual being without God, He cannot 
desire the justice which is in Him, and which is Himself, to exist simply in Himself; for 
justice cannot be a private property, so to speak; according to its idea, it is constituted a 
universal good for the reason where it is found. As self-willing justice, therefore, as the 
energetic will of His own self-preservation, God cannot be indifferent as to whether the 
world corresponds to this justice or not. There would be no earnest pursuit of justice on 
God’s part if He merely wished to be just Himself, and was indifferent as to the 
maintenance of the absolute good of justice without Himself.385 
 
Since in creation this good can never be diluted for the sake of something else, there is no 
toleration of a lesser goodness in creation. 
 Now that we have examined God’s self-preservation in the created order, we can now 
examine God’s self-communication. In beholding the good, God sees its communicable 
(universal) character, i.e. God sees the good as good even for that which is not God. Dorner 
states, “The divine self-love comprehends, it is true, everything in God in just self-preservation, 
but it is an ethical self-love, and this by no means limits God to Himself, by no means keeps Him 
enclosed by His transcendence, but is perfectly compatible with the tendency to self-
communication, to immanence in another.”386 
 Goodness as such is therefore goodness for everything, i.e., universally. God, as the good, 
then, is also universally good and thereby communicable. Dorner continues, saying, “Goodness 
in itself as such is not particular, but its desire is to be and dwell everywhere, where there is a 
possible abode for it, and therefore to be efficient. God as holy love, and therefore self-willing 
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and self-loving, desires Himself also to be communicable transeunt love, and with the volition of 
His self-preservation (as the universal goodness) there is also supposed the volition of His 
communicability.”387 
 Because God understands Himself and wills Himself as that which is both the inviolable 
good and the universal good, God’s interaction with creation expresses this unity: God 
communicates to creation this inviolable, yet universal good; that is, God communicates Himself. 
For Dorner, this unity of self-preservation and self-communication helps avoid two unacceptable 
alternatives to the God-creature relationship: pantheism and deism. 
 Divine self-preservation avoids pantheism because it prevents God from being identified 
with creation: “[God’s] transcendence and self-preservation is the necessary postulate of His 
self-communication and immanence in the world. For only because God has absolute self-
possession by means of His perfect self-consciousness and His self-love is He master of Himself, 
and certain that in His self-communication He will not, as all pantheistic systems think, lose 
Himself in what is different to Himself.”388 
 On the other hand, divine self-communication avoids deism because it enables God to 
interact with creation: “Deism emphasizes by its incommunicable God the divine exaltation, the 
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divine self-preservation, which stands estranged and cold over against the world; pantheism 
emphasizes the process of living divine self-communication in the world, but its God loses 
Himself therein. . . . They are positively transcended by the trinitarian apprehension of the ethical 
being, that is to say, of love, which desires itself as necessary and as free, that is, which even in 
self-love wills love, and even in self-communication has and wills itself, and in both is amor 
amoris.”389 Because God is triune, God therefore has perfect self-consciousness and self-love. 
Because God has perfect self-consciousness and self-love, God has perfect self-possession. And 
such perfect self-possession allows God to engage in the finite while preserving His 
transcendence. God’s communicability and transcendence are therefore possible because God is 
triune. 
 Dorner supplies various examples of how this unity of self-preservation and self-
communication is manifest in the divine-creature relationship. For our purposes, we need not go 
through them all.390 We need only to look at the greatest example, that of divine incarnation. In 
the incarnation, argues Dorner, we behold divine self-communication and divine self-
preservation, both in unity. Thus, in speaking of the incarnation as an act of God’s self-
communication, Dorner says, “Christendom knows in Christ not merely a transitory divine act, 
which has nothing to do with the internal divine essence, but the highest and permanent divine 
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self-revelation, an act which, because it is self-communication, becomes the divine being in the 
world which could have received this being in no other way”391 
 As fully transparent of the divine essence, we see in the incarnation both God’s self-
preservation and self-communication: “And this new idea is given to faith embryonically in 
Christ who, coming from God and leading to God, on the one hand confirms the distinction 
between God and the world; whilst, on the other hand, the immanence of God in the world is 
given in Him as a matter of fact in absolute form.”392 Here, Dorner parses the two-natures 
doctrine in terms of self-preservation and self-communication. Christ’s divine nature ‘confirms 
the distinction between God and the world,’ which is God’s self-preservation; Christ’s human 
nature is ‘the immanence of God in the world,’ which is God’s self-communication. 
 Christ, as the incarnation of the One who freely offers His obedience to the Father 
through the Spirit, reveals the Trinity as the unity of freedom and necessity. My hope is that, 
over the past three chapters, Dorner’s theological genius has become apparent. Genius, however, 
is no guarantee of truth. Our final task, therefore, is to evaluate Dorner’s understanding of the 
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 Staudenmaier and Dorner, as I hope to have shown, utilized the Trinity in very interesting 
ways. They took one of the most pressing philosophical issues of the nineteenth century – that of 
subjectivity – and sought to integrate it into two robust visions of the Trinity. As a conclusion, I 
will offer a brief evaluation of their trinitarian theologies. From this, it will be apparent how 
novel their understandings of the Trinity were in comparison to those who preceded them. 
 Because we have covered so much ground, it will be helpful to offer a summary of each 
thinker’s trinitarian thought. For Staudenmaier, God is to be understood as personal subject – an 
irreducible individual in possession of intelligence and will. Personal subjectivity, however, 
requires otherness, in that it requires something beyond the individual person as such in order to 
actualize her subjectivity. Although the created order would offer an otherness to the divine, 
Staudenmaier wants to maintain that God does not actualize His subjectivity by means of the 
otherness of the created order. To do so, Staudenmaier reasons, would entail that God was not an 
individual free from the created order, for the created order would be constitutive of God’s 
subjectivity. Instead, God must possess subjectivity immanently. The otherness which is required 
to actualize subjectivity, therefore, must be present in the divine immanently. 
 The trinitarian persons, who are distinct from one another, are that by which otherness is 
immanently present in the divine. In being other to one another (that is, in being personally 
distinct from one another), the divine persons mutually actualize the individual personal 




the divine persons actualize divine subjectivity, insofar as divine subjectivity refers to the divine 
persons considered collectively. Therefore, it is because God is a Trinity of irreducibly distinct 
persons that divine subjectivity becomes actualized. 
 For Dorner, God is to be understood as an ethical subject. Fully-realized ethical 
subjectivity requires of the subject that she will the good, but that she do so freely. To put it in 
Hegelian terms, fully-realized ethical subjectivity requires that the free subject see herself in the 
good which makes an ethical demand on her. The ethical subject is therefore a locus wherein 
ethical freedom and ethical necessity are united. For God to be an ethical subject, or to have fully 
realized His own ethical subjectivity, therefore requires that God freely will the good which is 
His own being. 
 This union of freedom and necessity demands a trinitarian structure (viz., the presence of 
freedom, the presence of necessity, and the presence of something by which they can united). In 
the case of the nondivine, the union of freedom and necessity creates no immediate metaphysical 
paradoxes: the creature is confronted with the ethical necessity of the good, which is 
ontologically distinct from her, and she freely wills to submit to the demands of the good.  
 In the case of the divine, however, matters are different. The ethical necessity of the good 
which makes a demand on the subject is one and the same with the being of the one who is to 
freely will this good. The good in which ethical necessity consists cannot be other than God, for 
then there would be a good greater than God Himself. The subject which is to freely will this 
good cannot be other than God, for then all notion of ethical subjectivity in God would be lost. 





 Since the union of freedom and necessity forms a trinitarian structure, it is because God is 
a Trinity of irreducibly distinct persons (each of whom is ascribed one of these ethical 
components) that ethical subjectivity – the union of freedom and necessity – can be actualized in 
the divine. And it is because God possesses ethical subjectivity that He can love. 
 The concerns of Staudenmaier and Dorner were not miles apart, for they both deal with 
divine subjectivity broadly speaking. For Staudenmaier, the central concern was how the divine 
could be free vis-à-vis the nondivine while nonetheless remaining a fully-constituted personal 
subject. For Dorner, however, the central concern was how freedom and necessity could be 
united in the Godhead. Thus, the differences between the two fall mainly on what each 
emphasized. Staudenmaier was focused on divine subjectivity per se, whereas Dorner was 
focused on one particular aspect of divine subjectivity, viz., the ethical aspect of subjectivity. 
Both theologians, I will argue below, shared a particular conception of the Trinity, one that 
consisted in two levels: the divine persons considered as individuals, and the divine persons 
understood collectively. The critique that I will make is that, because the divine persons were the 
means by which subjectivity was actualized in both Staudenmaier and Dorner, there is a 
discrepancy between these two levels which threatens the coherence of Staudenmaier’s and 
Dorner’s renderings of the Trinity. 
 For Staudenmaier, insofar as the term “God” refers to the collectivity of divine persons, 
“God” thereby denotes a personal subject, i.e. an agent in whom lie the personal characteristics 
of being-for-self, intellect, and will. As a personal subject, “God” therefore possesses otherness 
in and of Himself, i.e. possesses subjecthood immanently. This is why, as we saw, God does not 




 Because of the distinctions of the divine persons of the Trinity, the divine persons 
provide the immanent otherness that is a feature of the divine. Each person of the Trinity is a 
personal subject in His own right, in that each person of the Trinity possesses being-for-self, 
intellect, and will as an individual. It is in their presence to one another that otherness is present 
to each, and it is in their mutual recognition (to put it in Hegelian terms) that their personal 
subjectivities are actualized.  
 The individual members of the Trinity, because each has an actualized subjectivity 
(through the others), collectively form a personal subject. Thus, there are two levels of personal 
subjectivity in the divine: (1) the level of the individual divine persons, where personal 
subjectivity is ascribed to each, and (2) the level of the Trinity as a whole, where personal 
subjectivity is ascribed to the collectivity of the divine persons. It is through the presence of 
personal subjectivity at the level of the individual divine persons that personal subjectivity is a 
feature at the level of the Trinity as a whole. 
 Although personal subjectivity is ascribable at the level of the individual divine persons 
as well as the level of the Trinity as a whole, there is an important difference. Each individual 
member of the Trinity is in possession of subjectivity – or is a personal subject – by means of 
that which is external to Him as an individual, viz., by the other two members of the Trinity 
(since the members of the Trinity are personally distinct from one another). However, the Trinity 
is in possession of subjectivity by means of that which is internal or immanent to it, viz., the 
collectivity of the divine persons. Thus, the individual members of the Trinity need otherness 
vis-à-vis themselves as individuals in order to be personal subjects, whereas the Trinity as such 
does not need otherness vis-à-vis itself in order to be a personal subject (and hence does not need 




 Therefore, the individual divine persons are the means by which possession of immanent 
subjectivity is actualized at the level of the Trinity as a whole. Staudenmaier’s remarks on this 
score indicate that the divine persons are in a sense preceded by a principle of subjectivity, a 
principle which demands that it be actualized, and so demands that the divine essence contract 
itself into three persons. In other words, Staudenmaier indicates that the divine seeks to actualize 
itself as a personal subject, and does so in and through the subjectivity of the persons of the 
Trinity. This suggests that since the principle of subjectivity seeks actualization in and through 
the members of the Trinity, and so by means of them, it logically precedes them. Further, 
because subjectivity at the level of the Trinity is actualized by means of the divine persons, as 
actualized it logically succeeds the divine persons, being their product. 
 There is a similar rendering of the Trinity in Dorner. For Dorner, insofar as the term 
“God” refers to the collectivity of the divine persons, “God” thereby denotes an ethical subject, 
i.e. a subject in whom lies a unity of freedom and necessity. Further, because of the distinctions 
of the persons of the Trinity, the divine persons are capable of providing the distinct components 
of ethical subjectivity, viz., freedom, necessity, and the means by which the two are united. More 
specifically, each divine person, as personally distinct from the other two, is capable of 
possessing a component of ethical subjectivity which the other two cannot possess: the Father 
possesses the ethical component of necessity, the Son possesses the ethical component of 
freedom, and the Holy Spirit is the bond of freedom and necessity. 
 The individual members of the Trinity, because each possesses a component of ethical 
subjectivity which is unique to Him, collectively form an ethical subject. Thus, as with 
Staudenmaier, there are two levels to consider in the divine: (1) the level of the individual divine 




only one component of ethical subjectivity can be ascribed to each; and (2) the level of the 
Trinity as a whole, where ethical subjectivity is ascribed to the collectivity of the divine persons. 
It is through the presence of each ethical component at the level of the individual divine persons 
that ethical subjectivity is a feature at the level of the Trinity as a whole. 
 Unlike in Staudenmaier’s rendering of the Trinity, where personal subjectivity is 
ascribable both to each divine person as an individual, as well as to the Trinity as a whole, in 
Dorner ethical subjectivity is not ascribable at both levels. If an ethical subject is that in whom 
there lies a unity of freedom and necessity, then neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy 
Spirit considered on His own can be referred to as an ethical subject, since each individual 
member of the Trinity denotes a component of ethical subjectivity rather than the whole. 
 Therefore, the individual divine persons are the means by which possession of ethical 
subjectivity is actualized at the level of the Trinity as a whole. Again in a way similar to 
Staudenmaier, Dorner’s remarks indicate that the divine persons are in a sense preceded by a 
principle of subjectivity, a principle which demands that it be actualized, and so demands that the 
divine essence contract itself into three persons. In other words, Dorner indicates that the divine 
seeks to actualize itself as an ethical subject, and does so in and through the persons of the 
Trinity. Since the principle of subjectivity seeks actualization in and through the members of the 
Trinity, and so by means of them, it logically precedes them. And further, because subjectivity at 
the level of the Trinity is actualized by means of the divine persons, as actualized it logically 
succeeds the divine persons, being their product. 
 In both Staudenmaier and Dorner, therefore, there is a principle which dictates that the 
divine actualize itself either in terms of personal subjectivity (in the case of Staudenmaier) or in 




as the Trinity. The process of actualization therefore yields three distinct components: [A] the 
principle of subjectivity which is to be actualized; [B] the divine persons (insofar as they are 
individuals) as the means by which subjectivity comes to be actualized; [C] the resulting subject 
(personal or ethical) as the collectivity of the divine persons. 
 It stands to reason that, because they are the means of actualization, the divine persons 
(insofar as they are individuals) must be construed not simply as distinct, but different from, [A] 
the principle of subjectivity which is to be actualized and [C] the resulting subject (personal or 
ethical) as the collectivity of the divine persons. Unfortunately, neither Staudenmaier nor Dorner 
make any comments on this specific issue. Certainly they understand this principle of 
subjectivity as part of God’s being in some way, but precisely in what way is the issue. 
 The divine persons, as the one God, share one and the same essence. Put differently, their 
identification as “God” is dependent upon their being identified with the divine essence. Given 
their identity with the divine essence, this poses a problem for how the principle of subjectivity is 
related to the divine. If the divine persons (insofar as they are individuals) are different from both 
[A] the principle of subjectivity which is to be actualized and [C] the resulting subject 
understood as the collectivity of the divine persons, then as identical with the divine persons, the 
divine essence is different from [A] and [C]. That is, the divine essence cannot be identified with 
this principle of subjectivity. 
 Since “God” refers either to the divine essence as such, or to the divine persons insofar as 
they possess the divine essence, and since this principle of subjectivity can be identified with 
neither the persons nor the essence, this raises the question as to how this principle of 
subjectivity fits into the divine. If “God” refers to that which can be identified with the divine 




divine. If “God” includes this principle of subjectivity, then “God,” on this rendering, denotes a 
composition of two things: a Trinity of persons (who share one and the same essence) and a 
principle which transcends or in some way precedes them. 
 One possibility, though, is that we have misinterpreted how these components relate to 
one another. Perhaps the subjectivity of the divine is to be regarded as identical to the divine 
essence. This interpretation has the advantage that, since the divine essence denotes what is 
common amongst the divine persons, it also succeeds in denoting the resulting subject, since this 
is understood as the collectivity of the divine persons. Further, with this interpretation, it would 
be the case that the divine essence demands that it actualize its subjectivity, and does so by 
contracting itself into three persons. In contracting itself into three persons, the principle of 
subjectivity (as identical with the divine essence on this construal) would seem to be identical 
with the divine persons. 
 The problem with this construal, though, is that the divine persons are nonetheless the 
means by which subjectivity is actualized. This seems to be strongly supported in both 
Staudenmaier’s and Dorner’s texts. And as means, the divine persons can be identified neither 
with [A] the principle of subjectivity, itself identical to the divine essence, which is to be 
actualized, nor [C] the resulting subject (personal or ethical) as the collectivity of the divine 
persons. But if [A] the principle of subjectivity which is to be actualized cannot be identical with 
[B] the divine persons (insofar as they are individuals), and yet if, on this construal, [A] is just 
the divine essence, then the divine essence cannot be identical with the divine persons. And if the 
divine essence cannot be identical with the members of the Trinity, and if it is in virtue of 
possessing this essence that the members of the Trinity are God, then the members of the Trinity 




 It is evident, then, that both of these trinitarian renderings are problematic: the first gives 
us an identity between the divine persons and the divine essence, but also gives us an element 
that can be identified with neither; the second leaves us with the divine essence as not identical 
with the divine persons. The root of the problem seems to lie in the basic assumption that the 
divine persons are a means of actualization for divine subjectivity. The very notion of a means of 
actualization requires that those means be transcended by something greater than themselves, by 
that which they serve to actualize (in this case, collective subjectivity, either personal or ethical). 
Indeed, one basic tenet of Christian trinitarian doctrine is that there is no “God” above and 
beyond the divine persons, for the divine persons are God. 
 The trinitarian novelty of Staudenmaier and Dorner, therefore, seems to lie in this notion 
of the members of the Trinity being a means of actualization for divine subjectivity. And this 
notion that the members of the Trinity be a means of actualization is itself rooted in the notion 
that the Trinity provides a certain function. However, when the Trinity provides a function, it 
thereby becomes subordinated to that service to which it provides (in this case, the realization of 
divine subjectivity). In other words, by providing a function, the Trinity – and so the divine 
persons – becomes the means to an end which is greater than itself. But as the Christian faith 






Aubert, Annette G. Nineteenth-Century Mediating Theology. The German Roots of Nineteenth-
Century American Theology. Oxford University Press. Accessed March 2, 2021. 
https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199915323.00
1.0001/acprof-9780199915323-chapter-4. 
Axt-Piscalar, Christine. Der Grund des Glaubens: Eine theologiegeschichtliche Untersuchung 
zum Verhältnis von Glaube und Trinität in der Theologie Isaak August Dorners. Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1990. 
Barth, Karl. Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century. Grand Rapids, Mich: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002. 
Beiser, Frederick C. German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781–1801. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008. 
———. Hegel. 1st edition. New York; London: Routledge, 2005. 
———. The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte. Reprint edition. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
Bowie, Andrew. Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche. 2nd edition. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003. 
Brown, Robert F. “Schelling and Dorner on Divine Immutability.” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 53, no. 2 (June 1985): 237–49. 
Casper, Bernhard. “Der Systemgedanke in Der Späten Tübinger Schule Und in Der Deutschen 
Neuscholastik.” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 72 (1965 1964): 161–79. 
Dorner, Isaak August. A System of Christian Doctrine. Translated by Alfred Cave and J.S. 
Banks. 4 vols. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1880. 
———. Divine Immutability: A Critical Consideration. Translated by Robert R Williams and 
Claude Welch. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2009. 
———. History of Protestant theology: particularly in Germany, viewed according to its 
fundamental movement and in connection with the religious, moral, and intellectual life. 
Edinburgh: Clark, 1871. 





———. System der christlichen Sittenlehre. Berlin: Hertz, 1885. 
———. System of Christian Ethics. Edited by August Johannes Dorner. Translated by Charles 
Marsh Mead and R. T. Cunningham. New York: Scribner & Welford, 1887. 
———. Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie besonders in Deutschland: nach ihrer 
principiellen Bewegung : und im Zusammenhang mit dem religiösen, sittlichen und 
intellectuellen Leben. Geschichte der Wissenschaften in Deutschland. Neuere Zeit 5. 
München: JGCotta, 1867. 
Emery, Gilles, and Matthew Levering, eds. The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity. 1st edition. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Emundts, Dina. “The Refutation of Idealism and the Distinction between Phenomena and 
Noumena.” In The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, edited by 
Paul Guyer, 168–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Fergusson, David A., ed. The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Theology. 1st edition. 
Chichester, U.K.; Malden, Mass: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. 
Fichte, J.G. Fichte: Foundations of Natural Right. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Translated by 
Michael Baur. 1st Edition. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Grier, Philip T. “Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s Logic.” In Essays on Hegel’s Logic, edited by 
George di Giovanni, 59–75. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. 
Guyer, Paul. Kant. 2nd edition. London New York: Routledge, 2014. 
———. “Kant’s Intentions in the Refutation of Idealism.” The Philosophical Review 92, no. 3 
(1983): 329–83. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184480. 
Harris, Errol E. “A Reply to Philip Grier.” In Essays on Hegel’s Logic, edited by George di 
Giovanni, 77–84. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. 
Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Revised edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977. 
Hinze, Bradford E. “Roman Catholic Theology: Tübingen.” In The Blackwell Companion to 
Nineteenth-Century Theology, edited by David A. Fergusson, 187–213. Chichester, U.K.; 
Malden, Mass: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444319972.ch9. 
———. “Tracing Trinity in Tradition: The Achievement of Franz Anton Staudenmaier.” Journal 
for the History of Modern Theology / Zeitschrift für Neuere Theologiegeschichte 8, no. 1 
(January 1, 2001): 34–57. https://doi.org/10.1515/znth.2001.8.1.34. 
Holte, Knut Ragnar. Die Vermittlungstheologie. Ihre theologischen Grundbegriffe kritisch 





Houlgate, Stephen. Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit”: A Reader’s Guide. 1st edition. London; 
New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 
———. “Is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit an Essay in Transcendental Argument?” In The 
Transcendental Turn, edited by Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist, 173–94. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198724872.003.0009. 
Hünermann, Peter. “Der Reflex Des Deutschen Idealismus in Der Katholischen Tübinger 
Schule.” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 73 (1966 1965): 48–74. 
———. “Die Hegel-Rezeption Franz Anton Staudenmaiers.” In Kirche Und Theologie Im 19 
Jahrhundert, edited by Georg Schwaiger. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Rupprecht, 1975. 
———. “Franz Anton Staudenmaier.” Theologische Quartalschrift 150 (1970): 52–54. 
———. “Franz Anton Staudenmaier.” In Katholische Theologen Im 19 Jahrhundert, edited by 
Henrich Fries and Georg Schwaiger, 2:99–128. Munich: Kösel Verlag, 1975. 
———. Trinitarische Anthropologie Bei Franz Anton Staudenmaier. Freiburg: Verlag Karl 
Alber, 1962. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Kaplan, Grant. Answering the Enlightenment: The Catholic Recovery of Historical Revelation. 
New York: Herder & Herder, 2006. 
———. “Did Schelling Live on in Catholic Theology? An Examination of His Influence on 
Catholic Tübingen.” International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 80, no. 1–2 (2019): 
57–70. 
McConville, William E. Theology and Encyclopedia: A Study in the Thought of Franz Anton 
Staudenmaier. Vanderbilt University, 1983. 
Nichols, Aidan. “Catholic Theology of the Trinity in the Nineteenth Century.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of the Trinity, edited by Matthew Levering and Gilles Emery, 281–93. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Norgate, Jonathan. Isaak A. Dorner: The Triune God and the Gospel of Salvation. London; New 
York: T&T Clark, 2011. 
O’Meara, Thomas F. Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism: Schelling and the 
Theologians. 1st edition. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. 
O’Regan, Cyril. The Heterodox Hegel. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 
Pinkard, Terry. German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism. First Thus edition. 




Powell, Samuel M. “Nineteenth-Century Protestant Doctrines of the Trinity.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of the Trinity, edited by Matthew Levering and Gilles Emery, 267–80. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Reith, Karl Friedrich. Die Gotteslehre bei Franz Anton Staudenmaier. Bern: Peter Lang 
International Academic Publishers, 1974. 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. The Christian Faith. Edited by H. R. MacKintosh and J. S. Stewart. 
First Paperback Edition. London: T&T Clark, 1999. 
Schlitt, Dale M. German Idealism’s Trinitarian Legacy. Albany: SUNY Press, 2016. 
Staudenmaier, Franz Anton. Darstellung und Kritik des Hegelschen Systems. Aus dem 
Standpunkte der christlichen Philosophie. Mainz: Kupferberg, 1844. 
———. Die christliche Dogmatik. 4 vols. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1844. 
———. Die Philosophie des Christenthums oder Metaphysik der heiligen Schrift als Lehre von 
den göttlichen Ideen und ihrer Entwicklung in Natur, Geist und Geschichte. Vol. Erster 
Band: Lehre von der Idee. Gießen: Ferber, 1840. 
Stepelevich, Lawrence S. “From Tübingen to Rome: The First Catholic Response to Hegel.” 
Heythrop Journal 32, no. 4 (October 1991): 477–92. 
Weindel, Philipp. Das Verhältnis von Glauben und Wissen in der Theologie Franz Anton 
Staudenmaiers: eine Auseinandersetzung katholischer Theologie mit Hegelschem 
Idealismus. Mosella-Verlag, 1934. 
———. “Fr. H. Jacobis Einwirkung Auf Die Glaubenwissenschaft Der Katholischen Tübinger 
Schule.” In Aus Theologie Und Philosophie: Festschrift Für Fritz Tillmann Zu Seinem 75. 
Geburtstag, edited by Theodor Steinbüchel and Theodor Müncker, 573–96. Düsseldorf: 
Patmos-Verlag, 1950. 
Welch, Claude. God and Incarnation in Mid-Nineteenth Century German Theology. Oxford 
University Press, 1965. 
Welte, Bernhard. “Beobachtungen zum Systemgedanken in der Tübinger Katholischen Schule.” 
Theologische Quartalschrift: ThQ 147 (1967): 40–59. 
Williams, Robert R. Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition. Revised ed. edition. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998. 
———. “I. A. Dorner: The Ethical Immutability of God.” Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion 54, no. 4 (1986): 721–38. 
———. Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other. Albany: SUNY Press, 1992. 
———. Schleiermacher the Theologian: The Construction of the Doctrine of God. First Edition. 




Wood, Allen W. “Deduction of the Summons and the Existence of Other Rational Beings.” In 
Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right: A Critical Guide, edited by Gabriel Gottlieb, 72–91. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 
———. “Fichtean Themes in Hegel’s Dialectic of Recognition.” In The Free Development of 
Each: Studies on Freedom, Right, and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy, 214–28. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
———. “The ‘I’ as Principle of Practical Philosophy.” In The Reception of Kant’s Critical 
Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, edited by Sally Sedgwick, 93–108. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
